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Abstract
Dette projekt har sit udgangspunkt den naturaliserede metafysik, som den er
kommet til udtryk i en nyere tendens i analytisk metafysik. Denne tradition
tager sin begyndelse med Everything must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (2007)
af James Ladyman og Don Ross, og dette projekt har et særligt fokus på Alyssa
Neys nyere artikel ”Neo-Positivist Metaphysics” (2012). Projektets overordnede
konklusion er, at naturaliseret metafysik er et fejlslagent forsøg på at besvare,
hvordan metafysik er muligt. Mere præcist etablerer projektet, at ethvert svar
på dette spørgsmål skal instruere, hvordan det kan lykkes at lave en påstand om
den kantianske ting i sig selv, da dette er den eneste forståelse af ’virkelighed’,
der er robust nok til at rumme en ambitiøs metafysik. Dernæst bliver det de-
monstreret hvordan naturaliseret metafysik overordnet er et forsøg på at besvare
dette spørgsmål, og slutteligt argumenteres der for, at naturaliseret metafysik
ikke angiver sådan en instruktion. Problemet består i Carnaps udfordring til
metafysikken. Carnap observerer, at intet kan påstås uden for en sproglig ramme
[lingusitic framework], og dette medfører, at metafysik nødvendigvis kommer
til at udtrykke noget om valget af sproglig ramme snarere end om tingen i sig
selv. Det er Neys og de øvrige naturalisters påstand, at metafysik er mulig som
en naturaliseret metafysik, der viser en passende ærbødighed for videnskabens
opdagelser. Projektet argumenterer for, at dette krav til ikke kan løse Carnaps
udfordring. Udfordringen er lige signifikant for naturaliseret og ikke-naturaliseret
metafysik, så længe det kræves af begge, at de er succesfulde, når de påstår noget
om tingen i sig selv.
Projektet konkluderer, at så længe Carnap’s udfordring ikke er tilbagevist, forbli-
ver naturaliseret metafysik lige så umuligt som den metafysik, naturalisterne har
til hensigt at erstatte.
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Abstract
This project investigates naturalized metaphysics as a recent trend in analytic
metaphysics originating in the naturalist attitude of James Ladyman and Don
Ross in their seminal work Everything must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (2007).
The primary focus, however, will be the more recent article “Neo-Positivist
Metaphysics” (2012) by Alyssa Ney that originates in this tradition. The project
will conclude that naturalized metaphysics is an unsuccessful attempt at an
answer to the question ’how is metaphysics possible’. More precisely, the project
will establish that any answer to this question must instruct how to succeed at
attempts at assertions about the Kantian thing in itself. This requirement is
the result of an argument that no other conception of ’reality’ is robust enough
to accommodate an ambitious metaphysics. Subsequently, it will be argued
that naturalized metaphysics is conceived by its proponents as an attempt at
such an answer, but that naturalized metaphysics does not provide the required
instruction. This problem occurs because of Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics.
Carnap observes that no assertion can be made outside a linguistic framework
which has the consequence that metaphysical assertions must be about the
conceptual conventions of the linguistic framework rather than the thing in
itself. It is the view of Ney and the other proponents of naturalized metaphysics
that metaphysics is possible as a naturalized metaphysics; a metaphysics that
appropriately defers or yields to the findings of science. The project argues that
this requirement does nothing to ensure that Carnap’s challenge is avoided. The
challenge is equally significant to naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics, so
long as both require that successful attempts at metaphysics must be assertions
about the thing in itself.
The project concludes that until or unless Carnap’s challenge is refuted, natural-
ized metaphysics remain impossible, just like the metaphysics it is supposed to
replace.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is not coincidental that the title of the present project is similar the title of the late
Jonathan Lowe’s book, The Possibility of Metaphysics (1998). In this work, Lowe defends
the possibility of metaphysics by readdressing Immanuel Kant’s famous question, ’how is
metaphysics possible?’ (Lowe 1998, 1). While Kant and Lowe have different conceptions
of what serves as an appropriate answer to the question – Kant ultimately requiring a
demonstration that there are a priori synthetic truths – their motivation for addressing the
question is very similar. Kant found metaphysics to be under attack by the empiricism that
culminated with David Hume and his famous dictum:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for
instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity
or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter
of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain
nothing but sophistry and illusion (Hume 1748/2011, 706).
According to Hume, metaphysics has no relevant content and by raising the question of how
metaphysics is possible, Kant acknowledges that this attack on metaphysics is so significant
that it must be satisfactorily addressed before work in metaphysics can continue. Lowe
finds a similar motivation for readdressing the question. He writes: “the question is quite as
pressing for us as it was for Kant. Metaphysics is under assault from many sides, both from
within the ranks of philosophers and from various external forces” (Lowe 1998, 1). There are
challenges to metaphysics that Lowe regards to be so significant that the question of how
metaphysics is possible must be answered anew.
By titling the present project “The Possibility of Naturalized Metaphysics”, one would from
analogue assume that the purpose of this project is to ask how naturalized metaphysics
is possible, supposedly due to some significant challenges facing naturalized metaphysics.
There are some merits to this picture. However, there are also important non-structural
similarities between the present project and Lowe’s question of how metaphysics is possible.
In this project, I develop the view that naturalized metaphysics is regarded by its proponents
as the answer to the same question asked by Lowe. Consequently, by asking about the
possibility of naturalized metaphysics, I seek to question whether naturalized metaphysics
1
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answers how metaphysics is possible. This will be the main project undertaken below, and it
will be concluded that naturalized metaphysics in a particular sense does not answer this
question. With respect to a particular challenge, naturalized metaphysics is no more possible
than the suspicious metaphysics that initially made us ask how metaphysics is possible.
1.1 How is metaphysics possible?
In some sense, metaphysics is both the problem and the solution to the question ’how is
metaphysics possible?’ On the one hand, it is a suspicion towards metaphysics that provokes
the question. There would be no reason to ask how metaphysics is possible if we did not
suspect that metaphysics might be impossible. On the other hand, we want metaphysics
as the answer. It candidates as a tautology to say ’if metaphysics is possible, then it is
possible as metaphysics’. We will not find ’as a particular sort of square dancing’ to be an
acceptable answer to how metaphysics is possible because this is not metaphysics. We want
an answer to ’how is metaphysics possible’ to be ’as metaphysics’. Any answer incompatible
with this would seem misguided. It is in this sense that metaphysics is both the solution
and the problem. Obviously, no paradox occurs if the same metaphysics simply is both
the problem and the answer in the sense that an appropriate answer to how metaphysics is
possible involves a defence of the problematic metaphysics, i.e. to show how the metaphysics
under suspicion is not problematic after all. This, however, is not the approach adopted by
Kant. He regarded Hume’s challenge to metaphysics to be significant in such a way that
much of metaphysics simply had to be abandoned. Metaphysics, according to Kant, is only
possible if it is concerned with something other than the thing in itself. Kant’s answer to
how metaphysics is possible introduces a revision of metaphysics. I will follow Kant and
allow revisions such that the metaphysics of the answer in general is not identical to the
metaphysics that is under suspicion. This in turn requires that the question is treated
carefully so that the paradox does not emerge.
Allowing for revisions makes it easy to answer how metaphysics is possible. Within reasonable
limits, no matter how we conceive of metaphysics and its problems, any challenge to this
metaphysics is avoided if metaphysics is a particular sort of square dancing. So, we might as
above propose this to be an answer to how metaphysics is possible. Again, this answer will
not satisfy us; allowing revisions is not the same as recognizing anything as an acceptable
solution. Square dancing does not qualify as an answer to how metaphysics is possible.
I suggest that this is because square dancing does not have an appropriate relation to the
metaphysics initially under suspicion; square dancing is not a candidate as answer to ’how
is metaphysics possible’ because of the origin of the question. We are provoked to ask
how metaphysics is possible because we have been presented with a number of attempts
at metaphysics which we suspect are unsuccessful. Supposedly, we are made aware of a
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challenge facing such attempts, such that attempts at metaphysics are faced with problem
apparently rendering the attempts unsuccessful. Now, when we ask how metaphysics is
possible, we want to know how such attempts at metaphysics can be made successfully.
To even ask the question we must already know what we require of metaphysics. When
asking how metaphysics is possible, one must already be aware what necessary and sufficient
conditions something must obey in order to be metaphysics. We ask how metaphysics is
possible, and this must imply that a conception of metaphysics must already be in place.
We identify that which is under suspicion as attempts at metaphysics and this is why we
specifically ask how metaphysics is possible and not how, for instance, square dancing is
possible. The sort of thing under suspicion is not square dancing but metaphysics; if we were
suspicious towards square dancing we would rather ask how square dancing is possible. We
can only be suspicious towords metaphysics or squaredancing and thereby be provoked to
ask the question how, respectively, metaphysics and square dancing is possible if we already
know what we want from metaphysics and square dancing.
When Kant asked how metaphysics is possible, he already knew what he wanted from
metaphysics – synthetic, a priori truths. The problem was that Hume’s challenge suggested
that most attempts at such truths were unsuccessful. What he did was to argue that such
truths were possible as truths about the experience and understanding of rational beings.
Answering how metaphysics is possible, Kant instructs anyone attempting to do metaphysics
that the attempt will only be successful if the metaphysics is about the experience and
understanding of rational beings rather than about the thing in itself. Kant is not trying to
make sense of the metaphysics under suspicion or to show how this is not problematic after
all. In this way his answer is a revision. However, for his revision to be regarded as an answer
to how metaphysics is possible, Kant’s answer must instruct how to succeed where previous
metaphysics supposedly failed due to Hume’s challenge. The answer must be metaphysics.
These remarks on Kant clarifies the question ’how is metaphysics possible?’ as I will
understand it subsequently. The question is posed because of the suspicion that attempts at
metaphysics are generally unsuccessful. This suspicion arises due to some challenge facing
these attempts. As argued, this already presupposes that it has been settled what the
metaphysicists attempt to do, i.e. what necessary and sufficient conditions that must be
adhered to for something to be successful metaphysics. Now, the answer to how metaphysics
is possible should serve to instruct the metaphysicists how to succeed in their attempts. This
instruction might prove that some of the metaphysics under suspicion is indeed successful;
however, it is in general not a requirement that any of this metaphysics proves to be successful.
It is only required that the answer to how metaphysics is possible is metaphysics, i.e. that
the answer adheres to the conditions for something being metaphysics. Thus, asking how
metaphysics is possible is not a question of whether previous attempts at metaphysics are
successful, but how future attempts can be successful, that is, how to adhere to the settled
upon necessary conditions. It is in this that we allow revisions as answers to how metaphysics
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is possible; answers propose a way forward for metaphysics that in general will not preserve
the metaphysics under suspicion.1 However, an answer cannot revise what metaphysics is.
This is settled by those necessary and sufficient conditions that must be in place already when
the question ’how is metaphysics possible?’ is asked. Any acceptable answer must adhere to
these conditions and in this sense an answer is merely instructive. We ask how metaphysics is
possible, not because we are in doubt what to require of metaphysics, but because we suspect
that many attempts to meet the conditions for metaphysics are unsuccessful. Therefore, it is
that we want an instructive answer. Such an instruction will facilitate successful attempts at
metaphysics. To accommodate the intuition behind the tautological answer ’as metaphysics’
as the answer to the question ’how is metaphysics possible’, the project will take a strict
view of these instructive answers by requiring that any successful attempt at metaphysics
follows the instruction, i.e. no successful attempt at metaphysics is in conflict with the
instruction. For instance, if the instruction takes the form of a principle, then we will require
that no successful metaphysical assertion contradict the principle. This ensures adherence to
the tautological answer ’as metaphysics’ to how metaphysics is possible. An answer to how
metaphysics is possible merely helps us identify successful attempts at metaphysics, it does
not alter what to regard as successful and thereby what to count as metaphysics.
Evidently what counts as instructive and, thereby, what counts as an answer to how
metaphysics is possible is dependent on what counts as successful attempts at metaphysics.
Consequently, an answer to how metaphysics is possible is only determined up to the necessary
and sufficient conditions for something to be successful attempts at metaphysics. Even one
affirming the possibility of metaphysics and one denying it can prove to agree over everything
except these conditions. This emphasizes why these necessary and sufficient conditions must
be settled in preliminary clarifications before it can even be considered whether naturalized
metaphysics is an answer to how metaphysics is possible. That is, before it can be considered
whether naturalized metaphysics presents an instruction that must be followed to succeed in
attempts at metaphysics. The question simply has no determinate answer until these prior
conditions are explicated. This also suggests an important point regarding the conclusion of
the present project. Any conclusion about whether or not naturalized metaphysics answers
how metaphysics is possible must be conditional on the necessary conditions for successful
attempts at metaphysics that will be proposed below.
Following the above analysis, these conditions must stand in an appropriate relation to the
metaphysics under suspicion such that it is the settled upon conditions that a metaphysicist
attempts to obey. The conditions must mirror criteria for successful attempts at metaphysics.
Consequently, the conditions are closely related to the metaphysics under suspicion. This
1Obviously, there will remain a residual question regarding how to explain away the discussions taking
place in the metaphysics of our suspicion that are not part of the revised metaphysics. What is going on in
these discussions if they cannot be a metaphysical debate.
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suggests that a certain degree of circularity is unavoidable in the present project. On the one
hand, the project starts with attempts at metaphysics that is suspected to be unsuccessful.
To answer how and whether such a metaphysics is possible, it must be determined what this
metaphysics attempts to achieve. On the other hand, the project starts from naturalized
metaphysics as a proposed answer to how metaphysics is possible. These two must co-vary.
To evaluate whether naturalized metaphysics is an answer to how metaphysics is possible,
necessary and sufficient conditions for successful attempts at metaphysics must already
be in place. However, it would be uncharitable to evaluate naturalized metaphysics as
un-instructive, and therefore, not an answer based on conditions that are not necessary
conditions from the point of view of naturalized metaphysics. One is a prerequisite to
establish the other and vice versa. This circularity does not affect the argument of the
project, but it does have the consequence that the clarifying work below miraculously settle
on the right conditions based on the metaphysics of our suspicion such that the proponents
of naturalized metaphysics attempt to answer how such metaphysics is possible.
This, however, once again brings up the so far unaddressed question, ’What is naturalized
metaphysics?’. The content of naturalized metaphysics will be an extensive subject in the next
chapter, but some preliminary indications are instructive here with regards to which literature
in the philosophical tradition is considered to be concerned with naturalized metaphysics.
The following can therefore be viewed as an extensional explication of naturalized metaphysics
that will precede the later detailed intensional explication.
1.2 The recent history of ’Naturalized metaphysics’
Naturalized metaphysics is central to the present project. This obviously follows when the
overall conclusion is that naturalized metaphysics is not an answer to how metaphysics is
possible. This conclusion is after all about naturalized metaphysics. The significance of the
conclusion is also dependent on naturalized metaphysics. This is already suggested, when it
is argued that it would be uncharitable to evaluate naturalized metaphysics as un-instructive
with respects to a particular conception of metaphysics if naturalized metaphysics did not
share this conception. Not only would it be uncharitable, but once this divergence was
uncovered, it would prove the conclusion of the present project to be insignificant. Along
similar lines, the conclusion will bear no significance if it is not the intention that naturalized
metaphysics should be a solution to the question of the possibility of metaphysics. To
conclude in this case that naturalized metaphysics does not answer this question would
be to argue against a straw man. This suggests two important tasks when it relation to
naturalized metaphysics: First, that naturalized metaphysics attempts to be an answer to
how metaphysics is possible. Second, that naturalized metaphysics shares the requirements
imposed here to be considered an adequate answer to this question.
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Here, we will consider an implicit preliminary to both of these conditions on the significance
of the present project, namely that there are proponents of naturalized metaphysics. I will
argue that there are such proponents. I will advance the view that naturalized metaphysics in
a recent trend in analytic metaphysics from the last ten years. When I argue that naturalized
metaphysics is not an answer to how metaphysics is possible, this is a direct attack on this
new trend in analytic metaphysics. Below I will indicate which recent works in metaphysics
I take to be part of naturalized metaphysics and therefore vulnerable to the conclusions of
the present project. This will also indicate what parts of metaphysics are not considered to
be naturalized metaphysics from the perspective of the present project.
Compared to the term ’naturalized epistemology’, the term ’naturalized metaphysics’ is in fact
quite uncommon. This emphasizes the relevance of explicating what works in recent analytical
metaphysics that I take to be naturalized metaphysics. The term ’naturalized metaphysics’
occurs in a discussion between Leemon Mchenry (1996, 1998) and Daniel Hutto (1998)
concerning Francis H. Bradley’s (1893) views on metaphysics. Also, ’naturalistic metaphysics’
is the name given by Randy Friedman (2011) for John Dewey’s view of metaphysics. Neither
Dewey nor Bradley are the primary proponents for the sort of naturalized metaphysics
considered in this project, though Dewey’s views of metaphysics might be seen as somewhat
related to the metaphysics in question through Willard V. O. Quine.
Alvin Goldman has a non-historical use of the term in his article “A Program for ’Naturalizing’
Metaphysics, Application to the Ontology of Events” (2007). The naturalization proposed
here has much in common with the guiding thought in Quine’s famous article “Epistemology
Naturalized” (1969a) where Goldman proposes “to advance a certain program for doing
metaphysics, a program in which cognitive science would play an important role” (Goldman
2007). While metaphysics out of such a project certainly is entitled to the name ’naturalized
metaphysics’ due to its association with the Quinian project, this is not the sort of metaphysics
under consideration here either.
Instead ’naturalized metaphysics’, as we will understand it here, occurs frequently in
relation to the works by James Ladyman (2007; 2011a; 2011b; 2012) and Don Ross with a
first occurrence as the subtitle of their seminal book Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics
Naturalized (2007). The term occurs again in the title Jack Ritchie’s (2010) review of this
and three other books published in 2007: Alexander Bird’s Nature’s Metaphysics, Tim
Maudlin’s The Metaphysics within Physics, and Penelope Maddy’s Second Philosophy: A
Naturalistic Method. While Maddy’s book might be regarded as slightly off compared to
the others, all these works shares the characteristic views of naturalized metaphysics which,
as we will see later on, are the requirements that metaphysics should adequately defer or
yield to science. ’Naturalized metaphysics’ occurs again in the titles of two papers in the
anthology, Scientific Metaphysics (2013), edited by Ross, Ladyman and Harold Kincaid2.
2Kincaid also calls naturalized metaphysics by the name ’scientific naturalism’. This term has also been
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These are articles by Andrew Melnyk (2013) and Anjan Chakravartty (2013). The anthology
also include contributions from the editors and notable researchers such Mark Wilson (2013),
Paul Humphreys (2013), and Micheal Friedman (2013). I regard all of these to engage in
naturalized metaphysics and as part of what I describe as a trend in analytic metaphysics
that has received extensive treatment in the last ten years or so. Besides those already
mentioned, I include in this trend works by Sophie Allen (2012), Jonathan Knowles (2008),
Bradley Monton (2011), Laurie Paul (2012), Huw Price (2004; 2007; 2011), and Alexander
Rosenberg (2013).3 Interestingly, from a thematic point of view one might include Mario
Bunge’s “Is Scientific Metaphysics Possible” (1971) among the literature in naturalized
metaphysics, though it appears to be unrecognized by the aforementioned authors and
therefore not an inspiration for recent interest in naturalized metaphysics. Finally, it is
worth emphasizing Alyssa Ney (2012) who will be the main exemplar of a proponent of the
naturalized metaphysics that proves to be unsuccessful in answering how metaphysics is
possible.
There is another so far unmentioned direct occurrence of ’naturalized metaphysics’ found
in the title of Simon Saunders’ “Naturalizing Metaphysics” (1998). This predates the
naturalized metaphysics discussed so far by almost ten years and would seem to cast in
doubt that naturalized metaphysics is a recent trend in analytic metaphysics. However,
even though Saunders article is concerned with both metaphysics and science, I do not
regard it as part of the naturalized metaphysics as I conceive of it in the present project,
but rather as belonging to a related field with which Saunders is most often associated—the
philosophy of physics. The distinction between the philosophy of physics and naturalized
metaphysics is not clear cut. Arguably, many of the previously mentioned books and articles
could be considered part of philosophy of physics, perhaps particularly the later chapter
in Every Thing Must Go. Further, many of the previously mentioned philosophers have
made significant contributions to the philosophy of physics, most notably perhaps Ladyman,
Maudlin, Monton, Ney, and Price. I regard the philosophy of physics to be less concerned with
metametaphysical issues in comparison to naturalized metaphysics and to be more concerned
with particular problems such as the following: the identity and individuality of quantum
particles, entanglement, the ontological status of field, symmetry groups etc.; the relation
between the metric and space-time; and simultaneity to mention some examples. This means
that philosophers within the philosophy of physics considerate of metametaphysics might be
counted as engaged in naturalized metaphysics. These include Stephen French (2006; 2011;
2014), Katherine Hawley (2006), Mateo Morganti (2013), and Saunders (1998; 2003; 2006).
Nevertheless, I regard it as worth keeping naturalized metaphysics and philosophy of physics
used in the title of a recent book (Lightman and Reidy 2014) about John Tyndall and his contemporaries.
These two occurrences of ’scientific naturalism’ are unrelated.
3Of course this list in not exhaustive, however, it includes many of the most important works both for and
against naturalized metaphysics.
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apart because I will argue that naturalized metaphysics attempts to answer how metaphysics
is possible; this is not a similar concern for those working in philosophy of physics. They
inherit their problems directly from physical theories and debate them without much thought
to the metametaphysical issues relating to their work. By more directly addressing the
metametaphysical issues relating to the possibility of metaphysics, naturalized metaphysics
is more vulnerable to the conclusion of the present project that naturalized metaphysics
does not answer this question. However, neither does the philosophy of physics insofar as it
shares its view on metaphysics with naturalized metaphysics.
Finally, let us briefly mention the occurrence of ’naturalizing metaphysics’ as the title
of the fifth chapter in Ritchie’s Understanding Naturalism (2008). Here Ritchie writes:
“Naturalism is synonymous with another ’–ism’ – physicalism” (Ritchie 2008, 110) and
continues: “According to physicalists, everything is or is in some appropriate way dependent
upon the physical” (Ritchie 2008, 110). Identifying naturalized metaphysics with this sort of
physicalism commits naturalized metaphysics to a reductionist thesis about the hierarchical
structure of reality. If naturalized metaphysics is physicalism, then naturalized metaphysics
has a much longer history than the proposed ten years. According to Daniel Stoljar (2015),
the term ’physicalism’ is originally introduced by Otto Neurath (1931) and Rudolf Carnap
(1932). However, whereas Neurath and Carnap associated physicalism with a linguistic
thesis, contemporary philosophers regard physicalism to share similarities with the much
older thesis of materialism such that they are often used interchangeably (Stoljar 2015).
Just like materialism is often summarized by the slogan “everything is material” so can
physicalism be summarized as “everything is physical”; again this implies the reductionist
thesis. Physicalism (or materialism) has had prominent proponents including David M.
Armstrong (1978), David Lewis (1983), David Papineau (1993), and John J. C. Smart (1963;
1978) all preceding the claimed rise of naturalized metaphysics.
There are two reasons why I regard physicalism and materialism to be distinct from natural-
ized metaphysics. First, both physicalism and materialism are most prominent within the
philosophy of mind (Stoljar 2015). The reductionist program is here specifically concerned
with the reduction of the mental to the physical or material. In comparison, naturalized
metaphysics concerns all of metaphysics and it not related to any specific issue. Second, the
reductionism of physicalism is itself a metaphysical doctrine within traditional metaphysics.
I will argue that proponents of naturalized metaphysics are suspicious of traditional meta-
physics and suggest naturalized metaphysics as an answer to how metaphysics is possible.
Physicalism is not an answer to how metaphysics is possible, physicalism is metaphysics.
Contrary to Ritchie’s claim, physicalism cannot be identified as the naturalism guiding
naturalized metaphysics.
Finally, I will mention the anthology, Metaphysics and Science (2013), edited by Stephen
Mumford and Matthew Tugby which has some superficial similarities to the works that I
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propose belong to naturalized metaphysics. The contributions to the anthology, however,
are largely concerned with traditional metaphysical issues and then problems originating in
the philosophy of physics rather than metametaphysics and the possibility of metaphysics.
1.3 Ambitions for the present project
In this project I will argue that those works that I have claimed belong to naturalized
metaphysics share the attitude that they take traditional metaphysics – particularly newer
analytic metaphysics – to be problematic. As a result, they ask how metaphysics is possible
and their answer is that metaphysics is possible only as naturalized metaphysics. However, as
proclaimed I reject this proposal by the proponents of naturalized metaphysics. I will argue
that naturalized metaphysics is no more possible than the metaphysics they are suspicious
of.
This argument will employ an asymmetry between a general affirmative and a general
negative answer to the question of whether metaphysics is possible. To answer in the
affirmative, it must in principle be shown how the answer avoids or address all challenges to
metaphysics. Depending on the exact conditions for metaphysics, these challenges might be
numerous. In contrast, to answer in the negative, one has to demonstrate that there is a
single challenge to metaphysics that is insurmountable for all conjectured answers to how
metaphysics is possible. Both projects are immense. They each involve going through all
possible challenges – to answer in the affirmative – or answers – to answer in the negative
– unless a general proof can be made. This marks the ambition for constructive programs
such as Lowe’s or Kant’s involved with defending an affirmative (or negative) answer to the
possibility of metaphysics. In comparison, the present project is more modest due to its
destructive character. I do not have the ambition to show how metaphysics is possible by
advancing instructions as to how to overcome all the challenges facing metaphysics. Nor do
I aim to demonstrate how a particular challenge to metaphysics is insurmountable for any
proposed answer to the question ’how is metaphysics possible?’. The present project is merely
concerned with the rejection of naturalized metaphysics as an answer to how metaphysics is
possible, and thereby, the present project can be viewed as a small part of an argument for
the impossibility of metaphysics.
More precisely, the present project aims to demonstrate how naturalized metaphysics is just
as vulnerable to one of the challenges it intends to accommodate as the metaphysics it was
supposed to replace. Consequently, metaphysics and naturalized metaphysics are equally
possible in the light of this challenge. There is no ambition that this project should prove
that both metaphysics and naturalized metaphysics are impossible due to this challenge;
as proposed it would be an immense task to find conclusive arguments for such a thesis.
More modestly, the present project serves to demonstrate how metaphysics and naturalized
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metaphysics stand and fall together when it comes to this challenge. However, this is an
important conclusion. It will be argued that naturalized metaphysics is not only a descriptive
term, but that it also contains a normative aspect due to the conjecture that it is an answer
to how metaphysics is possible as opposed to the metaphysics it is supposed to replace.
Naturalized metaphysics is conjectured by its proponents to be better than this metaphysics.
By demonstrating that naturalized metaphysics is just as problematic as this metaphysics,
the normative aspect of the term must vanish—at least with respect to the challenge to
which they are both equally vulnerable. In terms of the question of how metaphysics is
possible, naturalized metaphysics might be better off than traditional metaphysics when it
comes to a range of challenges facing traditional metaphysics. This will not be addressed
in the present project. Rather, I will conclude that there is an unresolved challenge to
metaphysics for which neither naturalized metaphysics nor traditional metaphysics seems
to have any answer. With respect to this challenge neither naturalized nor non-naturalized
metaphysics appears to be possible. Thus, this is not a defence of traditional metaphysics
against naturalized metaphysics. Rather, both must hold their breath and await a solution
to this challenge; such a solution is not found in naturalized metaphysics. In summary, I will
argue that until this challenge is refuted, naturalized metaphysics is no more possible than
non-naturalized metaphysics. Refuting this challenge would open the question anew. But
until or unless the challenge is refuted, I will conclude that naturalized metaphysics is not
an answer to how metaphysics is possible. The significance of the present project is that it,
at least for now, refutes the belief held among proponents that metaphysics is possible as
naturalized metaphysics.
Presented as such, this project evidently must involve a significant amount of clarifying work
before the conclusion can be established. Three entangled topics occur in this clarification:
Metaphysics, naturalized metaphysics, and their relation to the already explicated question
’how is metaphysics possible’. The first part of the project will therefore be devoted to an
(inevitably incomplete) explication of what metaphysics is; more precisely it will propose a
necessary condition for something to be metaphysics. It will also consist of an investigation
into the details and content of naturalized metaphysics along with an examination of the
relation between naturalized metaphysics and the question ’how is metaphysics possible’.
Only after this extensive preliminary investigation will the systematic part of the project
be carried out. I will present the challenge posed to metaphysics by Carnap in his article
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (1956) as the challenge that metaphysics and
naturalized metaphysics are equally vulnerable to. The challenge is specifically addressed by
Alyssa Ney in her article “Neo-positivist metaphysics” (2012), and I therefore take an outset
in this article to establish my conclusion. I will first argue that Ney’s proposed solution is
a prototype of naturalized metaphysics, and then demonstrate how Ney, contrary to her
own view, does not avoid the challenge posed by Carnap. Finally, I will generalize the
problems faced by Ney to show how any variant of naturalized metaphysics must face the
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same problems with respect to this challenge.
Chapter 2
Metaphysics and naturalism
This chapter will take on the first part of the above mentioned clarifying work. The
clarifying work will revolve around this question ’how is metaphysics possible’, addressing
what is asked about and how to answer along with the particular task of establishing why
naturalized metaphysics is even a candidate answer, which obviously involves an explication
of what naturalized metaphysics is in this context. However, initially the matters regarding
naturalized metaphysics will be set aside until the question ’how is metaphysics possible’
has been appropriately clarified and along with it ’metaphysics’.
2.1 What is metaphysics?
The necessary conditions for something to be a successful attempt at metaphysics will be
the topic discussed below. The task undertaken will in fact be more modest, in that I will
merely establish a single necessary condition that is shared by the proponents of naturalized
metaphysics, but which we will later show cannot be obeyed by naturalized metaphysics.
For convenience we will call the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful attempts
at metaphysics ’conditions for metaphysics’ below.
2.1.1 A terminological remark
Before we undertake the investigation, it is worth making some terminological remarks. First,
it is worth noticing that the term ’metaphysics’ shares an ambiguity with the term ’science’.
’The ambiguity concerns their respective reference, as Bas van Fraassen (2002) notes:
The word ‘science’ displays a typical ambiguity between activity and product.
We say that science tells us that smoking is unhealthy: this refers to the product—
findings, well-confirmed theories accepted in the scientific community. We also
say that science investigates such structures as links between smoking and health
or between background radiation and the history of the universe. Here we refer
to the activity in which scientists are engaged (van Fraassen 2002, 155).
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The same is the case for metaphysics. ’Metaphysics’ refers to both the activity conducted by
the metaphysicist and the product of this activity. In van Fraassens account of the ambiguity
regarding ’science’ is not settled. He seems consent to the presence of the ambiguity, and
merely notifies the reader that he will primarily focus on the activity (van Fraassen 2002,
156). I will similarly consent to the ambiguity of the referent of ’metaphysics’, however,
contrary to van Fraasen, our focus will primarily be the product of metaphysics.
On a related note, there are those who does metaphysics and brings metaphysics about.
Those I will call ’metaphysicists’ throughout. This is less common compared to the often
used ’metaphysicians’, however, I find the former name to be better suited to those engaged
in metaphysics which after all shares similarities with science rather than medicine.
2.1.2 Is there metaphysics?
Generally, such conditions for metaphysics are by no means evident. Merely surveying
the titles, works of metaphysics include Aristotle’s posthumously titled work Metaphysics
(ca. 350 b.c.), Leibniz’ Discours de métaphysique (1686), Kant’s Prolegomena zu einer
jeden künftigen Metaphysik (1783), and Heidegger’s Einführung in die Metaphysik (1935).
Inferring any unifying conditions from these four works seems difficult, without even taking
into account the considerable parts of the philosophical tradition that have been categorized
as works of metaphysics (see Peter van Inwagen and Sullivan Meghan (2015)).
As it was proposed, the referent of ’metaphysics’ is ambiguously an activity or a product.
This will also manifest itself in the conditions that might be suggested as conditions for
metaphysics. As an example, Cartesians might propose that metaphysics is something that
engages in a particular rationalistic activity to bring about an assertion. This explication
actually concerns both product and method. However, proposing that the product is an
assertion does not do much to single out what metaphysics is. Indeed, I will regard it to be
uncontroversial that the products of metaphysics are assertions; an expression that is true
or false. Rather, this Cartesian proposal is an attempt to unify and single out metaphysics
based on its activity. Alternatively, one could consider the view of Platonists, who might
argue that the unifying and singular feature of metaphysics lies in the content of the product,
which she might propose to be eternally true proposition. This Platonist explication of
metaphysics sets no boundaries to the activity, but only requires that the product of the
activity has this particular feature.
This preliminary exploration already suggests that it is not an easy task to find any unifying
conditions for metaphysics. This problem is still manifest even if we consider only more
contemporary metaphysics, where attempts to characterize the activity of metaphysics by an
appropriate method are strongly debated. Notable among these methodological discussions
are the recent anthology Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? edited
by Matthew Haug (2014b). But also Braddon-Mitchell and Nola (2009), Corradini, Galvan
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and Lowe (2006) Lowe (1998), and Maddy (2007), include extensive and diverse discussions
about the appropriate method for metaphysics. Further, looking at the products similar
disagreement can be found in the literature on metaphysics. While the products are taken
to be assertions, it has particularly been debated what these assertions are about. The topic
is most notably discussed in the anthology Metametaphysics (2009), edited by Chalmers,
Manley and Wasserman, which in particular investigates the problems faced by non-deflated
metaphysics. Also the recent interest in neo-Aristotelian metaphysics (see for instance Tahko
(2012)) has a focus on what metaphysical assertions should be about. Nevertheless, in the
“Metaphysics” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Peter van Inwagen and
Sullivan Meghan (2015) do suggest that if anything unifying and singular can be explicated
about metaphysics, that explication must attend to the content of metaphysical theories
and assertions. However, investigating the different aspects of contemporary metaphysics
they conclude that it may be that nothing unites these aspects, and speculate whether
“contemporary metaphysics just [is] a compendium of philosophical problems that cannot be
assigned to epistemology or logic or ethics or aesthetics or to any of the parts of philosophy
that have relatively clear definitions” (van Inwagen and Meghan 2015).
This conclusion at least finds some support in the vast literature available in the field of
metametaphysics.1 If the discussion in a field is dominated by meta-discussions regarding
the appropriate content and methodology of that field, then it seems fitting to proclaim
that that particular field is, currently, no field at all. However, taking a look at analytical
metaphysics from the last sixty years or so, there seems to be an overwhelming number
of books and articles that shares an agreement about the content of their discussion and
instead debate substantive positions. While these discussions are exactly those that are under
suspicion in most metametaphysics for being unsuccessful and problematic, metaphysicists in
contemporary analytic metaphysics can nevertheless be said to agree over what they attempt
to discuss. This is enough for our purposes as the interest here is the conditions of successful
metaphysics.
Without an appropriate explication of ’metaphysics’, one might worry that the term ’con-
temporary analytical metaphysics’ is equally problematic, but I shall define this term
extensionally as that which is discussed in for instance Metaphysics: An Anthology (2011)
edited by Kim, Korman, and Sosa. Though not all articles in this anthology exhibit a
metaphilosophical consensus, most of the entries engage in genuine discussions both which
each other and with positions that are only mentioned. The topics considered include for
instance ontology with questions regarding the existence of abstract entities, possible worlds,
natural kinds, among others; and questions about identity, persistence through space and
time, modality, causation, objecthood and properties. As a particular example consider the
1Metametaphysics is here used following Tahko (2015) as a term for the field standing in the same relation
to metaphysics as metaethics stand to ethics.
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discussion regarding mereological sums. The problem is easy to state: Is there a heap, if
there are particles or hay arranged heapwise? This is immediately an ontological question,
but also a structural question regarding the relation between the heap and its constituents.
Further, answers might depend on whether the object and the constituent are, respectively,
observable or unobservable.
As I will argue later, it is exactly the metaphysics of this tradition that advocates of
naturalized metaphysics are suspicious of, and the attempts at metaphysics made in this
tradition that are proposed to be possible only if they are naturalized. Thus, the apparently
arbitrary choice to investigate what is attempted by metaphysicists in contemporary analytic
metaphysics manifests the slight circularity of this preliminary clarifying work.
2.1.3 Ambitious metaphysics
Lowe is among the most prominent figures in this tradition, and he suggests that metaphysics
is attempting a “systematic study of the most fundamental structure of reality” (Lowe
1998, 2). Similar proposals are found in this tradition for instance in Peter van Inwagen’s
(2015) book Metaphysics, where he cites an explication of metaphysics from his time as an
undergraduate. He writes: “metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality. This still seems to
me to be the best definition of metaphysics I have seen” (van Inwagen 2015, 1–2). Both Lowe
and van Inwagen thus emphasize that the interest of metaphysics is reality, and though Lowe
emphasizes that metaphysics is about the fundamental structure of this reality, whereas
van Inwagen simply suggests that metaphysics is about ultimate reality unqualified, there is
no reason to believe that Lowe disregards the ontology of fundamental reality (Lowe 1998,
210–227). In the introduction to his entry on metaphysics in the Blackwell Companion to
Philosophy Simon Blackburn (2002) also provides an explication of metaphysics. He writes:
“Metaphysics is the exploration of the most general features of the world”(Blackburn 2002, 61,
emphasis in original). If world here is taken to mean the same as Lowe’s and van Inwagen’s
reality, Blackburn’s explication is again very similar. As a synthesis, these three explications
suggest that attempts at metaphysics are successful if they produce assertions about the
general features of ultimate reality.
This explication accords very well with the discussion regarding the existence of a heap when
there is hay arranged heapwise. It seems reasonable to propose that what is attempted here
is to uncover whether reality in general is such that the mereological sum exists if a certain
arrangement of its constituents obtains. In general, the proposal is that metaphysicists
attempt to establish such assertions about ultimate reality. This sounds promising: It has the
right sort of gut-feeling to it. It suggests that all these metaphysical disputes are attempts
to settle what ultimate reality is, whether ultimate reality has abstract entities or possible
worlds, and what sort of natural kinds there are in ultimate reality, if there are any.
Chapter 2. Metaphysics and naturalism 16
Obviously, this suggestion is only as good as our understanding of the terms ’reality’ and
’ultimate’. van Inwagen is well aware of this and remarks that both need further qualification
in order for the explication to be of any use. To get a grasp of ’reality’, van Inwagen suggests
some paradigmatic assertions, which should qualify our understanding. According to van
Inwagen, one of them, “the earth is really rotating, despite the fact that it is apparently
stationary” (van Inwagen 2015, 3, emphasis in original) suggests that ’really’ and ’apparently’
are closely related to each other, and he speculates that neither has meaning in isolation
from the other.2 ’Really’ and ’apparently’ are derived from ’reality’ and ’appearance’ which
shares a similar relation; “We talk about reality only when there is misleading appearance to
be ’got behind’ or ’seen through’” (van Inwagen 2015, 3, emphasis in original). However,
this reality might itself be an appearance, he writes: “what we find behind appearance is
often something called ’reality’ only in relation to that appearance” (van Inwagen 2015,
3). As an example van Inwagen reports how popular science books in the 1920s and 1930s
recounted the new discovery from particle physics that what appear to be solid objects
in reality are mostly empty space. This story, however, was told just as physicist were
making the discoveries in quantum field theory on virtual particles that revealed empty space
to be filled with particles being created and then quickly annihilated again. van Inwagen
summarizes: “no sooner had people begun to digest the idea that what are normally called
solid objects contain a lot of what is normally called empty space than it was discovered
that what is normally called empty space is actually very densely populated” (van Inwagen
2015, 3). Behind an appearance we find something that we can call reality in relation to this
appearance, however, this reality might itself be an appearance in relation to another reality.
Based on this van Inwagen speculates: “Could it be that the reality behind every appearance
is itself only a further appearance? If the answer is No, then there is a reality that is not also
an appearance. This final or ’ultimate’ reality is the subject-matter of metaphysics” (van
Inwagen 2015, 3). Following this suggestion by van Inwagen, when we ask whether there is a
heap, if there is hay or particles arranged heapwise, what we are asking is whether we will
find such heaps in the ultimate reality that is not itself an appearance when there is hay or
particles arranged heapwise.
Even with this explication, it is still not quite clear what it means to meet the proposed
necessary condition that attempts at metaphysics are successful only if they produce assertions
about this ultimate reality. Part of the problem might be that van Inwagen conflates several
ways that the terms ’appearance’, ’appear’, ’real’, and ’really’ are used in ordinary discourse.
Before I turn to these issues, however, let me consider the most obvious candidate for van
Inwagen’s ultimate reality; the Kantian thing in itself. Kant distinguished between the thing
in itself and the world of phenomena or appearances. The world of phenomena is the world
of our experiences. It is the world as it appears to us. Beyond this world of phenomena we
2This is not a novel idea and can for instance be found in Francis H. Bradley’s Apperance and Reality
from 1893.
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find the thing in itself; the mind-independent, objective world. It is hidden away from our
senses; it lies behind a veil of appearance; it is a world that transcends experience. The only
restriction that we impose on this reality is that the world of phenomena must arise out of
this reality. The whole world of phenomena – and consequently every appearance – is an
appearance of this underlying reality. Based on this distinction, we can interpret our question
about the heap as a question of how matters are in the thing in itself. Evidently, when
someone experience something that they call a heap, they always find that is are something
that is arranged heapwise. However, with the present interpretation the metaphysical
question transcends such experiences and the way we talk about them. Rather, the question
concerns whether it is really true that that there is a heap, when there are particles or hay
arranged heapwise in the thing in itself beyond all appearances. According to this view,
it is a necessary condition for something to be a successful attempts at metaphysics that
the result are assertions about the general and fundamental entities and structures of this
mind-independent, objective, experience-transcending reality behind all appearances of the
world of phenomena. Such a metaphysics is what Stathis Psillos calls “the metaphysics of
things-in-themselves” (Psillos 2011, 304), and this associated condition for metaphysics will
be referred to as the ambitious condition for metaphysics.
2.1.4 The quest for a modest metaphysics
One might question whether we have to invoke this ambitious condition for metaphysics
when metaphysics is explicated as concerned with the general features of ultimate reality.
Perhaps there is a modest conception of reality available that does not appeal to a thing in
itself. This would perhaps allow for more modest conditions for metaphysics, which would
in turn be easier to meet and therefore less prone to be problematic. Below I will investigate
the option that there is an ultimate reality that metaphysical assertions might be about
that is not the thing in itself. The investigation will fall in three parts, the first part will
develop a coherent modest conception of reality without the appeal to the thing in itself
and the next part will then investigate whether this modest reality can be the reality that
contemporary analytic metaphysicists attempts to assert something about. That part will
conclude that this reality cannot accommodate such metaphysical discussion and the third
part will then investigate whether it is possible to build a more extensive modest reality.
The idea is to follow van Inwagen’s suggestion that reality is something that is found behind
appearances or when appearances are seen through and his conception of ultimate reality as
a reality that is not itself an appearance. ’Ultimate reality’ is introduced by van Inwagen
just subsequent to his example of how tables appear to be solid, while physics tells us that
they are really mostly empty space. While this example might be helpful, van Inwagen does
not provide any detailed account of this example and whether it might serve to establish a
more modest notion of ultimate reality. Instead, such work has recently been carried out by
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Nicholas Rescher in his book Reality and it Appearances (2010). Rescher wants to defend the
view that “the idea of reality pivots on the contrast between what actually is so and what is
merely— and perhaps mistakenly— thought to be so. But this is certainly not an ontological
distinction; on its basis there is no distinct realm of ’authentically real things’ hidden behind
a ’veil of appearance.’” (Rescher 2010, 4). It is thus an attempt to establish a conception of
reality that can serve as the subject matter for what Psillos calls “the metaphysics of the
given” (Psillos 2011, 304). It proposes a conception of reality that would allow attempts at
metaphysics to remain at our side of the veil of appearance.
Rescher begins his account with some remarks about the different unhelpful ways in which
reality is contrasted with appearance. He writes:
Reality [. . . ] contrasts with such alternatives as:
fiction: contrived or imaginary accounts
fakery: imitations, spurious pretenses, illusions, “magic”/ slight of hand
delusion: mirages, “voices”
pretence: deceit, make-believe, seeming, merely apparent
ersatz: synthetic, substitute
simulacra: look-alikes (stuffed owls) (Rescher 2010, 4–5)
All of these are examples of a relation between appearance and reality. These are things or
events that attempts to appear or look like another thing or event. Rescher qualifies that
these are examples of how “[t]he characterization of something as real often serves simply
to distinguish what is actual and authentic from that which is merely purported to be so”
(Rescher 2010, 4). This, Rescher argues, does not lead us to a philosophically interesting
notion of reality. Ultimate reality based on this distinction would simply be a world shed
of magicians, stuffed animals, and fake leather. In Rescher’s words, this is a world without
that which is merely purported to be actual and authentic, and such a world is certainly a
real world in a valuable sense. It would be an essential part of the upbringing of any child to
teach them not to conflate these items from their real counterparts, but we can hardly regard
this as a lesson in metaphysics. These are items that try to appear to be something other
than what they really are. However, according to Rescher, we want our notion of reality to
include everything, both that which purports to be something else, and the genuine things
themselves.
Rather, to quote Rescher’s positive proposal:
In distinguishing reality from mere appearance, what is fundamentally at
issue is [. . . ] an epistemological distinction between a correct and an incorrect
view of things. Properly understood, the operative contrast is thus [. . . ] between
reality (veridical and authentic phenomena included) and what is misleading or
incorrect. For reality can make its appearance in different guises— sometimes
correctly and sometimes not. Appearance is not something different in kind and
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nature from reality, it is how reality presents itself. And reality is not by nature
something different from appearance: it sometimes— and one would hope often—
actuality is what it appears to be (Rescher 2010, 6).
Rescher gives the example of a clock that might be deceptive in this epistemological manner.
He writes: “Our clock looses five minutes a day. Nevertheless on two occasions of the day it
will be right on time. But if this circumstance somehow blinds us to this clock’s flaws, we will
be much deceived” (Rescher 2010, 6). This example is very similar to van Inwagen’s example
of the earth only being apparently stationary while really rotating. It is “circumstances that
blinds us” to reality. If we were living on the moon, it would have been quite evident that
the earth is rotating. We would not even form the belief that it is stationary in the first
place. In both examples reality under certain circumstances manifests3 itself in a deceiving
way, a way that make us jump to the wrong conclusion. Luckily more thorough investigation
discloses these conclusions as mere appearances and reveal reality. Returning to the fiction,
fakery, delusion, pretence, ersatz, and simulacra from above, getting behind the misleading
appearances is exactly what we must be able to do to uncover for instance a fakery; not as a
fakery of something else, but rather as what it really is as opposed to what it appears to be.
Think of your simpleton friend who during a magician’s show whispers: “Look, the marble
came out of his ear”. In response you might reply: “The marble only appeared to come out of
his ear, it was really in his hand all along.” Supposedly, with this you state that it is false the
marble came out of his ear and true that it was in his hand all along. You might as well have
replied: “No, it did not come out of his ear, it was in his hand all along.” You have looked
more thoroughly, and this allows you to reveal the trick. The former formulation merely
serves to recognize that the appearances were deceptive. Again in the words of Rescher,
the guise in which reality made its appearance was misleading. The difference between the
appearance of the magician’s trick and the apparent stationary earth merely seems to be
that the former case has somebody in a privileged epistemic position, the magician, that
allows knowledge of the deception. Even with the entire world convinced, the magician can
finally reveal the trick; reality was different from how it appeared. We might give the similar
metaphorical suggestion that the stationary earth is just a trick played by the big magician,
who has the privileged epistemic point of view. Even when the entire world is convinced
by the trick it remains a trick, because reality is not like that; the earth rotates, it is not
stationary. In both circumstances reality merely manifests itself in a deceptive way such that
we jump to an incorrect conclusion. Under the right circumstances reality will appear just as
it is. The difference seems to be that the magician consciously manipulates the appearances
of reality in such a way that they will appear deceptive, whereas it is coincidental that the
earth appears stationary.
3’Manifest’ in this context must not be viewed as related to Wilfred Sellars’ ’manifest image’, though the
latter also relates to discussions about different conceptions of reality.
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In these stipulations we must tread carefully. A reality as that which gives rise to appearances
sounds like the unwanted reality that lies behind the veil of appearances according with
the proposal of an ambitious metaphysicist. This is the sort of reality that was to be
avoided by a modest notion of reality: It could not appeal to the thing in itself. Rescher
continuously emphasizes that the reality of his concern is not the experience-transcendent,
mind-independent reality of Kant. Rescher writes:
Reality is not a distinct realm of being standing apart and separate from the
manifold of what we know in the realm of appearance. Those “appearances” will—
insofar as correct— be appearances of reality that represent features thereof.
And, accordingly, the contrast between Reality and Appearance is not one carried
out in the ontological order of different sorts of things. The realm of appearance
is homogeneous with that of reality insofar as those appearances are correct
(Rescher 2010, 15).
Reality and appearances are the same sort of thing, they are not distinct ontological realms.
To Rescher “the crux is not the contrast between what is and what is thought to be, but rather
between what is thought correctly and what is thought incorrectly and imperfectly” (Rescher
2010, 5). To the best of our knowledge it is reality that the earth is rotating and appearance
that it is stationary. These are the same thing; they belong to the same ontological real.
The difference is that the former is correct and the latter is incorrect. Rescher provides a
further qualification by noting how the difference between mere appearance and reality is
manifest in assertions. He writes:
That claim one makes is not a claim about appearance but a claim about
reality. After all, the claim ’it appears to me that the cat is on the mat’ is
something quite different from— and far weaker than— the flat-out assertion
that the cat is on the mat. For while factual claims may manifest how things
appear to us, but they are claims about reality and not just claims about
appearance (Rescher 2010, 12).
What Rescher seems to suggest here is that these factual claims are formed by appearances,
but that they are not claims about appearances. They are claims about reality. This is only
changed by the introduction of the careful qualification that there appears to be a cat on
the mat. This careful qualification serves to convey that we are uncertain whether reality
is as asserted. The assertion is “weaker”, as Rescher puts it, than the assertion that the
cat is on the mat. But in what sense is it weaker? Rescher explicitly proposes that the
“flat-out assertion” is about reality, and one might speculate whether the former assertion
is then about appearances. This would establish a distinction between appearances as the
way reality manifest itself to us and reality as the origin of appearances. This interpretation
finds some support in Rescher, as he writes for instance: “Why are the appearances as is?
Simply because that’s how reality has matters work out. We explain the appearances in
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terms of reality. If reality were (sufficiently) different, then appearances would not be as
they are” (Rescher 2010, 14). This suggests a picture where beliefs are formed based on
appearances, but in such a way that the formed beliefs are about reality and not appearances,
unless it is explicitly stated. This, however, seems to withdraw the homogeneity between
appearances and reality and reintroduce the veil of appearances in front of reality. Reality
becomes the mind-independent world that transcends experience. This is the reality that our
assertions are about, but not the reality that forms these assertion, since this reality only
manifests itself through appearances. Again this seems to be the conception of reality that
Rescher wants to avoid. He writes: “There is no insuperable gap between the real and the
knowable, no Kantian Ding an sich, everlastingly hidden away behind an impenetrable veil
between appearance and reality” (Rescher 2010, 16). This is in tone with the previous quoted
proclamation that there is no distinction between the realm of reality and appearances.
Consequently, it looks as if there is a tension in Rescher’s conception of reality. On the one
hand, reality is the same as appearances or at least in the same ontological realm, while on
the other hand appearances are explained by reality. This tension is manifest in Rescher’s
previously quoted remark that “’appearances’ will— insofar as correct— be appearances of
reality that represent features thereof” (Rescher 2010, 15). Immediately, this again suggests
that reality is behind the appearances and the origin of appearances, however, following this
remark Rescher writes: “accordingly, the contrast between Reality and Appearance is not
one carried out in the ontological order of different sorts of things” (Rescher 2010, 15). It
must remain speculation, how the latter follows from the former. Particularly it is a mystery
what the incorrect appearances are, if they are not representations of reality, but maybe this
should be taken as an indication that the verb ’represent’ misleads us. Representation is
found between for instance designator and designated which most certainly belong to different
ontological realms. I think the only way for Rescher to avoid the Kantian thing in itself is to
abandon the conception of reality as something that is represented, unless representation
and represented can be one and the same. As soon as the appearances are placed in front
of reality, the veil of appearances follows. Thus, the appearances must be reality. Rescher
seems to consent to this when he writes: “Appearance [. . . ] can/will encompass that sector
of reality which presents itself to us as it indeed is— albeit only in point since reals will, and
invariably must, have features that experience does not make manifest” (Rescher 2010, 11).
Every appearance is a part of reality as required. When Rescher proposes that appearances
“represent” reality, this is in the same way as the near side of the moon represents the
whole moon. The near side of the moon is part of the moon, but there is more to the
moon. According to this reading of Rescher, appearances stand in such a relation to reality.
However, Rescher clearly states that it is only the correct appearances that represent features
of reality and that these appearances will only “encompass” a sector of reality. Parts of
reality are identical to parts of the appearances, the subset of appearances that are correct
appearances. However, what are then the incorrect appearances and the parts of reality
that are not in this encompassed sector? What are these if not distinct ontological realms?
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Rescher is particularly insistent on the unavailability of parts of reality. There are parts of
reality that cannot be an appearance because the “reals” will “have features that experience
does not make manifest”. Rescher qualifies this remark: “The nature of things reaches
beyond experience because the things that experience leads us to accept as real are invariably
seen as having features that experience does not reveal” (Rescher 2010, 10–11). How can
features of reality that are “beyond experience” avoid the status as a transcendent reality,
as features that cannot belong anywhere but in the thing in itself? And how can incorrect
appearances be part of reality if they do not represent reality or alternatively, if they are not
part of reality, how can they be in the same ontological realm as reality?
Both questions suggest that Rescher once again brings himself on shaky grounds. If we
consider van Inwagen’s example with the stationary earth, the first question is what the
stationary earth is if not reality? Certainly, the earth is not stationary. We have throughout
recognized that the earth only appears to be stationary, but that it is really rotating. It is
incorrect to believe that the earth is stationary. The appearance of the stationary earth is
just the rotating earth. It is a very essential aspect of changing ones belief that the new
belief can make sense of all the appearances. In this way, the appearance of a star might be
the international space station, because revelations from further investigations render the
belief that it is a star incorrect and rather suggest the belief that it is the international space
station. The appearance of a star is simply a particular manifestation of the international
space station. When we alter our belief that the earth is stationary and believe instead that
the earth is rotating, we change our belief about the reality that includes all appearances.
Now, Rescher’s other remark suggests that there must be more to the rotating earth than
what can appear. This is not a claim about the past. Rescher does not argue that the rotating
earth also includes potential appearances that have not yet manifested themselves to anyone,
rather, reals are “having features that experience does not reveal”. His motivation for the
introduction of this experience-transcending aspect to reality is apparently to accommodate
what he calls “the salient idea of realism [...] that the existence and nature of the world are
matters distinct from anyone’s thinking about it” (Rescher 2010, 10). Once again this seems
to threaten his insistence that the appearances and reality belong to the same ontological
realm.
This “salient idea of realism” is easily accommodated by a robust conception of reality as
the thing in itself, and Rescher’s move to suggest that reality is more than what experience
can reveal seems to introduce a substance or essence to reality that is not found in any of its
appearances. They are found in a distinct ontological realm, perhaps the thing in itself. The
only way to avoid this conclusion is to emphasize that it is us who conceive of reality and in
such a way that the “real [things] are invariably seen as having features that experience does
not reveal” (Rescher 2010, 10–11, my emphasis). These features that reality does not reveal
is our invariable abstraction. There is always more to reality than its appearances, however,
this does not require that there are features of reality that are beyond experience as such.
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We just expect there to be more reality no matter the degree to which we have investigated.
Further investigation will always reveal new appearances and thereby more reality. These
further appearances might be consistent with our beliefs about reality and this is supposedly
what we mean when we say that it is correct that the earth is rotating. There is more to
the rotating earth than our previous experiences with it, but when we say that the earth is
rotating this is not supposed to be correct of the earth as it is beyond all experiences. It is
merely supposed to be consistent with all the earth’s possible appearances; possibilities that
we, supposedly. invariably regard as never exhausted. When we say that the earth is rotating
we are asserting something about all actual and possible appearances. This accommodates
the salient idea of realism in so far as our change of belief regarding the earth’s rotation
is not induced by a change in reality. Reality was such all along because reality is both
the actual and the possible appearances. What this modest conception of reality cannot
allow is a conception of reality as something out there transcending our possible experience:
this would be a reality like the thing in itself. In comparison, modest reality can merely
be the reality of that which is believed correctly. It is the reality of all actual and possible
appearances; even the misleading appearances are aspects of this reality though we might
form incorrect beliefs about reality from them.
In summary, when Rescher proposes that correct appearances represent reality, this is perhaps
in contrast to the incorrect appearances, which are misleading. All appearances are reality,
but some of the appearances mislead us into forming incorrect beliefs about reality, that is,
about the appearances themselves. In this sense, it is incorrect to say that such a reality
manifests itself. Reality is the manifestations, however, these can be misleading, something
that more thorough investigation will uncover. The difference between the assertion ’The cat
is on the mat’ and the assertion ’The cat appears to be on the mat’ is not due to them being
about reality and appearances, respectively. In order for this modest conception of reality to
be coherent, they must assert the same and ’appears’ can merely serve to emphasize how
certain we are that the assertion is correct. They are both about reality and both about
appearances because these are the same, they are not ontologically distinct.
This raises the question of how we can possibly be wrong about reality. How is it possible to
form incorrect beliefs about reality if reality is the appearances based on which a belief is
formed? If we merely assert how things appear to us, then we cannot possibly we wrong.
Again it is fruitful to return to van Inwagen’s example of the earth. It is incorrect to believe
that the earth is stationary also under circumstances in which it appears to be stationary.
With an ambitious conception of reality, it is easy to explain why this incorrect. It is
simply because the earth is really rotating and not stationary out there in the thing in
itself beyond the veil of appearance. Proponents of the modest conception of reality must
provide another explanation, and the sketch of this emerges when it is recognized that it is
further investigation which reveals that the earth is really rotating. The appearances that are
revealed by these further investigations are incompatible with a stationary earth, while they
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are accommodated by a rotating earth. One might worry that this implies that the earth
went from stationary to rotating once these further investigations were conducted: this of
course would be worrisome. However, this problem dissipates once we recognize that it is not
our beliefs that constitute reality. It is the appearances. We come to alter our belief because
a new explanation is provided that can make sense of all the appearances, both the old and
the new. Reality turns out to be different from how we believed it to be. Our previous
belief was founded on misleading appearances in the sense that the available appearances
underdetermined the belief that the earth is stationary and the belief that the earth is
rotating. Our beliefs must be evaluated with respect to all actual and possible appearances.
This is what our beliefs can be correct about and consequently, this is reality. This nicely
eliminates the subjective aspect, which is threatening if reality is constituted by our respective
beliefs. In so far as we believe other people’s reports, their reports have to fit into our beliefs
about reality. Particularly, we have good reason to believe reports from carefully conducted,
reproducible experiments and consequently these must be accommodated by our beliefs
about reality. These are exemplars of our most thorough investigation. This in turn ensures
that even this modest reality at least acquires intersubjective validity.
This reality is not the Kantian thing in itself. It is the reality of actual and possible
appearances that is continuously uncovered by ever more thorough investigation. Every
appearance is a part of this reality and consequently, every appearance must be accounted
for by our beliefs about reality. This reality could as well be called ’ultimate reality’. It is the
reality we ultimately come to believe in when we have conducted our investigation thoroughly
enough. This belief has reality right and will remain unaltered even when we attempt to look
more thoroughly. In this sense it is the reality behind all the appearances even though it is
also just these appearances. It is the reality we come to believe in when we have replaced
all the beliefs that we formed from misleading appearances. When we say that the earth
appears stationary, but that it is really rotating, Rescher continuously emphasizes, correctly
I think, that we are not asserting how matters are in the appearances as compared to how
they really are in the thing in itself. Rather, we simply say that we are incorrect to believe
that the earth is stationary and correct to believe that the earth is rotating. We are correct
to believe this because more thorough investigation reveal that a rotating earth is consistent
with all appearances. The problem for Rescher is that he cannot regard this as an inference
from appearances to the reality of things, if the latter is a different ontological realm. Rather,
he must regard the appearances as the reality and therefore, an adequate paraphrase of ’the
earth appears stationary, but is really rotating’ is perhaps: ’circumstances mislead us to
form the belief that the earth is rotating, but more thorough investigation revealed that it is
stationary’. This seems to better capture what Rescher has called the crux of his distinction
between ’appearance’ and ’reality’, namely, what is thought correctly and what is thought
incorrectly, rather than the distinction between what there really is in contrast to what
we think there is (Rescher 2010, 5). Indeed, avoiding terms related to ’appearance’ and
’reality’ averts the confusion of the two conceptions of reality. As argued, this confusion easily
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arises, and even Rescher seems to shift from the distinction between misleading appearances
and straightforward appearances into the more philosophically familiar distinction between
appearances in a world of phenomena and reality as the thing in itself. I suspect this is a
general tendency; our daily discourse rarely and unproblematically speaks of anything else
than modest reality, but our philosophical discussions have such a character that they easily
invoke a notion of reality that is at least very difficult to accommodate as a modest reality,
and which is very similar to the thing in itself.
Importantly, this modest conception of reality does not imply that there is a tension between
science and everyday experience. Indeed, it is well known how Quine (1969b) among others
has argued that scientific investigations are continuous with those of our everyday life.
Rescher seems to agree with this point when he writes: “science and common life [. . . ]
neither deal with different realms of being, nor yet is one of them reality-oriented and the
other mere illusion. In ordinary life and science we emphatically do not address different
realities or different modes of being” (Rescher 2010, 86). Supposedly, science is exactly the
sort of closer investigation that helps us form the correct and avoid the incorrect beliefs.
Science is the most rigorous and detailed example of investigation that reveals appearances
and consequently, it is largely science that fuels the continued revelation of novel appearances,
i.e. it is that which uncovers new features of reality. Viewed in this way there cannot be a
conflict between the reality of everyday life and science because the appearances of everyday
life and science belong to the same reality. There can be a conflict between science and the
beliefs formed from everyday appearances, since these appearances might be misleading in
such a way that we form an incorrect conclusion.
In summary, this reading of Rescher proposes a modest conception of reality that will be
called ’empirical reality’. It is the reality of actual and possible appearances whose aspects
are particularly exposed by our state of the art scientific experiments. It is supposedly the
reality that we speak of when we say ’the cat is on the mat’. Saying this, we assert that more
thorough investigation – moving closer, walking around the mat – will continue to reveal
that the cat is indeed on the mat. I consider empirical reality to be a perfectly coherent
conception of reality, but the question of interest here is whether it can accommodate a
metaphysics, such that one might propose that the discussions taking place in contemporary
analytic metaphysics are attempts at asserting something about this empirical reality.
2.1.5 Can empirical reality accommodate metaphysics?
With the proposed conception of a modest reality as empirical reality, the question is whether
this reality can accommodate metaphysics. Is it sensible to propose that contemporary
analytic metaphysicists attempts to make assertions about this reality? Can there be a
metaphysics of the actual and possible appearances? A metaphysics of the given.
Rescher is optimistic that his conception of reality will accommodate a range of straight-
Chapter 2. Metaphysics and naturalism 26
forwardly existing entities. These are “things in space and time in the manner of trees,
dogs, and automobiles” (Rescher 2010, 8). It is not clear what sort of work space and time
does here. Perhaps the reference to space and time is a reminiscence of a Kantian idealism,
manifested in the presupposition that all appearances must be in space and time, or it might
just serve to facilitate our recognition of the sort of entities whose existence is unproblematic
according to Rescher.
Conceiving of reality as empirical reality, there is certainly a sense in which the existence of
trees, dogs, and automobiles is straightforward, at least if sentences such as ’There is an x’
can serve as a proxy for whether x is actually existing. In so far as unqualified assertions
in general are about empirical reality as already argued, then it is very difficult to provide
an interpretation of ’There is an x’ that does not imply the existence of x and thereby
commit us to include x in our ontology. We must not, however, be misled by the terminology
here. Returning to the heap example, when we say ’There is a heap’, this is a claim about
empirical reality in the sense that such claims commit us to the expectation that further
investigations will be consistent with this claim. When it is correct to say ’There is a heap’,
this means that we will continue to retain this belief even when more thorough investigation
is undertaken. If we were unsure about whether this would be the case, it would be more
appropriate to say ’There appears to be a heap’. As Rescher has emphasized, these are not
statements about different ontological realms. Their difference is merely epistemological.
Consequently, to say that the heap actually exists in such a reality, is to say that all actual
and possible appearances support it such that we would evaluate the claim ’There is a heap’
as correct about these appearances. The heap is not an illusion. We are not misled by
circumstances to believe that there is a heap. The heap is really there, it actually exists
as opposed to apparently exists. Again this cannot be an ontological difference, instead it
must be an epistemological difference. The entities whose existence is straightforward are
the entities found in assertions of the type ’There is an x’, whose correctness withstands
further investigation of the entity. This is what differentiates that which actually exists from
only apparently existing entities. They are apparently existing in the sense that further
investigation will expose that it is incorrect to believe in the existence of these entities. This
is not meant in the sense that they exist in the appearances but not in reality. Appearances
are reality; it is just that certain aspects of an entity can make us infer an incorrect conclusion
due to underdetermination of reality by the available appearances even though these are
themselves part of reality. Consequently, the ontology of straightforwardly existing entities
is the ontology of thorough investigation. This is the most there can be to the ontology of
modest reality.
I doubt that it is the straightforwardly existing entities that are the interest of contemporary
analytical metaphysics. Indeed, the mode of questioning found in this tradition implies that
they exactly want to move beyond this first order ontology. Let us consider a friend who says
’There is a heap’ while pointing at something heap-like. This assertion is about empirical
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reality if we understand the claim to be that closer investigation will also confirm that there
is a heap. Now, we indeed find that more thorough investigation, for instance walking around
the heap, reveals that she seems to be correct; there is a heap. Moving closer to the heap we
notice that it is made of hay: this raises our suspicion. Returning to our friend we ask her:
’Are you saying that there really is a heap or just that there is hay arranged heapwise?’ Our
friend will probably be baﬄed by the question. There is certainly a very straightforward way
in which the heap is constituted by the hay. Without the hay this particular heap would not
be there. This can all be revealed by close investigation. Removing the hay one straw at a
time until all of it is gone will make the heap disappear. Indeed, there are good reasons to
suspect that this is a general feature of heaps made of hay. Removing the hay will remove
the heap. As a metaphysically inclined interrogator we will agree to all of this. Indeed, this
is the origin of the problem. We might even argue that it is exactly because heaps of hay
disappear if the hay is removed that one could suspect that the heap is not really there and
that it instead is only hay arranged heapwise. Our friend will maybe reply something like, ’I
would say that there is a heap’. This, however, will not satisfy a metaphysical interrogator.
The metaphysical question ’Is there really a heap when there is hay arranged heapwise?’ is
not a question about the way we speak. Lowe very directly address the proposal that such
questions might be concerned only with our manners of speaking when he emphasises that
he has very little regard for a conception of metaphysics as “our currently accepted ways
of talking about what we unreflectively take to be certain general features of the world we
live in” (Lowe 1998, 2). He writes: “let us not pretend that in doing so we would be doing
anything worth dignifying by the name ’metaphysics’” (Lowe 1998, 2). Instead, van Inwagen,
Blackburn, and Lowe propose that such questions are about the general features of ultimate
reality. Is ultimate reality such that there generally is a heap under such circumstances
where hay is arranged heapwise?
If ultimate reality is empirical reality, then the interrogator supposedly asks whether closer
investigation will indeed continue to find a heap there or whether it is the circumstances that
mislead us to form the belief that there is a heap, and that closer investigation will reveal
reality to be otherwise analogous to the earth appearing to be stationary while really rotating.
In the latter case, deceiving appearances due to certain circumstances made us jump to the
conclusion that the earth is stationary even though the appearances and therefore reality
were underdetermined with respect to whether the earth is stationary or rotating. When we
find that there is a heap, is it similarly because hay appears in a deceiving way such that
we jump to the conclusion that there is a heap? Certainly, it is underdetermined when we
look at the heap at a distance whether there is a heap or whether there is just hay arranged
heapwise. However, even closer inspection does not decide between these two alternatives.
In fact, it will be very surprising if any sort of closer investigation of the heap will reveal
whether there really is a heap or just hay arranged heapwise.
The same problem seems to arise when it comes to other questions found in contemporary
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analytic metaphysics. It is difficult to see how discussions about abstract entities, for instance
numbers, can be regarded as attempts to discuss whether closer investigation of them will
reveal them to exist or not. This is not to say that closer investigation cannot reveal whether
there are 8 planets orbiting the sun. Closer investigation might reveal appearances that are
inconsistent with the belief that there are 8 planets orbiting the sun. The existence of the
abstract entities, numbers, is another matter. There are no possible appearances of these. No
closer investigation of any phenomena will reveal whether it is correct to believe that there
are numbers, at least straightforwardly. Indeed, in empirical reality where entities are their
appearances, entities that are unobservable are very difficult to conceive of; this must be the
case for all unobservables presumably including the so called theoretical entities of science.
Any discussion about the existence of such entities is not only unresolvable in empirical
reality. If reality is all actual and possible appearances then it is difficult to conceive how
one might even make sense of the question of whether abstract or unobservable entities exist.
The question is not only underdetermined, it is meaningless.
In general, there seems to be no way in which one can make sense of such questions as
questions about empirical reality. When we ask whether there really is a heap or just hay
arranged heapwise the question is asked in another mode than when we ask whether the
earth is stationary or rotating. The latter is a question about what will prove to be the
case when we investigate the matter closer and under different circumstances. The former
appears to be an attempt at a question that transcends empirical reality. Where ’really’ in
’It is really rotating’ serves to emphasize that ’It is rotating’ is correct even though it might
appear to be otherwise, ’really’ in ’Is there really a heap?’ signifies another mode of speech.
The question is not similar to ’Is there really a cat on the mat?’ when such a question is
asked in everyday discourse. Whether there really is a cat on the mat is perfectly sensible as
a question about empirical reality. Will further investigation reveal that there is a cat on the
mat, or will it reveal that it was only something that looked like a cat? On the other hand,
the metaphysicists are not asking whether it is a heap or only something that looks like a
heap, at least not in any ordinary sense. The alternative – that it is hay arranged heapwise –
is not something that can or is expected to be revealed by more thorough investigation. The
use of ’really’ in metaphysical discussions serves to change what reality the question is asked
about, away from empirical reality.
2.1.6 A modest realist’s reality
Consequently, to avoid that the reality of metaphysical discussions should be the world in
itself and thereby to avoid ambitious conditions for metaphysics, an alternative and richer
conception of modest reality must be developed. Again we can follow Rescher’s proposal for
such a conception of reality.
Rescher is optimistic that his modest conception of reality can be expanded with a quite
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rich ontology. He writes:
So— what is it to be real, actually to exist? In addressing this question it
seems sensible to begin with the straightforward existence of things in space and
time in the manner of trees, dogs, and automobiles. And we then thus proceed
reiteratively somewhat as follows, specifying that something exists if
1. it exists unproblematically in the just-specified manner of playing an active
causal role in this real world of ours in which our life and our experience unfolds,
or else
2. if it is something whose actual existence must be invoked in providing a
satisfactory explanatory account of the features of something that exists. (And
here it does not matter if the explanatory account at issue is efficiently causal,
or functionally finalistic, or conceptually explicative.) (Rescher 2010, 8).
Following this scheme, our ontology consists of two types of entities. First, there are those
entities whose existence is inferred from their active causal role in our life world. According
to Rescher, it is in this sense that that trees, dogs, automobiles, and supposedly also heaps
are straightforwardly existing. The ontology can then be expanded iteratively with a second
category of entities that gives a satisfactorily explanatory account for entities that are already
part of our ontology. Supposedly, the second category might include unobservable entities
and even abstract entities as long as they are satisfactorily explanatory. Thus, our ontology
will consist of the straightforwardly existing entities, and then a hierarchy of inferred entities,
which are not themselves straightforwardly existing. This seems very similar to what Stathis
Psillos (2011) calls “the realist framework”. He writes:
The realist framework, as I would put the matter, is the framework that posits
entities as constituents of the commonsensical entities and relies on them and
their properties for the explanation and prediction of the laws and the properties
of commonsensical entities. Accordingly, the realist framework is an explanatory
framework, viz., a framework of explanatory posits (Psillos 2011, 303).
Though the details might be different, Rescher’s second category of entities is similar to
the entities of Psillos’ realist framework. Both posit entities if they play a satisfactorily
explanatory role in the explanation of what Psillos calls commonsensical entities, supposedly
the same entities as Rescher’s straightforwardly existing entities. The difference lies in what
they take to be satisfactorily explanatory. Here Rescher seems to be more open-minded than
Psillos’ realist, as Rescher writes in the quote above: “it does not matter if the explanatory
account at issue is efficiently causal, or functionally finalistic, or conceptually explicative”
(Rescher 2010, 8).
Psillos argues that the realists posit the new entities using a Quine-Putnam style indis-
pensability argument. In the case of Putnam and Quine, the argument is that we should
be ontologically committed to entities, in Putnam’s case mathematical objects, that are
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indispensable to our best sciences.4 The argument, as Psillos analyses it (Psillos 2011, 309),
takes the form of a universal modus ponens. The first premise is an implication that gives
the conditions that an entity must meet to be real or existing. The second premise asserts
that some entity or type of entity satisfies those conditions. From this it is concluded that
the entity or type of entity is real. Psillos suggests a variant of the argument for microscopic
constituents of macroscopic objects which he attributes to Herbert Feigl (1950) and which
involves no direct reference to our sciences. Psillos writes:
Positing microscopic constituents of gross objects is indispensable for having
a causally-nomologically coherent image of the world (viz., a simple and unified
system of causal laws).
To be an indispensable element of the causally-nomologically coherent image of
the world is to be real.
Therefore, the microscopic constituents of gross objects are real (Psillos 2011,
309).
In so far as the real objects are the entities that exist, this argument proposes a scheme
to infer what entities exist based on their indispensability in “the causally-nomologically
coherent image of the world”. This particular argument is designed to infer the existence
of microscopic constituents of gross objects, however, the second premise states that any
element that is causally-nomologically indispensable in a coherent image of the world is
real; the microscopic constituents are just examples of such entities. As suggested, Rescher
is more open-minded when it comes to which explanatory roles allow an inference to the
existence of an entity. Also, Rescher does not explicitly require that these entities are
indispensable in explanations, but just that they are satisfactorily explanatory in one of the
ways mentioned above. Indispensability is supposedly the strongest sense of satisfactory
and Rescher might indeed accept something less than indispensability. However, Rescher’s
overall argumentative scheme must be the same as in the indispensability argument. An
assumption is made regarding what conditions must be adhered to if an entity is to be real or
existing, and then the existence of entities is inferred from their adherence to those conditions.
Psillos’ formulation of the indispensability argument only differs from Rescher’s scheme by
being more conservative. It requires indispensability and only accepts causal-nomological
explanations, which must be similar to what Rescher calls efficiently causal explanations.
The duality between Rescher’s scheme and Psillos’ account of the indispensability argument
is interesting because Psillos worries what this argument can establish. Particularly, he
is interested in the content and support of the second premise, that indispensable entities
are real, he writes: “How and why is indispensability a criterion of reality?” (Psillos 2011,
309). Similarly, we can ask how and why “a satisfactory explanation of something existing”
is a criterion for reality or existence. If a satisfactory answer cannot be provided for the
4I will return to Quine’s variant of the argument in section 2.2.
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former question, and if this view can be seen as the more conservative, then we should
have good reasons to suspect that a satisfactory answer will be similarly unavailable for
Rescher’s scheme. The second premise in Psillos’ indispensability argument displays the
conviction that real or existing entities are all those that are indispensable in the relevant
sense. It is the crux of (scientific) realism; certain theoretical entities are real, exactly
because they meet this condition. Scientific realism is often supported by the well known ’no
miracles argument’ originally due to Putnam (and following him Boyd, and Psillos himself)
(Psillos 2011, 311). This argument infers realism as the best explanation for the success of
science. Psillos writes: “the overarching common thought was that realism (as a theory) gets
supported by the relevant evidence (the success of science) in the very same way in which
first-order scientific theories get supported by the relevant evidence” (Psillos 2011, 311).
Psillos, however, remarks that he has changed his opinion with regard to the no miracles
argument. He points out that the argument presupposes that the success of science can
be evidence that realism is a correct theory. Realism is indispensable for the explanation
of this success and therefore we should be committed to realism, Psillos writes: “For the
no-miracles argument to work at all it is presupposed that explanation – and in particular
explanation by postulation – matters and that scientific theories should be assessed and
evaluated on explanatory ground” (Psillos 2011, 312) and he concludes: “ [The no miracles
argument] presupposes rather than establishes the realist frame” (Psillos 2011, 312). For the
no miracles argument to work realism must be presupposed. Indeed, according to Psillos
realism must be in place before we can evaluate any theory by its indispensability. Therefore,
realism cannot be a theory and particularly we cannot regard it as a true theory about
reality; no argument can establish realism since the evaluation of realism in the no miracles
argument requires realism to be in place already. Instead, realism must be a framework,
and Psillos emphasize “that the realist framework is not forced on us either by a priori
reasoning or by any empirical facts” (Psillos 2011, 311). This implies that “[o]ne can, of
course, deny the framework and adopt a different one, viz., a fictionalist one” (Psillos 2011,
312), adopting a framework is a matter of choice that must be settled on pragmatic grounds.
Psillos emphasizes that relative to aims such as causally-nomologically coherence there is no
framework that rivals realism, however, realism remains a framework whose adoption is not
forced upon us. Realism is simply the best framework in which to achieve certain aims.
The choice of a framework settles what Psillos calls “the ontic question” about what sort of
entities are candidates for membership of our ontology. About the adoption of the realist
framework, he writes that: “there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist
framework. [. . . ] [O]ntic questions are framework-questions and are not dealt with in
the same way in which questions about the reality of ordinary entities (be they stones or
electrons) are dealt with – the ontic framework must already be in place before questions
about the reality of specific entities are raised” (Psillos 2011, 303). Once the ontic framework
is in place, i.e. once it is settled by a criterion of reality what possibly exists, then there
are substantial questions regarding what entities exist and such question must supposedly
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be settled empirically. But what ontic framework to prefer is a pragmatic question, and an
unforced choice. A change in framework will in general imply a change in ontology, since the
possible members of the ontology change with the framework due the change of the criterion
of reality. Ontology is not robust, it is conventional. There is no correct ontology prior to
the adoption of a framework.
Returning to Rescher, he attempts to build a reality with a richer ontology by an iterative
scheme that shares many similarities with an indispensability argument. Crucially, both his
scheme and the indispensability argument relies on a criterion of reality. It is this criterion
that is conventional, according to Psillos: the adoption of a particular criterion involves the
unforced adoption of a particular framework. One is free to adopt another framework which
would result in a different ontology. The ontology depends on what we consider to be real
and this is a convention; it cannot be a theory. Once again, this gives us a metaphysics or in
this case more precisely an ontology that is about our chosen ways of talking rather that
about general features of ultimate reality. As proclaimed by Lowe, investigations into “our
currently accepted ways of talking” (Lowe 1998, 2) is not something “worth dignifying by
the name ’metaphysics’” (Lowe 1998, 2).
There is an objection to Psillos’ account that could suggest a way out of this framework
relativism. When he states what aims make the realist framework preferable, he writes that:
the adoption of the scientific realist framework is based on the indispensability
of theoretical entities for the explanation of observable phenomena and for
achieving maximum causal and nomological coherence in our image of the world
[. . . ]. Relative to these aims, there is simply no framework that can do a better
job at achieving them than the realist one (Psillos 2011, 313).
It is more practical to assume the realist framework in “the explanation of observable
phenomena” and to make a causally-nomologically coherent image of the world. Interestingly,
“the world” and “the observable phenomena” are already there when Psillos adopts the
realist framework. When Psillos adopts the realist framework it has already been settled
that there are observable phenomena and a world (perhaps consisting of these observable
phenomena). This problem is already implicit in Psillos formulation of the realist framework
as a “framework that posits entities as constituents of the commonsensical entities” (Psillos
2011, 303). Again, the commonsensical entities are already there. These are what realism
makes sense of by positing constituents. These observable phenomena, this world, and these
commonsensical entities are real prior to the adoption of the realist framework. Perhaps this
reality can serve as a modest conception of reality.
It must remain speculation how Psillos conceives of this apparently framework-independent
reality, however, Psillos stipulations that it is the observable phenomena that are prior to
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the adoption of the realist framework seems to indicate that the obvious candidate for this
reality preceding the adoption of the realist framework is the developed empirical reality;
the reality of all actual and possible appearances. This is the reality that serves as evidence
once a framework is adopted, and which determines the ontology based on the operative
criterion of reality. The primitiveness of appearances is an idea that we find among British
empiricists such as Locke and Hume, and the same idea seems to be driving the different
variants of the verificationalist principle of meaning. However, nothing is achieved for the
modest conception of reality if empirical reality is reinstated as a privileged reality, i.e. as
something in place prior to the adoption of any framework. As I have argued, empirical
reality cannot accommodate any substantive metaphysics.
Instead, granting a privileged position to empirical reality merely serves to emphasize that
any framework-dependent ontology is merely a conceptual convention. Within this picture,
frameworks are simply different ways to say the same or to talk about the same thing. They
are different conceptual systems. Frameworks do not constitute reality, rather, they are
introduced to expand reality. Psillos attributes the following view to Herbert Feigl (1950):
“the adoption of the realist frame is, ultimately, a matter of convention: it is based on a
decision to expand the conceptual framework through which we theorise about the world”
(Psillos 2011, 308). This is very different from the adoption being a convention simpliciter.
Different frameworks are different ways to carry out this expansion, and which of them
to adopt is a convention. The expanded part of the ontology is conventional and added
to the ontology already in place when a framework is adopted. With this conception of
frameworks words such as ’real’ and ’existing’ must have two distinct meanings. One for those
commonsensical entities whose existence is presumed in the introduction of frameworks, and
then another for the framework-dependent meaning that should be used about the expanded
parts of the ontology. These two parts of ontology share nothing but these signifiers. If this
is indeed the correct conception of frameworks it would perhaps be instructive to propose
that frameworks introduce conceptual schemes, to reserve the term ’reality’ to the realm of
the commonsensical entities, and to restrict ’existing’ and ’real’ to refer to those entities.
This conceptual scheme is exactly an expansion of the conceptual framework and though
these different expansions will refer to entities, the ontological commitment to these entities
differs from the commitment that we should have to the commonsensical entities. In this
sense, the conceptual expansion cannot serve as an ontological expansion.
This poses a dilemma to those who might entertain the idea that the attempts at metaphysics
in contemporary analytic metaphysics might be attempts at assertions about a reality that is
not identified with the Kantian thing in itself. Both horns of this dilemma are unattractive.
In the first horn, one ends up in framework relativism with the consequence that metaphysics
depends on the unforced choice of framework. Any true assertions about the general features
of such a reality would mirror this choice of framework and not the way things really are.
Referring to a framework-independent way things could be would either appeal to the
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unavailable thing in itself or the second horn of the dilemma: Empirical reality. This is the
reality of all actual and possible appearances. It appears to be a coherent conception of
reality that does not introduce any veil of appearances between distinct ontological realms,
however, as argued this reality is not rich enough to accommodate the discussions found in
contemporary analytical metaphysics. When it is argued that metaphysicists’ attempts at
metaphysics are attempts at assertions about the general features of ultimate reality, then
this reality must be the Kantian thing in itself: there is no other reality available.
Rescher is probably right that in our everyday discourse ’There appears to be a cat on the
mat’ and ’There is a cat on the mat’ are not assertion about different ontological realm.
The same is the case when we say ’The earth appears to be stationary, but it is really
rotating’. The difference in both cases is epistemological. However, when we enter what
van Inwagen calls ’the ontology room’ we change the mode in which assertions are made.
When a nominalist asks ’Is there really a heap or are there just hay (particles) arranged
heapwise’, she knows very well that most people will say that there is a heap when there
are hay arranged heapwise. In this question ’really’ indicates that we have changed the
ontological realm of the discourse from the empirical reality to the world in itself. This is the
world that contemporary analytic metaphysics attempts to assert something about. It is a
necessary condition for metaphysics as we will understand it that its assertions are about the
thing in itself. This condition is adopted because there are no other conceptions of reality
available that are rich enough, and I will argue in section 2.3 that there are indications
that the proponents of naturalized metaphysics share this view of the aim of metaphysics.
There are probably more conditions that must be met for something to be an answer to
how metaphysics can be possible, however, as we will see it is this particular condition that
proves to be equally difficult to meet for metaphysics and naturalized metaphysics in the
light of Carnap’s challenge, and thereby showing that naturalized metaphysics is not an
answer to how metaphysics can be possible.
2.2 Naturalized metaphysics
The previous section explicates what naturalized metaphysics is an answer to, when it
is proposed that naturalized metaphysics answers how metaphysics is possible. As an
answer, naturalized metaphysics should at least instruct how to succeed at attempts to make
assertions about the thing in itself.
The present section will then seek to investigate this answer. The main task will therefore
be to settle what naturalized metaphysics is. With this explication, it will be clear what
instruction naturalized metaphysics suggests for the attempts to succeed at metaphysics
i.e. what instruction the present projects concludes is unhelpful with respect to Carnap’s
challenge for anyone attempting to assert something about the thing in itself.
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2.2.1 Naturalism
In the introduction to their anthology Naturalism in Question (2004), Mario De Caro and
David Macarthur declare that, “[a]n overwhelming majority of contemporary Anglo-American
philosophers claim to be ’naturalists’ or to be offering a ’naturalistic’ theory of key concepts
(say, knowledge) or domain (for example, ethical discourse)” (De Caro and Macarthur 2004,
2). This view is supported by Hilary Putnam (2004), who writes: “philosophers – perhaps
even the majority of all the philosophers writing about issues in metaphysics, epistemology,
philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language – announce in one or another conspicuous
place in their essays and books that they are ’naturalists’ that the view or account being
defended is a ’naturalist’ one” (Putnam 2004, 59). While it would be an immense task
to verify this claim, it can at least be confirmed from paper titles alone that almost any
part of philosophy has in recent years been subject to a naturalization: Phenomenology
(Pachoud 1999), intentionality (Millikan 2000), action (Nanay 2014), the mind (Dretske
1995), aesthetics (McMahon 2007), semantics (Loewer 1997), ethics (Slote 1992), meta-ethics
(Zimmerman 1980), reasons (Dennett 2013), skepticism (Higginbotham 1992), natural kinds
(Ali Khalidi 2013), and most notably perhaps epistemology (Quine 1969a) (for an overview
see for instance Kornblith (1994)). This should make it an easy task to investigate what
a naturalism is, and what a naturalization amounts to, however, Macarthur and De Caro
remarks in continuation of the above that “[n]aturalism has become a slogan in the name of
which the vast majority of analytic philosophy is pursued, and its pre-eminent status can
perhaps be appreciated in how little energy is spend in explicitly defining what is meant by
scientific naturalism” (De Caro and Macarthur 2004, 2). This indicates a tale of naturalism,
as a position that has been overwhelmed by its own success; this to a degree such that most
philosophers no longer address, and explicate the content of their naturalism. Polemically,
about these invocations of naturalism Putnam writes the following,
this announcement, in its placing and emphasis, resembles the placing of the
announcement in articles written in Stalin’s Soviet Union that the view was in
agreement with Comrade Stalin’s; as in the case of the latter announcement, it
is supposed to be clear that any view that is not ’naturalist’ (not in agreement
with Comrade Stalin’s) is anathema, and could not possible be correct. A further
very common feature is that, as a rule, ’naturalism’ is not defined (Putnam 2004,
59, emphasis in original).
This raises the suspicion that naturalism is perhaps nothing but a slogan. Perhaps there is
no singular position behind the name.
To some degree this suspicion appears to be entitled. In the entry “Naturalism” in The
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jan Jacobs writes: “’Naturalism’ is a term that is
applied to many doctrines and positions in philosophy, and in fact, just how it is to be
defined is itself a matter of philosophical debate” (Jacobs 2015). A similar remark is made
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by David Papineau in entry “Naturalism” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he writes:
“The term ’naturalism’ has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy” (Papineau
2015). This suspicion will indeed be confirmed below, a range of attitudes can all rightfully
claim to be naturalistic. Thus, it will be the task below to settle which of these attitudes
that are shared between the works claimed to belong to naturalized metaphysics.
2.2.2 Non-supernaturalism
A very often-cited explication of naturalism is what can be called ’non-supernaturalim’.
According to Barry Stroud (2004) this is the most intuitive conception of naturalism. Stroud,
suggests that “the first thing to do with naturalism, as with any philosophical doctrine or
’ism,’ is to ask what it is against” (Stroud 1996, 44, emphasis in original). Just considering the
term ’naturalism’, the obvious suggestion would be that naturalism is against unnaturalism.
Naturalism is simply the doctrine that everything is natural. Stroud puts this suggestion
in the following way: “naturalism says that there is nothing, or that nothing is so, except
what holds in nature, in the natural world” (Stroud 1996, 44). Stroud recognizes that
this formulation is not very informative, but argues that even such a vague account of
naturalism exposes that naturalism excludes certain entities that people have believed in.
Stroud writes: “Naturalism on any reading is opposed to supernaturalism” (Stroud 1996, 44).
Similarly, Phillip Pettit (1992) writes: “Naturalism imposes a constraint on what there can
be, stipulating that there are no nonnatural or unnatural, praeternatural or supernatural,
entities” (Pettit 1992, 245). Naturalism on this conception is a doctrine specifying allowable
ontologies. Non-supernaturalism proclaims that there are certain entities, supernatural or
non-natural entities, which cannot be included in any ontology.
Finn Collin (2011) gives a similar account of naturalism: “Naturalism, in the broadest sense
of the word, is the view that the sum total of reality is coextensive with nature and that,
as a consequence, human knowledge has no object beyond the natural realm” (Collin 2011,
1). According to Collin, it follows from this view that “[t]here is no higher, transcendent
sphere; in particular, the human mind (or “soul”) does not itself inhabit any such higher
realm, nor does any aspect of man’s activities or thoughts bring him in contact with such
higher spheres” (Collin 2011, 1). There are no supernatural entities. The human mind must
like everything else, belong to the natural realm.
Also, Jan Faye (2012) proposes similar conception of naturalism, however, Faye’s explication
is interestingly given in terms of restrictions to acceptable explanations, he proposes “that
everything that happens in nature is a result of nature’s own causal powers, and that
everything should and could be explained according to these powers” (Faye 2012, 73). On
Faye’s view, naturalism is closed on itself. We should not introduce non-natural entities
and powers to explain that which happens in nature, and in this sense the closure is an
explanatory closure.
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The difference between Faye’s and Collin’s explications mirrors a distinction that is often
drawn between metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism. Metaphysical
naturalism5is explicated as the claim that there are no supernatural entities (Draper 2005;
Rea 2002; Ruse 2013). In so far as supernatural entities are non-natural entities, metaphysical
naturalism can equivalently be explicated as the claim that all that exists is natural. Geert
Keil (2008) suggests a similar explication, when he writes: “Metaphysical naturalism can be
described by the sayings ’Nature includes everything,’ ’everything is natural,’ and ’Everything
is part of the natural world’ (Keil 2008, 264). Metaphysical naturalism is identical to the
naturalism explicated by Stroud, Petit and Collin. Methodological naturalism is explicated
as the claim that we should not refer to supernatural entities when we explain natural
phenomena (Draper 2005; Ruse 2013). Again, taking supernatural entities to be non-natural
entities, methodological naturalism can equivalently be explicated as the claim that only
natural entities can be referred to when we explain natural phenomena. With this explication
methodological naturalism is very similar to the conception of naturalism presented by
Faye. Unfortunately, not only the term ’naturalism’ but also ’metaphysical naturalism’
and ’methodological naturalism’ has been used in the literature of naturalism to denote
different positions. Due to this ambiguity, it is worth emphasizing that the two positions:
metaphysical and methodological (non-super)naturalism are different from the ontological
and methodological naturalism that will be introduced below. In fact the ambiguity is quite
immediate, even though De Caro (2010), Draper (2005), Papineau (2015), Rea (2002), and
Ruse (2013) all share the same conception of metaphysical naturalism, they give two very
different explications of methodological naturalism. While Draper and Ruse propose the
explication above, De Caro, Papineau, and Rea propose an explication of methodological
naturalism as the requirement that philosophy should employ the same methods as science.
This is the conception of methodological naturalism that will be introduced subsequently.
Obviously, non-supernaturalism is not a novel position. In the first half of the 20thcentury, Roy
Wood Sellars advances a view echoing the already given explications of non-supernaturalism
when he writes of naturalism that “its opposite is supernaturalism” (Sellars 1927, 217),
and he continues: “I mean that naturalism takes nature in a definite way as identical with
reality, as self-sufficient and as the whole reality” (Sellars 1927, 217). Both metaphysical and
methodological non-supernaturalism are emphasized here. All that is real is natural, and
taking reality to be all there is, it must be the case that all that exists is natural according
to Sellars. This is metaphysical non-supernaturalism. Further, Sellars emphasizes that
nature is “self-sufficient”. There is no need for anything outside of nature, implying that
explanations should not refer to non-natural entities. Nothing happens which does not have
a natural explanation. This is methodological naturalism. Qualifying his view of naturalism,
he writes: “it stands in opposition to those movements which are called absolute idealism,
5Metaphysical naturalism is also known as ontological naturalism (see for instance Moser and Yandell
(2000), De Caro (2010), and Papineau (2015)).
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transcendentalism, theism, in short, for supernaturalism in the large sense” (Sellars 1927,
217).
Sellars openly acknowledge that his view of naturalism is not one of his own development.
In his article “The Requirements of an adequate Naturalism” (1921), he cites an explication
of naturalism found in the English translation of the German theologian and philosopher
of religion Rudolf Otte’s D.phil. dissertation from 1905 (Otto 1907). Sellers introduces the
citation with the words: “The following characterization of naturalism is true to its spirit”
(Sellars 1921, 254), after which Otto’s explication follows:
At first tentative, but becoming ever more distinctly conscious of its real
motive, naturalism has always arisen in opposition to what we may call ’su-
pernatural’ propositions, whether these be the naive mythological explanations
of world-phenomena found in primitive religions, or the supernatural popular
metaphysics which usually accompanies the higher forms. It is actuated at the
same time by one of the most admirable impulses in human nature the impulse
to explain and understand, and to explain, if possible, through simple, familiar
and ordinary causes (Otto 1907, 18; Sellars 1921, 254).
Otto’s explication also emphasizes both metaphysical and methodological non-supernaturalism;
naturalism, according to Otto, is opposed to both propositions that are mythological expla-
nations and propositions that are supernatural metaphysics.
Otto proclaims that not even in 1905 such a conception of naturalism is a novelty. Rather,
Otto argues that it can be found already in antiquity with Democritus and Leucippus and
further identifies naturalism
in the more modern systems of materialism and positivism, in the Système
de la nature and in the theory of l’homme machine, in the materialistic reactions
from the idealistic nature-speculations of Schelling and Hegel, in the discussions
of materialism in the past century, in the naturalistic writings of Moleschott,
Czolbe, Vogt, Büchner, and Haeckel, and in the still dominant naturalistic
tendency and mood which acquired new form and deep-rooted individuality
through Darwinism,—in all these we find naturalism, not indeed originating as
something new, but simply blossoming afresh with increased strength (Otto 1907,
17–18, emphasis in original).
These examples provided by Otto attest to the claim that non-supernaturalism in neither
of its forms are a novelty. A similar point is made when Michael Eldridge remarks that
tendencies towards a non-supernaturalism is found both in Hume in the 18thcentury and in
Nietzsche in the 19thcentury (Eldridge 2004, 52). Both metaphysical and methodological
non-supernaturalism has been around for a long time.
While non-supernaturalism might arguably be counted as a naturalized metaphysics, con-
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temporary discussions about non-supernaturalism are only rarely found outside the domain
of philosophy of religion and then overview articles of naturalism. Of course exceptions can
be found, perhaps most notable is Michael Rea’s World Without Design, (2002). In that
he argues that non-supernaturalism cannot be a philosophical position but must rather be
regarded as a research program, a notion that shares some similarity with van Fraassen’s
(2002) stances. That non-supernaturalism is largely ignored outside the philosophy of religion
may be because the unqualified non-supernaturalism is opposed to different forms of theism
rather than philosophical doctrines. Geert Keil (2008) writes: “As long as naturalists confine
themselves to selling their position as a bulwark against irrationality, obscurantism, and
superstition, they insinuate that any kind of philosophy not committed to naturalism must
be obscurantist” (Keil 2008, 255). This must in consequence imply that any philosophical
position that are not obscurantist is naturalistic in this sense, whereby it is explained
why non-supernaturalism remains debatable in philosophy of religion along with why it is
largely uncontroversial in the rest of philosophy. The problem is not the non-supernaturalist
doctrine, all that exists is natural, in itself. Rather, that the position remains philosophically
uninteresting as long as ’natural’ is merely explicated as opposed to the non-natural or
supernatural. If non-supernaturalism rediscovered is all that there is to recent trend going
under the name ’naturalized metaphysics’, what then is all the fuss is about?
2.2.3 Scientific naturalism
Indeed, non-supernaturalism is not the main theme in the naturalized metaphysics that
has received such extensive treatment in recent years. Most proponents of this movement
are subscribing to what can be called scientific naturalism. Scientific naturalism is the
sort of naturalism following the spirit behind Alexander Rosenberg’s (2013) suggestion that
“[n]aturalism is the label for the thesis that the tools we should use answering philosophical
problems are the methods and findings of the mature sciences – from physics across biology
and increasingly neuroscience” (Rosenberg 2013, 17).6 Scientific naturalism is not explicated
by the canonical antonyms of the constitutive morpheme ’natural’: supernatural, religious,
mind, freedom, culture, and society. Rather, scientific naturalism has a stronger association
with the ’natural’ of ’natural science’ (Keil 2008, 263). Actually, Rosenberg identifies two
distinct aspects of scientific naturalism. The aforementioned methodological naturalism,
which involves the suggestion that philosophical problems should be answered using the
methods of the mature sciences and then ontological naturalism with the suggestion that
philosophical problems should be answered using the findings of these sciences.
These two naturalisms – methodological and ontological naturalism – can be defended
6Scientific naturalism is often associated with reductionist physicalism (Dupré 2004; De Caro 2010). As
stated in the introduction, I do not regard naturalized metaphysics to endorse physicalism. It is hopefully
clear from this account of scientific naturalism that it is a position distinct from reductionist physicalism.
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independently. Adopting the method or methods of our mature sciences does not require
that the findings of science have any role to play in philosophy. These methods might
be applied to a distinct field of subject and thereby give results that are not findings of
science. However, if the methods are employed to the same field of subject as these sciences,
then methodological naturalism must reproduce ontological naturalism, since the findings
of such an investigations will be the findings of science. This suggests a relation between
methodological and ontological naturalism; they can be conflated into the same position
under certain assumption, but they are in general distinct.
The proponents of scientific naturalism, both methodological and ontological, often point
back to Quine as the origin of the position. This is emphasized by De Caro and Macarthur
when they write: “Often scientific naturalists give the impression of thinking that philosophy
began with the Quine” (De Caro and Macarthur 2004, 17). It might be considered curious
that both methodological and ontological naturalists refer back to Quine, when these two
positions are claimed to be distinct. Quine is certainly a naturalist. He is famous for his
article “Epistemology naturalized” (1969a) and the slogan that philosophy is continuous with
science (Quine 1969b, 129). The latter in particular suggests that Quine is a methodological
naturalist. At least, De Caro and Macarthur use this exact formulation in their explication
for methodological naturalism, they write that it is “a reconception of the traditional relation
between philosophy and science according to which philosophical inquiry is conceived as
continuous with science” (De Caro and Macarthur 2004, 3). In comparison, Quine writes: “my
position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork
for science, but as continuous with science” (Quine 1969b, 129). However, to identify Quine’s
slogan with methodological naturalism is unfortunate, at least following Jeffrey Roland, who
interprets Quine’s slogan as signifying “that philosophy and science are under the same kinds
of pressure vis-á-vis experience and confirmation” (Roland 2014, 48). Both must conform
to experience. This is hardly a methodological continuity, but a similarity shared among
the products of science and philosophy. In so far as science is the authority on conformity
to experience, this requirement reproduces the ontological naturalism rather than a variant
of the methodological naturalism. However, according to Roland, Quine also supports a
distinctly methodological naturalism in that he favours a principle of deference to scientific
methodology. In Roland’s formulation of the principle: “Philosophy should defer to science,
in that the methods it employs should be or be analogous to those of the sciences” (Roland
2014, 51). This principle explicitly specifies that the methodological continuity with science
should consist in the employment of the scientific method in philosophy in so far as there is
such a method. Roland qualifies that this particular principle is the cornerstone of Quine’s
attempts to naturalize epistemology, where the methods of psychology in particular are
imposed on any appropriate epistemology (Quine 1969a; Roland 2014, footnote 22). Roland
also suggests a principle attributed to Quinian naturalism, which explicates the proposed
ontological naturalism, he writes: “Philosophy should defer to science, in that the theories
it advances should be consonant with those of the sciences. In case of conflict between
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philosophical and scientific theories, the latter prima facie trumps the former” (Roland 2014,
51). Thus, on Roland’s interpretation Quine can be read as a proponent of both ontological
and methodological naturalism. While these two positions are intertwined in Quine’s view,
nothing forces the adoption this particular aspect of Quine’s thinking.
Again, Quine’s methodological naturalism has its particular application in his naturalized
epistemology. On the other hand, it is the ontological naturalism that guides what can
arguably be called Quine’s naturalized metaphysics. This naturalized metaphysics or perhaps
more appropriately, a naturalized ontology is in particular developed in his article “On What
There Is” (1948). Here Quine proposes that we should find our ontological commitments
in our best scientific theories, i.e. in the findings of our best sciences. The ontological
commitments of a theory are those entities that that are indispensable for the theory to be
true, Quine writes: “we now have a more explicit standard whereby to decide what ontology
a given theory or form of discourse is committed to; a theory is committed to those and
only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring
in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true” (Quine 1948, 33). As noted
by Phillip Bricker (2014), it would perhaps be more appropriate to talk about existential
implications, or ontological presuppositions rather than ontological commitments. Both
terms more directly emphasize how the ontological commitments are determined and thereby
dependent on the theory or generally on the conceptual scheme (form of discourse) from
which the commitments are inferred. The ontology follows from the adoption of such a
conceptual scheme. Obviously, this mirrors the Psillos’ remarks about conceptual frameworks
discussed in section 2.1, however, compared to Psillos there are places where Quine seems
more confident that there is a preferred conceptual scheme, for instance he writes: “Our
ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the over-all conceptual scheme which is
to accommodate science in the broadest sense” (Quine 1948, 36). The conceptual scheme
that best accommodates science is the preferred scheme. Thus, with ontology determined
by the conceptual scheme and the conceptual scheme determined by the findings of science,
Quine here seems to introduce an ontological naturalism – that philosophy should defer to
the findings of science – in the construction of an ontology, a naturalized ontology.
Guided by Quine, naturalized metaphysics will in the following be a metaphysics that
adheres to an ontological naturalism, which requires that philosophy as well as metaphysics
in particular should defer to the findings of science. As will be argued below, proponents
of naturalized metaphysics all exhibits a commitment to variants of ontological naturalism.
However, before this investigation, it is worth remarking that Quine is not the origin of
scientific naturalism, despite the quoted observation made by De Caro and Macarthur
that many philosophers inclined towards scientific naturalism writes as though Quine is
the origin of philosophy and that these naturalists are of the opinion “that to read earlier
texts is to leave philosophy behind for the study of the history of ideas” (De Caro and
Macarthur 2004, 17). Contrary to this conception, Hillary Kornblith remarks: “The idea
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that philosophy must somehow be grounded in the sciences is not new, and indeed, has
given rise to an extraordinarily diverse set of philosophical ideas. Descartes, Locke, Leibniz,
Kant, Marx, Reichenbach, and numerous others sought to show that their ideas comported
well with the best available science at their times” (Kornblith 1994, 49). Further it is
often argued that Quine is greatly indebted to the American pragmatists and naturalists
from the early 20th century. Among them perhaps most notably John Dewey, who belongs
to both to the pragmatists and the naturalists and whom Quine reports as an important
inspiration: “Philosophically I am bound to Dewey by the naturalism that dominated his
last three decades” (Quine 1969a, 27). Peter Godfrey-Smith (2013) is less certain about this
inheritance. He notices that Quine’s quoted courtesy to Dewey is found in one of Quine’s
John Dewey lectures and speculates that the remark is made out of politeness. Godfrey
Smith argues “Quine does not appear to have been greatly influenced by the work of the
’classical’ pragmatists, Peirce, James, and Dewey” (Godfrey-Smith 2014, 54). Historical
exegesis is not the purpose of this project, and I will leave this topic of Quine’s inheritance.
See Godfrey-Smith (2014) and Eldrige (2004) for more on the relation between Quine and
the American pragmatists and naturalists.
2.2.4 Naturalized metaphysics
Instead I will turn to the present day naturalized metaphysics. I have proposed that the
sort of naturalized metaphysics considered in the present project is weakly Quinian in the
sense that it introduces an ontological naturalism with the restriction that metaphysics
should defer to the findings of science. Again, as I will ultimately argue that naturalized
metaphysics is not an answer to how metaphysics is possible, it is worth considering whether
there are any proponents of such an ontological naturalism with respect to metaphysics. If
there are none, then it would be arguing against a straw man to defend that naturalized
metaphysics is not an answer, as it would be the case if these naturalists has no ambition of
answering how metaphysics is possible or if their conception of metaphysics is significantly
different from the one proposed in section 2.1. I will return to these questions in section 2.3.
Generally, I will argue that those works described in 1.2 as part of naturalized metaphysics en-
dorses variants of ontological naturalism, the most explicitly stated perhaps by Chakravartty:
“Naturalized metaphysics is metaphysics that is inspired by and constrained by the output
of our best science. Non-naturalized metaphysics is metaphysics that is not so inspired or
constrained” (Chakravartty 2013, 33). Naturalized metaphysics is a metaphysics that results
from the requirement that metaphysics should defer to the findings of science. Chakravartty
qualifies that “in the characterization of naturalized metaphysics just given, it is science that
plays the role of constrainer, not empirical data as such” (Chakravartty 2013, 33). Thus,
naturalized metaphysics takes the results of science, not empirical data themselves as the
evidence on which to build metaphysics. Along the same lines Ladyman and Ross writes:
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“we think that contemporary science provides evidence for some positive metaphysical claims
and theses” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 27). Others, more specifically requires deference to
the findings of physics. Maudlin writes:
The basic idea is simple: metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the
natural world, can do no better than to reflect on physics. Physical theories
provide us with the best handle we have on what there is, and the philosopher’s
proper task is the interpretation and elucidation of those theories. In particular,
when choosing the fundamental posits of one’s ontology, one must look to scientific
practice rather than to philosophical prejudice (Maudlin 2007, 1).
Maudlin’s remark emphasizes the theme investigated later that naturalized metaphysics
is preferable to traditional metaphysics who looks at “philosophical prejudice”. It is the
physical theories that “provide us with the best handle we have on what there is”. In this
way physics has the authority over metaphysics; metaphysics should defer to the findings of
science and physics in particular. Bird makes a similar point when he writes: “If there is a
contradiction between the physics and the metaphysics, then the metaphysics must give way”
(Bird 2007, 8). Also, Monton seems to regard ontological naturalism as the important outset
for naturalized metaphysics, when he frames the overall question for his article “Prolegomena
to any future physics-based metaphysics” (2011) with the question: “To what extent can
questions in metaphysics be answered by appealing to results in physics?” (Monton 2011,
142). Kincaid as well shares the view that metaphysics should defer to the findings of science,
but he also includes methodological naturalism as part of what he calls ’scientific naturalism’:
“As an ontological claim, scientific naturalism says that we know what exists through the
application of scientific methods and results” (Kincaid 2013, 5). As I shall argue later, also
Ney (2012) endorses ontological naturalism.
While these examples are not conclusive, I take them to make it very plausible that naturalized
metaphysics has ontological naturalism as a guiding doctrine. Most proponents of naturalized
metaphysics endorse the view that metaphysics should defer to the findings of science. In
the following, naturalized metaphysics will refer to metaphysics restricted by ontological
naturalism.
2.2.5 Further remarks on naturalism
While I have argued that the particular trend in recent analytic metaphysics that I have called
’naturalized metaphysics’ is generally inclined towards ontological naturalism, there are also
work done that is proclaimed to be inclined towards methodological naturalism. For instance,
in his book Putting Metaphysics First (2009), Michael Devitt’s writes: “The metaphysics I
want to put first is a naturalized one” (Devitt 2009, 2). This would seem to situate Devitt in
the middle of naturalized metaphysics, however, Devitt’s naturalized metaphysics is inspired
by methodological naturalism, which is evident from remarks such as the following: “From
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the naturalistic perspective the intuitions that so dominate the methodology of ’armchair
philosophy’ cannot be a priori” (Devitt 2009, 1). This suggests that Devitt belongs to another
tradition in analytic metaphysics and philosophy in general that particularly engages in the
methodological discussion evident from the titled of Matthew Haug’s anthology Philosophical
Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory (2014b). The apparent question asked here is
whether to adopt methodological naturalism; whether philosophy should adopt the method
or methods of science. However, neither Devitt nor the contributions on metaphysics found
in this anthology (Lowe 2014; Papineau 2014; Thomasson 2014; J. M. Wilson 2013) engages
seriously in this methodological question. None of them propose that metaphysicists should
start doing experiments on their own. Rather, their interest is in the content of metaphysical
assertions and the role played by conceptual analysis and intuitions in establishing such
assertions. While the former is completely orthogonal to scientific naturalism, the latter
can just as appropriately be conceived of as a discussion regarding the scope of ontological
naturalism. Does metaphysics defer properly to the findings of science if it also relies on
conceptual analysis and intuitions as evidence besides these findings of science?
If no one wants to propose that metaphysics should employ the methods of science to a field
of subject distinct to metaphysics, then the divide between ontological and methodological
naturalism is only manifest as a procedural difference. Both will require metaphysics to defer
to the findings of science, and the difference is whether to take an assertion and investigate
if it adheres to the criterion – ontological naturalism – or simply to have the criterion
in mind when the assertion is established in the first place – methodological naturalism.
This procedural difference cannot warrant as a distinction between two types of scientific
naturalism. A successful metaphysical assertion resulting from an adherence to ontological
or methodological naturalism is the same. The only difference remaining is a difference
observed by Jeffrey King:
One cannot determine whether a philosopher is a naturalist in this sense
[methodological naturalist] by looking a his positions on specific philosophical
issues. One needs to consider the methods the philosopher employed in reaching
those positions. Because [. . . ] I am interested in accounts of naturalism which
directly apply to philosophical positions or theories rather than to philosophers,
I shall set methodological naturalism aside (King 1994, 54).
The difference is merely that methodological naturalism concerns the activity whereas
ontological naturalism applies directly to the product.
It is therefore interesting, that none of the aforementioned works including Haug’s preface to
the anthology refer to any of the literature that I have claimed belong to naturalized meta-
physics, besides a single reference to Maudlin (2007). This is despite a very comprehensive
discussion in the first chapter of Every Thing Must Go (2007), on the role of conceptual
analysis and intuitions in metaphysics. It must remain speculation, but apparently the mere
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belief in this distinction seems to sustain a division between naturalized metaphysics and
the work done in the methodology of metaphysics.
Besides methodological and ontological naturalism, Huw Price (2004) identifies what he calls
subject naturalism. Subject naturalism is the view that “philosophy needs to begin with
what science tells us about ourselves” (Price 2004, 73). This seems to follow trivially from the
general explication of ontological naturalism, since all philosophy should defer to the findings
of science so should any philosophy concerned with humans. However, Price emphasize that
following a subject naturalism “[s]cience tells us that we humans are natural creatures, and
if the claims and ambitions of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to
give way” (Price 2004, 73). Thus, in the ambitions we set for philosophy we should take
subject naturalism into account. It is futile to have ambitions for philosophy that cannot
be fulfilled since we, as interrogators are limited beings. In this sense, subject naturalism
constitutes a preliminary naturalism, which treats our epistemological (and supposedly
semantic) capacities in order to settle the possible scope of any ambition for philosophy
including the ambition to naturalize philosophy following ontological naturalism. When
science tells us that humans are the consequence of evolution by natural selection, we must
adjust our philosophical ambitions accordingly to the consequences of this matter of fact.
The consequences of this evolutionary origin are particularly treated by Faye (2016) under
the description ’evolutionary naturalism’. Here Faye points to Roy Wood Sellars (e.g. 1922)
as the originator of this variant of naturalism.
2.3 Metaphysics as naturalized metaphysics
With the characterization of naturalized metaphysics and explication of metaphysics from the
two previous sections, the sense in which naturalised metaphysics is regarded as an answer
to how metaphysics is possible can finally be demonstrated. It was argued that a necessary
condition for an answer is that it instructs how to succeed in attempts to assert something
about the thing in itself. By proposing that naturalized metaphysics is an answer and that the
characterising feature of naturalized metaphysics is the restriction that metaphysics should
defer to the findings of science, this restriction is identified as the sought for instruction.
Following the discussion in section 1.1, the instruction should be a necessary condition for
a successful metaphysical assertion. Therefore, to propose that naturalized metaphysics
is an answer implies the proposal that metaphysical assertions are successful only if the
these assertions defer to the findings of science. When I want to argue that metaphysics is
not possible as naturalized metaphysics because of Carnap’s challenge, this then requires a
demonstration how this challenge is equally problematic for naturalized metaphysics and
non-naturalized alike, i.e. that it makes no difference whether a metaphysical assertion defers
to the findings of science in the light of Carnap’s challenge.
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Again, the significance of this conclusion relies on naturalized metaphysics being an attempt at
an answer to how metaphysics is possible. If ontological naturalism is invoked in naturalized
metaphysics for other reasons then it would be quite irrelevant that it turned out not to
constitute an answer to how metaphysics is possible. Thus, this remains to be shown. Further,
the significance of the conclusion still depends on the conception of metaphysics among the
proponents of naturalized metaphysics. Even if naturalized metaphysics is considered an
answer to how metaphysics is possible, this might be with respect to more modest metaphysics
that does not involce the necessary conditions for metaphysics than the requirement that
metaphysical assertions are about the thing in itself. Below, I will argue that both are
fulfilled such that the conclusion of the present project is indeed significant.
2.3.1 Naturalization of metaphysics
The claim that naturalized metaphysics is an attempt at an answer to how metaphysics
is possible can find support in an argument already developed from some considerations
concerning the name ’naturalized metaphysics’.
Unqualified, ’naturalized metaphysics’ appears to be a descriptive term that supposedly
identifies a particular part of metaphysics. Naturalized metaphysics is metaphysics that
is selected by some further requirement, for instance, that this metaphysics defers to the
findings of science. It is superficially concealed that this part of metaphysics has its origins
in a naturalization of metaphysics. However, this origin can hardly be controversial. It is
merely claimed that naturalized metaphysics is the part of metaphysics which is naturalized.
Though this seems evident, this exposition serves a purpose with respect to the origin and
status of naturalized metaphysics. When one consider the term ’naturalized metaphysics’, the
immediate question is what this term denotes. As already established this reference is some
part of metaphysics. When it is exposed that naturalized metaphysics is the product of a
naturalization, one is instead tempted to ask another question: ’Why naturalize metaphysics?’
Asking this question, the suspicion is implicitly aired that metaphysics is not naturalized
simply because it can be naturalized, but rather that there is another motive behind
naturalization. Perhaps the naturalization is a consequence of suspected defects in parts of
metaphysics which one wants to avoid. ’Naturalized metaphysics’ would then be more than
a descriptive term. The term then includes a normative aspect as well, which emphasizes
that naturalized metaphysics is the part of metaphysics which avoids these defects. Of
course, it might be objected that there is no such project of naturalization. For instance
a term like ’ontology’ is solely descriptive terms in metaphysics. This just identifies the
part of metaphysics which is about the existence of entities. There is no such thing as the
“ontologization” of metaphysics. However, I will argue that ’naturalized metaphysics’ has
both the descriptive and the normative dimension. There are probably those who will insist
that this term is merely a way to denote a particular scientifically inclined part of metaphysics
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and that it bears no judgement about the rest of metaphysics. For most, however, I suspect
that the term denotes the only allowable sort of metaphysics, and thereby the term carries a
strong normative aspect. ’Naturalized metaphysics’ it was proposed denotes a particular new
trend in analytic metaphysics. If naturalized metaphysics is merely a descriptive term in
metaphysics similar to ’ontology’, then what is all the fuss about? If naturalized metaphysics
does not contain this normative aspect, at least among its followers, then there is no reason
that this should constitute a particular new trend in metaphysics. There is no ontological
trend because ’ontology’ is merely a descriptive term. Naturalized metaphysics is a trend,
because ’naturalized metaphysics’ is more than a descriptive term.
Naturalized metaphysics is a part of a revisionary tradition in metaphysics which has very a
proud history, ranging from Aristotle to Kant to the logical positivists which is still carried
out today.7 All are motivated by the suspicion that something is defective in all or parts of
metaphysics, so a revision is required. All of these philosophers are engaged in the question
’how is metaphysics possible?’. Many different answers are suggested with very different
ambitions; however, they all share the interest in the question regarding the possibility
of metaphysics. By applying the name ’naturalized metaphysics’ to one’s metaphysical
program this must signify that the program engages in this revisionary tradition. The name
’naturalized metaphysics’ alone suggests that naturalized metaphysics is a proposal for an
answer to the question ’how is metaphysics possible’.
This view is supported by the entry on “Naturalism” in TheInternet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Here, Jon Jacobs exactly suggests such a revisionary motivation for naturalism
in general. About naturalism he writes: “Naturalism often assigns a key role to the methods
and results of the empirical sciences”, and continues “Whether in epistemology, ethics,
philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, or other areas, naturalism seeks to show that
philosophical problems as traditionally conceived are ill-formulated and can be solved or
displaced by appropriately naturalistic methods” (Jacobs 2015).
2.3.2 Naturalized metaphysics as an answer
Looking at naturalized metaphysics literature, it is further supported that naturalized
metaphysics is a proposal for an answer to how metaphysics is possible. Chakravartty is
very explicit in his views on naturalized metaphysics, quoting him at length:
Having understood metaphysics in these general and innocuous terms, it
should be clear immediately that there is nothing here to distinguish metaphysics
simpliciter from metaphysics pursued in the context of the sciences, since clearly
the latter is typified by attempts to theorize about the ontology and causal
workings of the various systems and phenomena it investigates, no less than
7See for instance Dummett (1991), Chalmers et al. (2009), Tahko (2012) and Haug (2014b).
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metaphysics simpliciter . This of course is what one should expect if naturalized
metaphysics is to be a form of metaphysics (simpliciter), offering an important
clue, I believe, in aid of the formulation of a plausible conception of naturalized
metaphysics. The distinction between putatively acceptable naturalistic meta-
physics and putatively excessive metaphysical inquiry does not concern what
these forms of inquiry aim to do, where the relevant aims are conceived in the
general and innocuous terms of shedding light on ontological and causal features
of the world (Chakravartty 2013, 32, emphasis in original).
In relation to the question of interest, Chakravartty makes two important qualifications.
First, he regards non-naturalized metaphysics to be no different from naturalized metaphysics
in aim, i.e. in what they attempt to achieve. Both attempt to shed “light on ontological and
causal features of the world”. Naturalized metaphysics is also just a “form of metaphysics”.
Second, he regards naturalized metaphysics to be “acceptable” with the implication that
non-naturalized metaphysics is not acceptable or at least “excessive”. A similar remark is
made when he writes the following: “The idea here is that grappling with the metaphysical
underpinnings of our best current science need not amount to metaphysics in the style of
analytic metaphysics as it is problematically practiced in other domains” (Chakravartty
2013, 30). Here, he explicitly states the worry that “analytical metaphysics” is problematic,
not because of its subject matter, but because it is non-naturalized metaphysics. It is not
adequately “inspired or constrained by the output of our best science” (Chakravartty 2013,
33). Thus, Chakravartty seems to subscribe to the view that naturalized metaphysics is an
answer to how metaphysics is possible. Naturalized metaphysics is just a form of metaphysics
and shares the aims of metaphysics while avoiding the problems facing non-naturalized
metaphysics. While he has no direct reference to a Kantian thing in itself, he does write
that ontology is “considerations of the most general nature of existence and the natures of
things that exist” (Chakravartty 2013, 31). He also gives the following characterization of
scientific realists: that “advocate beliefs concerning things that philosophers today would
still regard as metaphysical, including beliefs about properties, causation, laws of nature,
de re modality, and so on” (Chakravartty 2013, 28). This is not conclusive evidence that
Chakravartty endorses the necessary condition that an attempt at metaphysics is successful
only if it results in an assertion about the thing in itself, however, his formulation suggests
that he adopts such a view.
The view that metaphysics is problematic is shared by Melnyk; he writes:
I do not approach these questions, however, with the assumption that meta-
physics is bound to turn out to be a viable branch of inquiry, and hence that
the only live question is how it works. On the contrary, I think there is a
real possibility that the activity that we call ‘metaphysics’ should turn out not
to constitute a viable form of inquiry at all, either empirical or non-empirical
(Melnyk 2013, 81).
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He airs the worry that metaphysics is in fact impossible and whether or not it is an “empirical
or non-empirical” inquiry. Presumably, these two alternatives are equivalent to naturalized
and non-naturalized metaphysics respectively. This is also suggested by his remark which
immediately follows: “I am therefore prepared to find that the right answer to the question,
‘Can metaphysics be naturalized?’ is ‘No, it can’t.’” (Melnyk 2013, 81). Even as a naturalized
metaphysics, Melnyk worries that metaphysics is impossible. However, as a remark about
metaphysics, he writes: “On the face of it, the only possible approach to such a question
requires scrutinizing our best current physical theories and working from there” (Melnyk 2013,
94). Melnyk shares the view that naturalized metaphysics is the only way that metaphysics
might be possible. Furthermore, this quote demonstrates how he also endorses ontological
naturalism as characterizing for this naturalized metaphysics that might prove metaphysics
to be possible. Interestingly, Melnyk directly considers how much of traditional metaphysics
that remain when metaphysics is naturalized. He asks: “But can metaphysics be naturalized?
And if it can, [. . . ] [h]ow many traditional metaphysical problems will it still be reasonable
to investigate?” (Melnyk 2013, 81).
Kincaid suggests that the views displayed by Chakravartty and Melnyk are general for the
contributions to the anthology Scientific Metaphysics (2013). He summarizes:
This volume is about the prospects for a naturalized metaphysics and its
relation to traditional metaphysics. One overarching theme is that traditional
metaphysics, especially in its current incarnation as analytic metaphysics, is a
questionable enterprise because of its lack of scientific standing. The thesis is
that any legitimate metaphysics and conceptual analysis must be tied into the
results and practices of the sciences (Kincaid 2013, 1).
Naturalized metaphysics is exactly an answer to how metaphysics is possible and developed
because traditional metaphysics is “a questionable enterprise”. Chakravartty observed that
naturalized metaphysics and traditional metaphysics has the same aim – shedding light on
features of the world. Melnyk recognised that parts of traditional metaphysics might remain
problematic even with naturalization. In terms of the present project, he express the view
that we might indeed be entitled to have suspicions towards much of traditional metaphysics.
Perhaps only very little of this metaphysics under suspicion turns out to be possible as
naturalized metaphysics.
Additionally, Ladyman and Ross share the view that traditional metaphysics is problematic
and that naturalized metaphysics is the solution to these problems. After a compliment to
the scientific orientation of the logical positivists, Quine, and Kuhn, they write: “there are
now, once again, esoteric debates about substance, universals, identity, time, properties, and
so on, which make little or no reference to science, and worse, which seem to presuppose that
science must be irrelevant to their resolution” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 9). Their worry here
concerns the sort of analytic metaphysics that has been conducted in the last sixty years or
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so. This sort of metaphysics is problematic from their point of view. They write: “This book
is an exercise in metaphysics done as naturalistic philosophy of science because we think
that no other sort of metaphysics counts as inquiry into the objective nature of the world”
(Ladyman and Ross 2007, 9). This further emphasizes how they share Chakravartty’s view
that metaphysics and naturalized metaphysics has the same aim, but that only naturalized
metaphysics can succeed in this aim, which they propose to be “inquiry into the objective
nature of the world”. Elsewhere, they further describe this aim of metaphysics as “the
attempt to discover general truths about the objective world” (Ladyman and Ross 2007,
14).
In summary, the above demonstrates that naturalized metaphysics is a proposed answer to
the question ’how metaphysics is possible’. Traditional metaphysics, particularly the analytic
metaphysics of the last sixty years, is problematic according to the naturalists. Only by
obeying to ontological naturalism – the requirements to a naturalized metaphysics – can one
succeed in attempts at metaphysics. Further, proponents of naturalized metaphysics share
the view that such attempts are successful only if they produce assertions about the thing in
itself – assertions that are true in an objective and absolute sense. Metaphysics is possible
only if it defers to the findings of science.
This appears to conclude the preliminary investigation into naturalized metaphysics and
the question ’how is metaphysics possible’, however, taking the naturalized metaphysics
as an answer to this question into closer investigation will reveal further questions in need
of clarification. These revolve around the term ’science’ and this deference relation that
is required between metaphysics and the findings of science. What is it that ontological
naturalism requires? This will be the topic of the following chapter and will further clarify
what naturalized metaphysics is and thereby, how proponents of naturalized metaphysics
think metaphysics is possible.
Chapter 3
A deference to science
What is ontological naturalism? What is required of metaphysics, when it should defer to
the findings of science? The present chapter will find that there is a range of answers to
this question that differ due to differences in the conception of (the findings of) science and
due to different interpretations of the entailments of this deference relation. Naturalized
metaphysics is not a single position but a range of positions that all result from these
differences. The present chapter will attempt to systematize these differences.
Such systematization is important since the overall conclusion of the present project applies
to all of these different naturalizations of metaphysics. Within reasonable limits, no matter
how metaphysics defers to the findings of science, this requirement will prove not to ensure
that metaphysics is possible. This argument will not be undertaken in this chapter but in
the next. The present chapter will once again take on a preliminary task; to systematize the
variants of naturalized metaphysics.
This chapter will therefore investigate the possible variations that might be found among
naturalizations of metaphysics due to the deviances in the conception of science, and the
differences in the interpretation of deference-relation. Also, this chapter serves to show how
these differences result in deviations in the answers to what metaphysics amounts to after
the naturalization and what the task for the metaphysicist might consequently be.
The first section will investigate the different conceptions of science that are available to a
naturalist. First, I establish a conception of science that is proposed to be shared among all
naturalists, and then the differences will be developed with an outset in this core conception.
The second section will then turn to the ontological naturalism and investigate which different
restriction that might be imposed as a result of this. Finally, the third section will then
bring together the different conceptions of science and the different restrictions in order
to develop the differences among naturalized metaphysics that result from these various
interpretations of ontological naturalism. A general criticism of naturalized metaphysics due
to Sophie Allen (2012) will also be considered in the service of a better understanding of
naturalized metaphysics as I understand it.
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3.1 What is science?
When metaphysics is required to defer to the findings of science, this presupposes that it
is known what metaphysics and science are, and further, it requires a knowledge of what
such a deference should amount to. The latter will be the topic of the next section, while
the former will be the topic of this section. The section will investigate what science is in
relation to metaphysics and ontological naturalism. It is generally no easy task to define
what science is. This, after all, is viewed as the problem in philosophy of science. When only
a single section is devoted to the question here, it is obviously impossible to include all the
nuances of the illuminating literature on the matter. Consequently, many aspects of science
must remain unqualified.
It is worth remembering that the origin of this interest in science is the role that science
plays in ontological naturalism. Thus, the science discussed here is the naturalists’ science.
It is a science that can warrant the introduction of ontological naturalism as an instructive
restriction that can guide attempts at metaphysics. Consequently, an answer to what science
is in this context should be confined to conceptions of science that explains this proposed
role for ontological naturalism. A bold metaphysicist might attempt to embrace ontological
naturalism by declaring that her metaphysics certainly defers to science and then simply
define science in such a way that no restriction is imposed and she can continue her work
in metaphysics as always. Such a move cannot be allowed, since her metaphysics would
still face the same problems as before. Such a conception of science will make ontological
naturalism obsolete since no restriction is de facto introduced by requiring a deference to the
findings of science. Instead, the ontological naturalist must insist that there are some merits
to the findings of science that any naturalist acknowledges, and that these merits ensure
that ontological naturalism indeed is an instructive restriction to metaphysics. Consequently,
this section begins with some indications of these merits of the findings of science that the
naturalists take to ensure this. It is in the context of this shared naturalist conception of
science that possible differences in the conception of science will then be considered.
Assuming a naturalist conception of science, it will in turn be considered whether science is
true, how science relates to the thing in itself, whether science is consistent, what science
implies, and how science relates to these implications.
3.1.1 Why science?
What is it about science that makes naturalist require that philosophy should defer to the
findings of science? Why science, and not the content of fairy tales, the proposals of old
wisdom, the hunches of intuitions, the teachings of religion or the results of thorough thinking
under date trees? Supposedly, naturalists will give different answers to this question, but I
will try to establish that there is common ground on which the naturalists’ varying answers
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stand. This will in turn imply how naturalists in general conceive of science; this is the
baseline science as it is understood when naturalists require that metaphysics should defer
to science.
Surprisingly, scientific naturalists do not discuss this to any great length. The aspects of
science that make it worthy of the deference of philosophy in general and metaphysics in
particular are largely only implicit. Mostly, it is simply assumed that science is a prestigious
enterprise and that it is obvious that metaphysics and anything else must yield to it.
Mockingly, Blackburn (2002) proposes that scientific naturalism is popular in metaphysics
because “it allows the philosopher some of the prestige and glory of the scientist” and
continues with the following speculation:
[p]erhaps philosophy is always something of a free-loader when it comes
to continuity with the most prestigious activities. When theology ruled the
universities, philosophy and theology were continuous; in the first part of this
century, and after the spectacular successes of modern logic, philosophy was
deemed continuous with logic; then a little later with linguistics, and now
philosophy marches into the future handinhand with science (Blackburn 2002,
76).
Blackburn’s story seems to suggests that the naturalists are opportunists who yield to science
for no other reason than that “[i]t is reassuring to ally philosophical reflection with the
most secure and intellectually privileged elements of the contemporary culture” (Blackburn
2002, 76). The secure and intellectually privileged elements of contemporary culture was
once theology. It has largely gone out of fashion and has been replaced by science, which
opportunistic philosophers now swear their allegiance to, supposedly until it is replaced by a
new trend.
I think Blackburn’s mocking remark has some truth to it. It is exactly because science
is regarded as a prestigious enterprise that the naturalist argue that it is science that
metaphysics should defer to. However, they will maintain that this prestige is well earned.
They will argue that the history of science has proven science to be a successful enterprise.
The success is taken to justify our regard of science as prestigious. Science is not a consequence
of dogmatism, the naturalists maintain, rather, naturalism is rationally entitled due to the
incredible success of science. James Ladyman (2012) displays this attitude when he writes:
“Prima facie it is puzzling that although we have successful empirical science, philosophers
also carry out a separate form of a priori enquiry into the nature of things” (Ladyman 2012,
32, my emphasis) and a similar view about physics in particular is suggested by Alyssa Ney
(2012): “The point is that physics has a proven track record of success making it a good
place to begin metaphysical inquiry (Ney 2012, 62, my emphasis). Both accounts display this
naturalists spirit, and emphasize explicitly that they regard science (physics) as successful.
It seems plausible that it is exactly these successes that entitles naturalism and supports the
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requirement that metaphysics should defer to science and not to something else.
This is important. The naturalist do not regard the epistemic priority of science over
metaphysics to be a thesis, which can be given foundation in a priori reasoning. It is the
success of science, “the track record of science”, that grants this epistemic priority. This
point of view is emphasized for instance by Hilary Kornblith (1994), who writes:
What does have priority over both metaphysics and epistemology, from the
naturalistic perspective, is successful scientific theory, and not because there is
some a priori reason to trust science over philosophy, but rather because there is
a body of scientific theory which has proven its value in prediction, explanation,
and technological application. This gives scientific work a kind of grounding that
no philosophical theory has thus far enjoyed (Kornblith 1994, 49).
The successes according to Kornblith consist in the empirical adequacy of science, the
predictive power of science and the technological applications of science. Particularly the
predictive power of science is highly regarded by Ladyman and Ross (2007). They write:
“the real miracle about the success of science is not empirical success in general, but how it
is that scientific theories can tell us about phenomena we never would have expected without
them” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 75). The real miracle, according to Ladyman and Ross,
is that science can make novel prediction and particularly, that these prediction concern
very unexpected phenomena. They give the example of “the empirical success of General
Relativity in predicting the deflection of light as it passes near large masses, and the empirical
success of Fresnel’s wave optics in accounting for the celebrated phenomenon of the white
spot in the shadow of an opaque disc” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 76). These success stories
relate how science reliably describes how the world around us behaves. In observation of our
surroundings and as well as when we manipulate them, science has proven to be a potent tool
for predictions of the future and resulting phenomena for several centuries. This impresses
the naturalists, however, they seem just as impressed with the continued improvement and
replacement of good scientific theories with even better ones. In other words, it is not only the
empirical adequacy of our current best sciences that is impressive, it is equally the continued
improvement of science that is manifest throughout its history. Particularly, the naturalists
seem to have a significant regard for the systematic, self-regulatory error correction found
in science, which they consider as the reason for its continued improvement. The current
success of science originates in this continued improvement due to this self-regulation – the
success of science is not accidental, but due to the way it is institutionalized in a scientific
practice.
I propose that this self-regulation and the immense success of our current best science are
the reasons that naturalists take to justify naturalism and the introduction of ontological
naturalism. Science displays an ever increasing success in the description of our surroundings
and this success is not accidental, rather, it is the result of self-regulation of the scientific
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practice. According to the naturalist, this story warrants not only the conclusion that the
current findings of science have a particular epistemic authority and priority, but also that
this authority will only increase with future science. The successes of science are so impressive
that naturalists find themselves entitled to deny anything challenging science in its sphere of
authority. Metaphysics as well as any other discipline should defer to science; not only to our
current best science, but to any future science as well. Ney at least supports this view when
it comes to physics. She writes: “physics has a good claim to superior epistemic standing due
to its use of mathematical precision, sophisticated experimental techniques, high standards
for confirmation, and a discipline engaging in good practices like peer reviews of publications”
(Ney 2012, 71). These are examples exactly of the self-regulatory practice, which ensures
the success of science and supports its consequent epistemic authority. Ladyman and Ross
also support this conception, when they write: “The epistemic supremacy of science rests
on repeated iteration of institutional error filters” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 29). The
institutional filters they have such regard for include “requirements for rigorous peer review
before claims may be deposited in ‘serious’ registers of scientific belief, requirements governing
representational rigour with respect to both theoretical claims and accounts of observations
and experiments, and so on” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 27). Together, these supports
the story of naturalism as a position which finds its support in the continued successful
improvement of science as a potent tool for the description and prediction of phenomena.
Naturalists feel confident that science consists of our currently best justified assertions, and
that it will remain so in the future. This, I propose, is why it is the findings of science that
naturalists maintain that metaphysics should defer to.
As mentioned in the beginning, our immediate interest is what science is according to the
naturalists. Now, with this exposition why naturalists maintain that metaphysics should
defer to science and not something else, some features of science are indiacted that are
obligatory to the naturalists conception of science. Consequently, these features might for
practical purposes function as a demarcation criterion for science, that is, a criterion that
allows us to recognize those theories and assertions that are members of science. In their
account it is central that these theories and assertions are empirically adequate, and that
the theories must display some predictive power. Thus, the naturalists invoke a variant
of a Popperian demarcation between science and non-science. However, further features
of science are viewed as central by the naturalists to ensure that the success of science is
not accidental. These are institutional error filters like peer review and representational
rigour, which manifest a self-regulation in science. Scientists constantly evaluate each other
through these institutional error filters and the naturalists view this feature of science as
the guarantee that the successes of science are not accidental. The naturalists’ science is
something that adheres to a variant of Popperianism, but which also adheres to further
institutional requirements that are imposed by the established scientific community. In so
far as the scientist themselves impose Popperianism as a part of the institutional error filters,
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the naturalists’ science is whatever the scientific community accepts as science.
Some important aspects of science remain unaddressed by this account. While the assertions
of science are proposed to the best justified assertions, it is not settled whether we are justified
in believing that they are true, and further, it remains an open question exactly what these
assert something are about. The naturalists will agree that science is empirically adequate,
but naturalism itself does not settle what this implies with respect to the relation between
science and different conceptions of reality. This question will be considered subsequently.
Prior to this, a preliminary question is whether scientific assertions can be regarded as true.
This will be the subject below.
3.1.2 Is science true?
The above account of science suggests a history of science where theories have continuously
been improved and replaced. Though Newtonian mechanics proved to be empirically
adequate, further investigation proved that quantum mechanics and general relativity in
their respective fields are even more empirically accurate. Following the naturalists line of
argument, Newtonian mechanics was the epistemic authority which anything should defer to
up until the time it was replaced by even better science. This suggests that the epistemic
authority which the naturalists associate with science does not imply truth. Even though
a scientific theory displays impressive empirical adequacy this is not a guarantee that it is
true, rather, the history of science suggests that theories are constantly improved upon and
replaced by better theories. This must imply that when the naturalists suggest that current
science always has been and always will be composed of our best justified assertions, this is
not immediately a justification of the belief that these assertions are true. Rather, when
the naturalists infer that the success of science justifies science, this is a justification in the
belief that science is the best we have. In their field of subject the assertions of science are
authoritative, because they are the assertions available that are most likely to be true. A
naturalist will perhaps argue that the story of science makes naturalists confident that the
probability that a scientific assertions is true is always higher than the probability that a
competing philosophical assertions is true. It might be objected that it is not well defined
how to understand such unqualified probabilities, however, the general conception is suitably
clear: It is always the case that the current best sciences are the most trustworthy assertions
and theories available.
This of course raises the question of how good our current science is. How close is it to
be true? This question is not immediately answerable by the naturalists. Though they
portray the history of science as a story of continued improvement, the history of science
does not suggest just how good science has become. Sure, current best science is empirically
adequate, but the history of science suggests that also replaced theories have been considered
as empirically adequate in their time. Naturalists might argue that these theories were
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evidently not empirically adequate after all, thus as long as our current best science is
empirically adequate naturalists could maintain that it is at least a possibility that our
current best science is true. Though it may be possible, a pessimistic induction from the
history of science suggests that it is at least unlikely. All previous best sciences have been
replaced, which by induction implies that the same will be the case for our current best
science.1 Further, as many authors have advanced, the incompatibility of quantum mechanics
with the general theory of relativity seems to provide non-empirical reasons to believe that
our current best science is not true. For example, Bradley Monton (2011) writes:
the actual physical theories that are utilized in doing metaphysics of this sort
[naturalized metaphysics] are almost certainly false. Our two best theories of
physics, quantum theory and relativity theory, are incompatible. The evidence in
favor of quantum theory suggests that relativity theory is false, and the evidence
in favor of relativity theory suggests that quantum theory is false (Monton 2011,
143, emphasis in original).
With this qualified suspicion that our current best science is not true, the naturalist can still
maintain that metaphysics should defer to science because science remains the epistemic
authority even though it is probable that science is not true. This does not undermine the
naturalists reasons for defending naturalism.
However, as Monton points out, if this is an adequate picture of science, naturalism requires
that metaphysics defers to a collection of assertions and theories of which many “are most
certainly false.” While it is supposedly an inspiration for continued work in science that
the current best sciences can be improved upon, it has the opposite effect on naturalized
metaphysics. What is our interest in a metaphysics that is founded on a science that is
most probably not true? Monton summarizes the problem in the following way: “when
physics-based metaphysics is done, it’s relying on false theories of physics; this is why physics-
based metaphysics rests on shaky foundations” (Monton 2011, 143). If science is fallible and
perhaps even probably false, so is a metaphysics founded on science. The critically minded
will suggest that such a state of science should refrain us from engaging in naturalized
metaphysics. If the naturalists insist that there is no other way to do metaphysics, some
might respond that we should then refrain from doing metaphysics altogether until science
is in a state where it can serve as a proper foundation for naturalized metaphysics. There
are two reactions available to this line of argument. One approach is to assent, but to
emphasize that a metaphysics deferring to science, i.e. naturalized metaphysics, at time t is
the best metaphysics we can have at t, and in so far as we need metaphysics at t, naturalized
metaphysics is the best available metaphysics at t.2 We must simply live with the fallibility
1Obviously we disregard Hume’s problem of induction when it is argued that this inductive inference
implies anything. Even, when it is just inferred that the conclusion of an induction is only likely to be true.
2Ladyman and Ross (2007, 42) suggests this line of argument.
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of naturalized metaphysics. This attitude can further be defended by questioning whether
we would be able to recognize completed science. If we are unable to recognize completed
science, we would not know when science will be in a state where it would serve as an
appropriate foundation of metaphysics. In that case, we would never know when science
would be in a state such that it could serve as a foundation of metaphysics and consequently,
we might as well continue to do naturalized metaphysics, but with the knowledge that the
foundation of the metaphysics developed might suddenly change due to improvements of
our best science, since naturalized metaphysics would never get out of this indeterminate
state. The view presents metaphysics as currently possible and supposedly valuable, so long
as it is a naturalized metaphysics, however, it is also acknowledged that being a naturalized
metaphysics it is fallible and will probably be subject to change as science develops. Monton
is not very happy with this solution, and he writes that: “metaphysics isn’t meant to be an
elucidation of our best current scientific theories; metaphysics is meant to get at truth. In
order to rely on our current best scientific theories in doing metaphysics, one would need to
argue that these theories are true” (Monton 2011, 156). What Monton seems to argue is
that such a fallible naturalism cannot be an answer to how metaphysics is possible.
What Monton proposes is a necessary condition for a successful attempt at metaphysics. Such
an attempt is only successful if it results in a true theory. In 2.1, I defended the condition
that such assertions and theories should be about the thing in itself, and Monton’s condition
therefore further strengthens the requirements to successful metaphysics. However, the two
conditions are essentially orthogonal. While Monton requires true theories without specifying
what these theories should be true about, I require that that the theories and assertions
of metaphysics are to be about the thing in itself, without any requirements regarding the
truth of these assertions other than they are assertions and therefore either true or false.
As I will argue that this requirement alone is insurmountable for naturalized metaphysics,
the criticism of naturalized metaphysics in the present project and Monton’s criticism are
distinct problems for naturalized metaphysics. In so far as Monton also acknowledge the
requirement that successful metaphysics is about the thing in itself, I regard my criticism to
be more fundamental than Monton’s.
3.1.3 Science and the thing in itself
Above, it has been discussed whether we are justified to consider science as true, however,
it has not yet been discussed what science might be true of, that is, what the assertions
of science are about. In relation to naturalism, our primary interest is how the assertions
of science are related to the thing it itself, since it is required of successful attempts at
metaphysics that they result in assertions about the thing in itself. Consequently, when
the naturalists require metaphysics to defer to the findings of science, it is important how
science relates to the thing in itself.
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This question is addressed in the discussion about realism in relation to science – scientific
realism. This question was already touched upon in the discussion of the possibility of a
modest conception of reality, however, it is worth expressing again what form this discussion
takes in relation to science. Psillos (1999) lists a number of controversies relating to scientific
realism, among them a qualification of this debate. He asks: “how exactly scientific theories
should be understood” (Psillos 1999, xviii), the question being whether they should “be
taken as attempts to reveal truths about the unobservable entities that populate the world,
or should they be taken to be no more than sophisticated instruments for the systematisation
and classification of observable phenomena” (Psillos 1999, xviii). Psillos here conflates two
related questions into one, which I propose to keep distinct for the current purposes. The
first regards the existence of those unobservable entities that occur in scientific theories. In
Psillos (2011) this debate takes the form of a pragmatic question regarding how best to
expand the ontology constituted by the commonsensical entities. This problem is related
to but not identical with another problem also hinted at in Psillos’ question. This problem
concerns whether scientific theories are indeed about the thing in itself or whether science is
merely about a modest reality.
These two question are related. In order to regard realism about theoretical entities to
be more than a pragmatic choice of a particular way of speaking, then one needs to be a
realist about the content of scientific assertions and theories. For the posited entities to be
more than a conceptual sleight of hand, they must be held to refer to entities out there in
the thing in itself. On the other hand, a weaker realism about theoretical entities which
acknowledges that any talk of them is merely the result of an unforced adoption of the
realism framework, must consent to an expressivism and therefore accept that there is a way
in which these entities are merely a means to systematize and classify the appearances that
science is really about. In this way, it can be proposed, the two discussions mirror each other.
The concern here will be with what science is about, but as can be seen, the conclusions will
have consequences for the discussion regarding the existence of theoretical entities.
The thing in itself is the reality behind all appearances. This is the experience-transcending,
mind-independent, objective world. So, the question of interest here is whether the aim of
science is to investigate empirical reality or whether the aim of science is to disclose the
thing in itself behind the phenomena. The central concern here is whether science and
metaphysics are in the same game, so to say: Whether both science and metaphysics aim to
assert something about the thing in itself or whether scientific assertions are merely about
ampirical reality.
In this debate it is taken to be indisputable that science has proven to be very successful in
the systematization and classification of appearances and even the prediction of these. The
assertions inferred from science have displayed an empirical adequacy which is second to
none. This is a view that is arguably shared by all naturalists. Now, this success calls for
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an explanation. Here, the scientific realists provide the most obvious one; the phenomena
originate in the thing in itself and consequently, the empirical adequacy of science can be
easily explained if it is assumed that science is a good account of the thing in itself. This is a
variant of the previously introduced no miracles argument, however, this time it appeals to
the thing in itself. It argues that the best explanation for the empirical adequacy of science
is that science is a good description of mind-independent reality, the objective world, that is
the cause of appearances.
The scientific realists are in opposition to the scientific anti-realists. The anti-realists
recognize the predictive power of science and its empirical adequacy, but they express a
skepticism with regard to the no miracles argument. According to the anti-realists, the thing
in itself remains largely underdetermined even though science displays significant empirical
success. Thus, realists and anti-realists agree that science provides good descriptions and
predictions of the appearances, what they disagree about is the implication of this. The
realist argues that the empirical adequacy implies that science is a similarly good description
of the thing in itself, whereas the anti-realist denies that this conclusion is warranted.
The debate is sometimes described as an opposition between those who regard science to be
true about the thing in itself, the realists, and those who deny this, the anti-realists. However,
as already argued, there are good reasons to believe that the current best sciences are not
true. The naturalists seem to be aware of this, but nevertheless many of them are realists.
As I will argue later, Ney (2012) is a realist, however, she simultaneously acknowledges that
there is still much work remaining to be done is science. About physics she manifestly writes:
“today no one thinks that completing physics is only going ‘to require more and more precise
measurement’ as Lord Kelvin suggested in 1900”3 (Ney 2012, 70). This must suggest that
Ney insists that significant changes will follow in the continued development of physics, and
thereby, following her realist position, current physics cannot generally be true about the
thing in itself. Similarly Ladyman and Ross favour a variant of scientific realism (Ladyman
and Ross 2007, chap. 2), while they also recognize that science is incomplete (Ladyman
and Ross 2007, 2). Consequently, it is reasonable to account for realism and anti-realism as
a sort of attitude to science. Both the realist and the anti-realist view science as engaged
in discoveries about the phenomena, however, the realist further maintains that science is
simultaneously engaged in an investigation of the thing in itself. This is how I will conceive of
the difference between realists and anti-realists in the following. In terms of truth, according
to the realist completed science will be true about the thing in itself, while the anti-realist
will maintain that completed science is merely true in the sense that it will be completely
empirically adequate.
Anti-realists have in general two reasons to defend their view: epistemological and semantic.
3It has been argued that there is no evidence that Lord Kelvin has said anything like that. Rather, it is
suspected that the quotation is misattributed to Lord Kelvin, while it is in fact a paraphrase of a passage
from a speech given by Albert Michelson in 1884 (Horgan 2015, 12).
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The epistemological reasons are those presented above. The anti-realist simply do not find us
entitled to conclude that science is an authority on the thing in itself, only on the phenomena.
There might be assertions about the thing in itself, but the successful assertions of science are
simply not among them. Following the condition from 2.1, this is contrary to the successful
assertions of metaphysics, and consequently, the assertions on either side of the deference in
ontological naturalism do not concern the same, following the anti-realist.
The semantic reasons for anti-realism will result in a very different naturalism. For ter-
minological clarity, such semantic anti-realism will be called instrumentalist for historical
reasons, and ’anti-realist’ will in the following only refer to those who are anti-realists for
the epistemological reasons. The question of interest for the instrumentalists is a question
also noted by Psillos, who formulates it as “whether science can possibly describe a mind-
independent world” (Psillos 1999, xvii). He further qualifies that “[t]he main question here
is whether it makes sense to say that there is a mind-independent world which science aims
to describe and explain” (Psillos 1999, xviii). The instrumentalists question whether there is
anything meaningful added when it is claimed that science is not only about the world of
phenomena, but also about the thing in itself. The instrumentalists express the worry that
expressions referring to the term ’the thing in itself’ is problematic. It is in this sense that
the instrumentalists are anti-realist for semantic reasons.
The instrumentalist conception of science is opposed to both scientific realism and anti-
realism. Where the dispute between realists and anti-realists concerns whether one is
epistemologically entitled to take science to be about the thing in itself, the instrumentalists
reject the intelligibility of such a discussion altogether. According to the instrumentalists,
there is no epistemological question, because the expression ’Science is about the thing in
itself’ is semantically problematic. This, however, makes an ontological naturalist who favours
scientific instrumentalism an apparent oxymoron. If scientific realism and anti-realism are
equally defective due to semantic problems with the term ’the thing in itself’, then it is
difficult to see how the same instrumentalists can propose that metaphysics can succeed to
assert something about this thing in itself if it defers to the findings of science. Consequently,
scientific instrumentalism should more properly be regarded as a threat to naturalized
metaphysics, rather than an available view of science.
Thus, in summary an ontological naturalist can either be a scientific realist or anti-realist.
The realist will display the attitude that it is warranted to take scientific assertions to be
about the thing in itself, whereas the anti-realist will reject this. Notably, both take the
discussion to be meaningful and substantive.
3.1.4 Is science consistent?
A minimal restriction that results from ontological naturalism must be that metaphysics does
not contradict science. Thus, the assertions in metaphysics cannot be allowed to directly
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contradict the assertions of science. However, it is not clear how to impose this restriction
in the circumstance that both an assertion and its contradiction are members of science.
Such contradictions must generally be expected in science, as they could be a result of
competing theories where one is not clearly preferable over the other. Following the naturalist
conception of science, such contradicting theories might both be regarded as scientific if the
scientific community regards both as scientific, which would probably mean that they are
both empirically adequate and have an associated predictive power, that they meet the high
scientific standards for confirmation, and that they have been subject to institutional error
filtering such as peer review. If both theories meet these standards there seem to be nothing
which prohibits that they are both scientific, though they contradict each other.
In the light of this, the naturalist must answer how metaphysics is supposed to defer to the
findings of science if science contains contradictions. One answer available to the naturalists
is simply to insist that science, as the term is meant in this requirement, cannot contain
contradictions. Thus, they regard it as a problem that must be solved with a proper
conception of science, i.e. that science is such that it is consistent. This will probably include
a further condition of demarcation, which requires that science is some consistent intersection
of those theories and assertions that meet the other criteria. This will ensure that science
cannot include contradictions and consequently the problem does not occur. Alternatively,
if it is maintained that science can include contradiction, the naturalist must supplement
ontological naturalism with an instruction guiding the conduct of the metaphysicist when
faced with a contradiction. Supposedly, this will either instruct the metaphysicist to suspend
judgement about the matter or to choose among the alternatives. The former instruction
will de facto reproduce an ontological naturalism that results from a deference to a science
that is required to be consistent or in agreement. Consequently, they will be treated as one
position, though they might result from different attitudes.
To allow that the metaphysicist can choose among the alternatives opens a potential problem
for the naturalist, since the choice must be either arbitrary or settled using potentially
problematic metaphysical reasoning – perhaps some theoretical virtues whose credentials
can be questioned. On the other hand, it might significantly reduce the topics dealt with by
science, if it is required that science must be consistent. This will in turn reduce the topics
where ontological naturalism can instruct metaphysics.
The problem with the potential inconsistency in science becomes even more significant if
the naturalist principle is interpreted in such a way that metaphysics must defer to both
findings of science and any logical implications of these. In that case a contradiction will
pose an immediate problem since any assertion can be inferred from a contradiction. A
contradiction in science will then allow that any assertion adheres to ontological naturalism.
In consequence, the naturalist principle cannot serve as an instructive restriction, unless
science is consistent or ontological naturalism is supplemented with instructions guiding the
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allowable conduct of the metaphysicist when faced with a contradiction.
3.1.5 The logical implications of science
The logical implications of science is in itself a topic that also requires a brief mention.
Scientific theories make reference to all sort of abstract entities, for instance mathematical
entities such as fields, functions and numbers, but also generally abstract entities such as
categories or natural kinds. Now, in so far as any existential quantification is made over
these entities, it can logically be inferred that these entities exist. It seems to be an open
question whether asserting the existence of for instance numbers is regarded as scientific,
just because the assertion is logically implied by a member of science. This opens two
question: One is whether a logical implication of science is itself a member of science. This
is a question concerning the closure of science under deductions. The second is the question
also aforementioned question of whether ontological naturalism requires a deference to both
the findings of science and the logical implications of these. Obviously, an affirmative answer
to the first question implies an affirmative answer to the second question, since any logical
implication of science will then be a member of science itself. If science is not closed under
deduction, i.e. if for instance these existence claims are not members of science, then it is an
open question for naturalists whether metaphysics should defer to these existence claims,
and generally whether metaphysics should defer to the logical implications of science. For
practical purposes only the second question will be dealt with in the following, since an
affirmative answer to this question will be de facto identical with an affirmative answer to
both questions.
With such ambiguity, it is relevant to introduce a notion that is neutral as regards these two
alternatives. Alexander Paseau (2010) introduces such a notion: ’scientific sanction’. Paseau
explicates that p is sanctioned by science if and only if “scientists correctly endorse p qua
scientists” (Paseau 2010, 642). Evidently, assertions in science are sanctioned by science, but
it remains an open question whether an assertion is scientifically sanctioned if it is logically
implied by science but not a member of science. Paseau’s explication might indicate that the
scientists have to believe that p, however, Paseau emphasizes that “science could sanction p
even if scientists disbelieve p” (Paseau 2010, 642). Thus, even if some scientists disbelieve p
and supposedly also if the scientist has formed neither belief nor disbelief about p, it might
be the case that p is sanctioned by science, because it is the enterprise as a whole which
sanctions the assertion. How exactly an assertion comes to be scientifically sanctioned is
not of immediate importance, but one might speculate that the sanctioned assertions are
those that have been subjected to the previously mentioned institutional error filters. The
important aspect of the notion ’scientific sanctioning’ is that it remains an open question
to the naturalist whether the logical implications of science are sanctioned by science, or
whether it is only the members of science that are scientifically sanctioned.
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3.2 Minimal, trumping and biconditional naturalism
Ontological naturalism invokes the requirement that metaphysical assertions must defer to
the findings of science. This section shall investigate which restrictions a naturalist might
impose as a result of this requirement. Three particular restrictions will be introduced:
the minimal, the trumping and the biconditional restrictions. These are in order stronger
and stronger requirements, however, it will be investigated whether the prima facie weaker
restrictions might be equivalent to the stronger biconditional restriction.
For convenience, ’science’ will refer to the collection of findings of science, and ’metaphysics’
will refer to the collection of metaphysical assertions.
3.2.1 Minimal naturalism
When it is claimed that metaphysics must defer to science, this should at least require that
metaphysics must not directly contradict science. This is the minimal conception of the
deference of metaphysics to science. Consequently, this will be called minimal naturalism
and the resulting restriction will be called the minimal restriction: this restriction postulates
that metaphysics must not have any member which is the negation of a member of science.
Put formally, it holds for any assertion p and the collections ’metaphysics’, M, and ’science’,
S, that:
∀p (¬(p ∈M ∧ ¬p ∈ S)) (3.1)
Obviously, this is a very weak naturalism. It is only relevant, if metaphysics and science
are such collections that the same assertion or its negation might be members of both.
Therefore, this restriction will only restrict metaphysics, if science is about the thing in itself.
If scientific anti-realism is assumed, then the minimal restriction will be completely irrelevant
to metaphysics, in the sense that it will not be instructive with respect to which assertions are
genuine members of metaphysics, since science and metaphysics are such that no assertion or
its negation is possibly a member of both collections. Notably, it is not enough that science
logically implies an assertion that is not a member of science itself, which then contradicts
a potential member of metaphysics. Following the minimal restriction, metaphysics might
contain the negation of an assertion implied by science, if this assertion is not a member of
science. This is of course only possible if science is not closed under deductions.
However, it seems reasonable that any naturalist must require that metaphysics can contradict
neither science nor the logical implications of science and as a result, naturalists must
strengthen the minimal restriction in order to ensure this.
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3.2.2 Trumping naturalism
A naturalism invoking this requirement will be called ’trumping naturalism’ following the
name Alexander Paseau (2010) gives to a naturalism following the imperative: “Accept p, if
science sanctions p” (Paseau 2010, 642). If an assertion is sanctioned by science, it should
be a member of metaphysics, if it is a possible member of metaphysics. Thus, on trumping
naturalism there is no assertion, p, such that p is logically implied by metaphysics and ¬p is
scientifically sanctioned. With the introduction of the one place predicate scientific sanction,
SA, this can be put formally:
∀p (¬(M ` p ∧ SA(¬p))) (3.2)
Due to the different conceptions of the scope of scientific sanctioning, this formulation
is indeterminate between the restriction that no logical implication of metaphysics can
contradict a logical implication of science, and the restriction that no logical implication
of metaphysics can contradict a member of science. It should be noted that the latter is
implied by the former, since any member of science is trivially, logically implied by science.
However, the opposite is not the case.
The formulation so far leaves out an important aspect of the imperative. We must accept
p if it is sanctioned by science. Supposedly, this means that if p is sanctioned by science
and p is possibly a member of metaphysics, then p is a member of metaphysics. Again, put
formally:
∀p ((SA(p) ∧ (p ∈M))→ p ∈M) (3.3)
This principle ensures that the metaphysicist cannot choose not to include an assertion
in metaphysics, if it is sanctioned by science and it is a possible member of metaphysics.
There are no metaphysical reasoning which can allow such an exclusion of an assertion,
if science sanctions it. This restriction is superfluous if not adopting p is equated with
adopting ¬p since this would result in a contradiction that would then be restricted by the
trumping restriction. However, if not adopting p does not imply the adoption of ¬p then
this restriction ensures that p must be adopted if it is a possible member of metaphysics
and sanctioned by science. Due to its origin, this restriction will be called ’the imperative
restriction’.
Combining the trumping restriction and the imperative restriction results in a naturalism
that arguably captures a relevant interpretation of ontological naturalism. With these two
restrictions, metaphysics defers to science in the sense that science is the authority on matters
that are the concern of science. Consequently, assertions implied by metaphysics cannot be
allowed to contradict assertions sanctioned by science and further, metaphysics must adopt
scientifically sanctioned assertions that are within the subject matter of metaphysics. In
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cases where metaphysics and science overlap, metaphysics should defer to science.
Finally, we can notice that even though trumping naturalism might be prima facie stronger
than minimal naturalism, if science and metaphysics are closed under deductions, i.e. if any
assertion logically implied by metaphysics or science is itself a member of metaphysics or
science, then minimal naturalism is equivalent to trumping naturalism.
3.2.3 Biconditional naturalism
Trumping naturalism is a weak restriction in a similar way to minimal naturalism. If the
assertions of science and those of metaphysics are completely unrelated, the restriction might
not affect metaphysics even when including also the implications of science and metaphysics.
On both minimal and trumping naturalism, a metaphysicist can disregard both restrictions
as long as she keeps an appropriate distance to any inquiry, which is directly addressed
by science or might be in the scope of a logical implication of science. Some if not most
naturalists regard such metaphysics distanced from science with suspicion. Such metaphysics
do not exhibit an adequate deference to science and they want to restrict it. Consequently,
they might impose what Paseau calls biconditional naturalism, which he gives the following
imperative formulation: “Accept p iff science sanctions p” (Paseau 2010, 642). As the name
suggests, this biconditional naturalism adds a direction as compared to trumping naturalism.
We should not only accept any assertion that is sanctioned by science, further, these are the
only assertions that we should accept. In the context of a naturalization of metaphysics, this
imposes the restriction that any logical implication of metaphysics must be sanctioned by
science. The opposite is not immediately the case, since many assertions implied by science
are not implied by metaphysics. Consequently, we can provide the following formalization:
∀p (M ` p→ SA(p)) (3.4)
or the equivalent formulation, which shares the form of the former restrictions:
∀p (¬(M ` p ∧ ¬SA(p) (3.5)
Which reads that there are no assertions logically implied by metaphysics that are not
sanctioned by science. This is indeed a very strong restriction.
With this biconditional naturalism, it is even more important exactly which assertions that
are sanctioned by science, as these assertions are the only acceptable assertions. Following
a conception of scientific sanctioning, where the logical implications of science as well as
the members of science are scientifically sanctioned, biconditional naturalism introduces
the restriction that all assertions logically implied by metaphysics are logically implied by
science. This can be given the following formalization:
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∀p (M ` p→ S ` p) (3.6)
We will call this open biconditional naturalism. On the other conception of scientific
sanctioning, only assertions in science are sanctioned by science and consequently, it is
required that any assertion logically implied by metaphysics is a member of science, put
formally:
∀p (M ` p→ p ∈ S) (3.7)
We will call this closed, biconditional naturalism. Here metaphysics must be a part of
science or more precisely, metaphysics must be a subset of science.4 Put formally:
∀p (p ∈M → p ∈ S) (3.8)
This restriction is even stronger than open, biconditional naturalism. Metaphysics is simply
a part of science.
Under the assumption that science is closed under deduction, open, biconditional naturalism
is equivalent to closed biconditional naturalism, since closure under deduction entails:
∀p (S ` p↔ p ∈ S) (3.9)
Even open, biconditional naturalism is probably too strong for some naturalists. However,
settling on a restriction between trumping and biconditional naturalism is difficult since
any such restriction must try to stipulate under what conditions metaphysics wanders too
far from science without restricting metaphysics to the implication of science and thereby
reproducing biconditional naturalism. See Chakravartty (2013) for an attempt at a middle
ground between trumping naturalism and biconditional naturalism.
Like trumping naturalism, biconditional naturalism is introduced as an imperative. Again
this must imply that the metaphysicist has no choice of whether to accept an assertion as
metaphysical, if the assertion is a possible member of metaphysics and is sanctioned by
science. Above, this was formalized in the imperative restriction: ∀p ((SA(p) ∧ (p ∈M))→
p ∈M), which must be imposed alongside the biconditional restriction in order to reproduce
biconditional naturalism.
These expositions emphasize that biconditional naturalism is prima facie stronger than
trumping naturalism. However, making certain assumptions about science and using what
4Since ∀p (p ∈M →M ` p) and ∀p (M ` p→ p ∈ S) together implies ∀p (p ∈M → p ∈ S).
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Paseau calls the collapse argument, it can apparently be shown that these two naturalisms
are equivalent under these assumptions. Following Paseau (2010, 644–645), the argument
goes like this: According to trumping naturalism there are two possibilities, either science
sanctions p or it does not sanction p. If p is sanctioned by science then we must accept p. If
science does not sanction p it either sanctions ¬p or it neither sanctions p nor ¬p. If science
sanctions ¬p we must reject p and therefore not accept p. All this follows trivially. Now
according to the argument, if science neither sanction p or ¬p, it sanctions not sanctioning p.
Science sanctions its own disbelief about p and ¬p. Following trumping naturalism, if science
sanctions not sanctioning p we must accept that neither p nor ¬p is sanctioned. Following
the argument, this is interpreted such that science sanctions the statement ’suspend belief
about p’ if science neither sanctions p nor ¬p. So, according to trumping naturalism we
should accept p if science sanctions p, reject p if science sanctions ¬p and accept to suspend
belief, if science neither sanctions p nor ¬p. Thereby, only the assertions sanctioned by
science should be accepted. This is equivalent to biconditional naturalism.
This argument presumes that scientific sanction is reflexive such that if p is not sanctioned
then it is sanctioned that p is not sanctioned. Again, if it is assumed that science sanctions
those assertions that are logical implications of science, then this implies that not sanctioning
p is logically implied by science. This has the consequence that either assertions about
scientific sanctioning are members of science, or that it can be shown within science itself
what assertions science sanctions. This must at least be defended.
Paseau (2010, 646) gives several other objections to the collapse argument, among them
the objection that the reflectivity thesis for scientific sanction is so strong that scientific
sanctioning must be inconsistent due to Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. However,
he himself answers this and the other objections, but one objection remains unanswered. In
this objection, Paseau questions what he calls “the metaproposition” that disbelief about
p should implies the imperative ’suspend belief about p’. He argues that disbelief about p
amounts to not sanctioning anything about p, and to infer that it implies ’suspend belief
about p’ assumes biconditional naturalism, thereby assuming what is supposed to be shown.
More precisely, Paseau (2010, 647) provides a formal deduction, which shows that science
must sanction biconditional naturalism in order for trumping naturalism to be equivalent
to biconditional naturalism. It can hardly be surprising that this follows from trumping
naturalism since it states that if science sanctions biconditional naturalism, then we should
accept biconditional naturalism. However, as Paseau points out, it is questionable whether
science sanctions that every assertion which should be accepted is sanctioned by science. In
consequence, he concludes: “The logical gap between TN [trumping naturalism] and BN
[biconditional naturalism] is therefore real and not bridgeable by a valid scientific argument.
An argument for BN must apparently come from outside of science” (Paseau 2010, 648).
From the point of view of naturalism, is is difficult to see what this argument might appeal
to if not science.
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3.3 Variants of naturalized metaphysics
The previous chapter argued that attempts at metaphysics are successful only if metaphysics
defers to science. Metaphysics restricted in this way is naturalized metaphysics. The two
previous sections expose the differences that result among naturalized metaphysics from the
available deviant views about science investigated in section 3.1 and varieties among the
exact restrictions following the deference of metaphysics to science that was investigated in
section 3.2. Thus, naturalized metaphysics is a range of positions that all invoke variants of
ontological naturalism. Below, some of these varieties will be considered.
In principle, it is possible to discuss any combination of answers to the questions suggested
in the two previous sections and their consequent positions. However, the interest in these
positions is ultimately to know of their differences. Therefore, the scope here is limited to
demonstrating how the details of a naturalization determine the sort of metaphysics that
results from the naturalization and the task for metaphysicist, and how differences in these
details result in differences for metaphysics and metaphysicists. These considerations will
then later serve to ensure that there are no variants of naturalized metaphysics that can
avoid the problems proposed in the next chapter.
Besides these preliminary qualifications of how a particular naturalization determines the
scope of the resulting naturalized metaphysics and the related task for the metaphysicist,
this section will also discuss some criticism which threatens to withdraw any content from
naturalized metaphysics and some remarks will be made on how the investigations from
the previous sections provide useful insight as analytic tools in the study of naturalized
metaphysics.
3.3.1 Moderate naturalism
As it has been remarked already, it seems to be a contemporary doctrine in our culture
that any investigation must accord to the findings of science. Further, only science itself
has the authority to overturn scientific theories and replace them with new ones. Very few
philosophers today will outright deny this doctrine. The pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides
has famously argued that everything is one, uniform, eternal, unmoveable and consequently,
that there cannot be change. This obviously is contrary to how it appears to be in the
world, however, Parmenides favoured the authority of his rationalistic method over that
of his senses. Parmenides’ argument inspired the famous paradoxes of Zeno, among them
the paradox of the tortoise and Achilles, the purpose of which was exactly to demonstrate
the necessity and truth of Parmenides’ cosmology despite its apparent falsity. In this sense,
Parmenides and Zeno can be viewed as rejecting ontological naturalism, i.e. that the findings
of empirical science has an authority over the conclusions of philosophical theorizing, but it
is questionable whether anyone will follow Parmenides and Zeno to this conclusion today.
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Instead, a moderate naturalism has even influenced traditional analytic metaphysicists
such as Lowe and Laurie A. Paul, who both in passing claim that they, too, commit to
naturalism in the sense that they recognize the authority of science on empirical matters,
and consequently that metaphysics should defer to science on these matters (Lowe 1998, 5–6;
Paul 2012, 3). It simply seems unreasonable to deny science this authority in the light of the
success of science.
In the context of metaphysics, this moderate naturalism is simply the introduced trumping
naturalism: ∀p (¬(M ` p∧SA(¬p))), which requires that no logical implication of metaphysics
may contradict an assertion sanctioned by science. As previously noted, for any work in
metaphysics that is adequately detached from matters that are the concern of science,
the commitment to trumping naturalism has no influence and consequently no instructive
implications. This is so both when scientific realism and scientific anti-realism is assumed,
even though the metaphysically interesting topics outside the influence of trumping naturalism
are supposedly fewer under the assumption of realism, since science then might engage in
the same questions as metaphysics, those about the thing in itself. The question of whether
science is completed enters here in an interesting way under the assumption of scientific
realism. Under this assumption, if science is incomplete in the sense that there are still
matters that are ultimately the concern of science but about which science does not yet
sanction any assertions, then nothing prohibits the metaphysicist from engaging in an
investigation of these matters as long as it is recognized that any conclusion reached by
the metaphysicist is trumped by science, if science reaches a state where it sanctions an
assertion about the matter. This will again expand the range of matters which metaphysics
can engage in; even when assuming scientific realism.
Naturalizations of metaphysics by trumping naturalism leaves much of metaphysics unaffected
whether realism or anti-realism is assumed. However, this in turn makes it very difficult to
see how such a naturalized metaphysics should answer how metaphysics is possible, at least if
most of metaphysics is under the suspicion of being problematic. Trumping naturalism leaves
so much of metaphysics unaffected that it is implausible that anyone should invoke trumping
naturalism as a means to instruct how to avoid the problems of metaphysics, besides the
potential problem that metaphysics contradicts science either knowingly like Parmenides
or unknowingly. It is simply difficult to see how trumping naturalism can resolve any of
the problems of metaphysics, when it invokes such a relatively weak restriction that allow
metaphysics to be very detached from science. Thus, if the conclusion of the present project
were merely that trumping naturalism is not an answer to how metaphysics is possible, this
would again be somewhat futile. Supporters of trumping naturalism such as Lowe and Paul
are confident that metaphysics is generally possible, but not as a result of a naturalization
due to trumping naturalism.
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3.3.2 Implications of biconditional naturalism
Most naturalists endorse the much stronger biconditional naturalism, precisely because many
naturalists suspect that the problems of metaphysics occur exactly when metaphysics gets
too detached from science. As proposed, biconditional naturalism can solve this since it
requires that any assertions logically implied by metaphysics must be sanctioned by science:
∀p (M ` p→ SA(p)). As it was also shown, this restriction conflates two restrictions that
differ due to the varying conception of scientific sanctioning. One is open, biconditional
naturalism with the restriction that all assertions logically implied by metaphysics are
logically implied by science: ∀p (M ` p → S ` p) and the other is closed, biconditional
naturalism with the restriction that all assertions logically implied by metaphysics are
members of science: ∀p (M ` p → p ∈ S). Closed, biconditional naturalism is the most
restrictive. Again, it implies that metaphysics is a subset of science: ∀p (p ∈M → p ∈ S).
Closed, biconditional naturalism simply withdraws the autonomy of metaphysics and its
status as an independent field of inquiry. According to closed, biconditional naturalism,
whatever metaphysics contains it is science. Science is divided into individual scientific
disciplines, so according to closed, biconditional naturalism, metaphysics must find its place
among these. Three possibilities are available: I) Metaphysics is simply identified with
parts of one or more of these disciplines, the task of the metaphysicist is simply to read
off the metaphysics of science and thereby construct this special collection of scientific
assertions. The analysis of Ney’s naturalized metaphysics will reveal that she endorses this
view. II) Metaphysics serves as an interdisciplinary investigation, perhaps in showing the
consistency of science and scientific theories. Such a conception is proposed by Ladyman
and Ross (2007, 27–45). III) Metaphysics is simply one of the scientific disciplines, and
has a place among them and consequently, ’metaphysicist’ is merely the name of a scientist
engaged in this disciple. This third option is vague in this formulation. It seems to provide
leeway for the metaphysicist to simply accept that metaphysics is part of science and then
continue doing metaphysics as before. This, however, would be to disregard the settled-
upon conception of science. As argued, science is a very particular collection of assertions,
which are characterized by their empirical adequacy and successful passage through the
institutional error filters. Even being an autonomous part of science, metaphysics must
comply to this, and consequently, the metaphysicist must exhibit ingenuity in order to find
parts of science that are not already dealt with by another scientific discipline. This is
metaphysics as science, and such a conception is for instance proposed by Bunge (1972). For
closed, biconditional naturalism, the supplementary imperative restriction entails that there
is no task for the metaphysicist in arguing exactly which scientific assertion that should
also be part of metaphysics, at least once it is defined what assertions that are possible
members of metaphysics. Thus, once it is settled what metaphysics is about, it follows
directly which subset of science is included in metaphysics. There is no special metaphysical
reasoning which the metaphysicist can invoke to argue that certain scientific assertions are
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not members of metaphysics, unless it can be argued that the assertions are not possible
members of metaphysics.
In relation to closed, biconditional naturalism, the matter of realism and anti-realism
has no direct influence on metaphysics. Metaphysics is simply a part of science and
therefore, metaphysics must also be subject to the assumed realism or anti-realism. Thus, if
scientific anti-realism is assumed, such a naturalized metaphysics cannot be an answer to
how metaphysics is possible. Metaphysical assertions must be about the same as the rest
of science, so under the assumption of anti-realism, metaphysical assertions are not about
the thing in itself. On the other hand, if realism is assumed, a more positive prospects are
available for naturalized metaphysics since the proposed condition for metaphysics would
then be adhered to by all of science, including metaphysics. This does not imply that such
a naturalized metaphysics is an answer to how metaphysics is possible, but just that this
particular condition is adhered to by assumption.
Open, biconditional naturalism leaves slightly more room for metaphysics. It does not entitle
us to infer that metaphysics is merely a part of science, but it still requires metaphysics to
be either assertions of science or assertions logically implied by science, since the implied
conception of scientific sanctioning suggests that also logical implications of science are
scientifically sanctioned. This allows the metaphysicist to engage in a task of finding these
logical implications of science and on the ground of these to establish the collection of
metaphysics. We might suggest that this is the task often described as interpretation of
science. Such a task is not available for the metaphysicist under the assumption of closed,
biconditional naturalism, if metaphysical interpretation of science is beyond science. Open,
biconditional naturalism, on the other hand, allows for such a work. Here, metaphysics can
consist of assertions that are not members of science but which have inherited a scientific
sanctioning from the theories that these metaphysical assertions are inferred from. This
is a metaphysics of science. Under the assumption of realism, one might suspect that
metaphysics and science have a significant intersection and this work might therefore be
somewhat limited since the assertions of science in that case themselves are about the thing
in itself. Consequently, we must expect that much of the metaphysics of science is merely
science like it is the case with closed, biconditional naturalism, and the metaphysicist’s task
would primarily consist in finding these scientific assertions that are members of metaphysics.
The imperative restriction ensures that this intersection is as large as it possibly can be.
Since any possible members of metaphysics sanctioned by science must be a member of a
metaphysics. Since science is about the thing in itself following realism, it follows that all
possible members of metaphysics that are members of science are members of metaphysics.
Supposedly, there remain assertions that can be inferred from the assertions of science that
are metaphysical in nature, but which do no belong to science. Thereby metaphysics is not
a subset of science. However, due to the imperative restriction, the members of metaphysics
are still forced upon it, since any assertion sanctioned by science must be accepted.
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If anti-realism is assumed, there seems to be more genuine interpretive work to do for
the metaphysicist. Here science is merely considered to be an adequate description of the
appearances and consequently, a substantial task would be involved in inferring conclusions
about the thing in itself, which due to the underdeterminism of science to the thing in
itself would probably take the form of modal statements of possibility. The intersection
between metaphysics and science is necessarily empty when anti-realism is assumed since
science and metaphysics have different subject matters, however, the imperative restriction
still forces the anti-realist to adopt any assertion that is sanctioned by science. Since both
members of science and logical implications of these are scientifically sanction acoordin to
open, biconditional naturalism and the anti-realist’s metaphysics necessarily is composed of
such assertions due the biconditional restriction, it still follows from the imperative restriction
that the anti-realist must adopt these logical implications as members of metaphysics, if
they are possible members.
As mentioned, biconditional naturalism seems to be a more appropriate interpretation of
ontological naturalism, if a naturalized metaphysics building on this should be an answer to
how metaphysics is possible. However, open, biconditional naturalism might face problems if
anti-realism is assumed, since it is not clear how metaphysics can inherit scientific sanctioning
as assertions about the thing in itself from the scientific assertion, when it is exactly assumed
due to anti-realism that the thing in itself is underdetermined by science. The extent of the
difficulty will depend on the exact reasons behind the naturalist’s anti-realism.
3.3.3 Allen’s critique of naturalized metaphysics
The combination of the biconditional and the imperative restrictions confines the metaphysi-
cist, such that she can only rely on the findings of science in the construction of metaphysics.
According to biconditional naturalism science is the only authority. There are no other
means to discover and justify members of metaphysics than through the investigation of
scientific theories and their implications, and the imperative restriction entails that there is no
metaphysical reasoning that is relevant for the adoption of these assertions into metaphysics.
If science sanctions them, they must be accepted.
This effectively prohibits any other means of acquiring knowledge in metaphysics besides
the means available in science. Apart from the findings of science, only logical deduction is
available to the metaphysicist, however, this is in principle not a means to acquire anything
but knowledge already implied by the premises. According to biconditional naturalism,
metaphysics cannot tell us anything about the thing in itself on its own; it must rely on the
findings of science. This de facto reproduces the sort of methodological naturalism which
entails that only science and supposedly thereby the methods of science can produce the
knowledge available for the construction of a metaphysics. If metaphysics itself becomes a
science, it may be involved in the production of this knowledge, but only as a science. If
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metaphysics remains distinct from science, the task for the metaphysicist is as a handmaiden
to science, who helps scientists to read off those metaphysical commitments that are logically
implied by science.
Sophie Allen (2012) worries about this confinement of metaphysics. Her critique is initially
directed at what she describes as a methodological naturalism which implies a “continuity of
metaphysics with empirical investigation” (Allen 2012, 212). A metaphysics that “shares
its methodology with science (whatever the methodology of science may be). Naturalized
metaphysical theories are only open to revision on logical grounds or upon those which are
naturalistically or empirically acceptable” (Allen 2012, 212). While biconditional naturalism
does not directly impose these methodological restrictions, such restrictions follow as a
consequence of the restriction that metaphysics can solely rely on the findings of science as
already argued. In so far as these findings are brought about by a scientific method, then
biconditional naturalism is a methodological naturalism by association and consequently,
Allen’s critique applies to it.
According to Allen, such a naturalized metaphysics is incompatible with robust realism,
the view that our metaphysical theories are about the thing in itself. Allen describes it
as “the requirement [. . . ] that we can know about the objectively-existing ontology of the
mind-independent natural world” (Allen 2012, 221). This is an interesting criticism since
it once again threatens to render the present project futile. If biconditional naturalism
implicitly assumes that robust metaphysical realism is wrong, i.e. if biconditional naturalism
implies that there are no theories and assertions that are true about the thing in itself,
then the biconditional restriction could not serve as an instruction as to how metaphysics is
possible. Nothing would then adhere to both the biconditional restriction and the proposed
condition for metaphysics. Ney shares the view that metaphysics cannot be possible as
biconditional naturalism, however, in her view this is due to a simple contradiction. As will
be demonstrated below, there is no such contradiction.
Allen’s outset is the following set of premises:
[1] More than one ontological theory fulfils the same explanatory aims.
[2] If robust realism is true, then one of these theories is the correct, or true one.
[3] If one takes a naturalistic approach to metaphysics, then there is no method of
choosing between theories which: (a) is naturalistically acceptable; (b) does not
presuppose the existence of some of the very ontology postulated by the theory.
[4] If there is no basis for choice, then any decision between theories would be
arbitrary, which is not acceptable from the point of view of realism (nor, perhaps,
in general). (Allen 2012, 214)
Allen notes that this set premises is contradictory, which according to her implies one of the
following:
Conclusion 1: Robust realism is false: realism should be relaxed or abandoned in
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favour of another way of regarding the relationship between our theories and the
world.
Conclusion 2: Naturalized metaphysics cannot be sustained in its current form.
Conclusion 3: One of the above premises is false. (Allen 2012, 214)
Obviously, the biconditional naturalist who regards naturalized metaphysics as answering
how metaphysics is possible cannot accept conclusion 1 and 2, thus they must prefer the
third conclusion or argue that the four premises are not contradictory after all. The latter
option does not seem to be viable and consequently, the naturalist must argue that one of the
premises is false. However, Allen goes to great lengths to show that this third conclusion is
at least very unlikely and this of course, is what drives Allen’s criticism home as a significant
problem for naturalized metaphysics. About the second premise, Allen writes: “Premise
(2) is true by definition, since the robust form of realism with which I am concerned makes
the ontological claim that there is a way the natural world is” (Allen 2012, 215). Our
biconditional naturalist must agree to this. This is required in order for there to be assertions
about the thing in itself. According to Allen, “[p]remise (3) is the hardest to establish”
(Allen 2012, 215). This might very well be the case for methodological naturalism, but the
biconditional naturalist has only logical methods and the findings of science available and
consequently, if it is underdetermined by science what theory to prefer and none of them is
contradictory, then indeed there cannot be any way for the naturalist to choose between
them. This leaves only premise (1), but Allen writes: “This premise is not particularly
contentious, but it may not be an obvious claim to all” (Allen 2012, 214). As a consequence,
Allen provides three examples of metaphysical questions, where there are several distinct
theories available. This seems to settle the matter unfavourably for the naturalist. However,
there are two responses available to the naturalist. One is proposed by Allen almost as an
afterthought at the end of her paper and concerns premise (4). The other is not mentioned
by Allen, and presents a way to undermine Allen’s support for premise (1).
Premise (4) really conflates two distinct premises as it contains two distinct claims. The first,
Premise (4a), is that “If there is no basis for choice [between theories], then any decision
between theories would be arbitrary” (Allen 2015, 214). If this were all there was to premise
(4), then the set of premises would not be contradictory. Rather, these four premises would
merely imply that there are competing metaphysical theories where any choice among them
must be arbitrary if the choice is made by a robustly realistic naturalist. Now, the set of
premises are only contradictory if the set includes premise (4b) that this arbitrariness “is
not acceptable from the point of view of realism (nor, perhaps, in general)” (Allen 2015,
214). Premise (4a) is uncontentious and perhaps even true by definition. Premise (4b) on
the other hand is less self-evident. Why is it not acceptable for the realist that we have no
means with which to choose between certain competing ontological theories? Allen does not
address this directly, but the following passage might shed some light on the matter: “The
implication of not being able to explicate ontological priority in naturalized metaphysics
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would result in the ontological alternatives discussed in Section 3 [the competing ontological
theories] being only terminologically different” (Allen 2012, 232). If we take this “not being
able to explicate ontological priority” to mean that there is no non-arbitrary way for us to
choose between theories such that we cannot argue for the ontological priority one over the
other, then Allen seems to suggest in this passage that this has the consequence that the
difference between such competing theories is merely verbal. That the difference is merely
verbal entails that the question is either completely deflated, i.e. that there is not fact of the
matter ,or at least that all the competing theories describe the same matter of fact which
implies some sort of structuralism. Indeed, Allen seems to regard such a structuralism to be
the only position available for a robustly realistic naturalist. She writes:
‘Strong’ or ‘Ontic Metaphysical Structuralism’ would diagnose the failure to
detect a difference between theories as being evidence for the fact that there
is no objective difference between ontological theories, the structure is all that
there is. This strong version of structuralism opens the door once more to robust
realism in naturalized metaphysics, albeit in a new and intriguing way, since
Premise (4) of the argument which asserts that the realist metaphysician must
make a decision between competing ontological theories (which has hitherto been
uncontested) no longer holds. One could be a realist about the shared ontologi-
cal structure—whatever that is—of all the explanatorily equivalent ontological
theories, maintaining that this structure is or represents the ontological structure
of the objective natural world (Allen 2012, 232).
This strong or ontic metaphysical structuralism implies that premise (4) is false, and more
precisely, following the distinction introduced, it implies that premise (4b) is false, whereby
the structuralist can accept conclusion 3 and consequently avoid the problematic conclusions
1 and 2. It is worth noticing the emphasis when she writes: “This strong version of
structuralism opens the door once more to robust realism in naturalized metaphysics” (Allen
2012, 232). It is this special sort of strong structuralism that opens the door.
Allen contrasts strong structuralism with a weak structuralism. About this position she writes:
“‘Weak’ or ‘Epistemic Metaphysical Structuralism’ would treat the failure of naturalized
metaphysics to distinguish between alternative ontological theories as an epistemic problem;
one or another of the ontological theories we have might be true of the objective world, but
we cannot tell which one that is” (Allen 2012, 232). According to weak structuralism, it is
for epistemological reasons that we cannot choose between competing ontological theories.
Whether this is adequately described as a structuralism is debatable but nevertheless, this line
of reasoning might be the most compelling to the naturalists. It provides the qualification of
premise (4a) that the choice is arbitrary for epistemological reasons, however, the naturalist
will probably maintain that it does not follow that there is no fact of the matter. Rather, the
epistemological problems entail that we must accept that we can only justify to assert that
each of these competing theories is possible and that we have no means of settling which of
Chapter 3. A deference to science 77
them is true of the actual world. This seems to allow the naturalist to remain a robust realist
because premise (4b) is rejected. That there are no epistemological means to settle which of
the theories is true in the actual world does not imply that robust naturalism is false.
Returning to Allen’s formulation from above, she does not seem to agree to this. She
specifically emphasizes that it is strong structuralism that opens a door to robust realism
once more in naturalized metaphysics, whereas she says nothing of the sort about the weak
structuralism. It is not clear why Allen rejects that weak structuralism can open this
door, but we might speculate that she regards the mentioned epistemological problems as
unavailable. If there are no such epistemological problems that can explain why we should
be unable to choose between the competing theories, then this must imply that they are not
ontologically distinct after all. This in turn leads us to the strong structuralism. Thus, the
weak structuralist has to provide epistemological reasons why the choice cannot be made
even though the theories are ontologically distinct. We can speculate that it is Allen’s view
that the weak structuralist cannot provide such reasons. Perhaps because there are no such
reasons following the robustly realistic naturalism that Allen has in mind.
It must remain speculation, but perhaps Allen requires of a robustly scientific naturalist that
she can reproduce the current debates in metaphysics or at least that this naturalist must
be able to make some sense of the current debate. This is achieved with both deflationism
and strong structuralism, the former explains the debate as concerned with a merely verbal
dispute, whereas the latter endorses an underlying view of ontology which can explain why
there is only a superficial difference between the competing ontological theories while in fact
they are ontologically equivalent; it is only the structures on which they agree that actually
exist. The weak structuralist on the other hand has no immediate explanation for the debate.
Rather, the weak structuralist must simply acknowledge that there is no way to reproduce
the debate in naturalized metaphysics even though the robust realism entails that there is a
fact of the matter. Metaphysics becomes restricted if weak structuralism is assumed in order
to prove one of the premises (1)-(4) wrong. However, at least for our biconditional naturalist
this is not a problem. To the contrary, it is to be expected. The initial motivation for the
naturalization was exactly that all of metaphysics was under suspicion as being defective.
The naturalization is introduced to instruct us which parts of metaphysics remain successful.
This is the condition in which metaphysics finds itself and the reason why a naturalization
is imposed. It is proposed that biconditional naturalism can save the metaphysics which
can be established from those assertions that are sanctioned by science. If science only
sanctions the assertions regarding the possibilities of these competing ontologies and does
not sanction one rather than the other as the ontology of the actual world, then there is no
way to choose between these competing theories. However, the naturalist does not promise
that. In fact, the motivation behind the naturalization should make us expect that much of
current metaphysics will prove not to be genuine metaphysics after all.
This line of argument even suggests how a radical deflationism about the debate engaged in by
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these competing theories might be an available solution even for a robustly realistic naturalist.
Premise (1) states that there are more ontological theories which serve the same explanatory
purposes and even though Allen regards this as uncontestable, the biconditional naturalist
might indeed contest it due to the problems facing metaphysics that the naturalization
is supposed to avoid. Now, the biconditional naturalist argues to solve the problems of
metaphysics, however, only for those assertions that adhere to the appropriate restrictions.
Thus, if the competing ontological theories in question do not adhere to these restrictions
then naturalism does not save them from the problems facing metaphysics. It is exactly the
conjecture of the naturalist that only the naturalized metaphysics avoid these problems and
thereby, the naturalist can remain a robust realist with respect to the naturalized metaphysics
and simultaneously regard non-naturalized metaphysics as misguided and perhaps defective.
Thus, if the competing theories are not part of the naturalized metaphysics, then the
naturalist might simply reject the first premise; there are no competing ontological theories
because they cannot be ontological theories. Obviously, it still remains to be shown how
naturalization of metaphysics ensures that these problems are avoided.
This concludes the investigation of Allen’s critique of naturalized metaphysics. It has been
shown how the biconditional naturalism is not contradictory to a robust metaphysical realism.
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, naturalized metaphysics is not an answer to
how metaphysics is possible, but the problem is not a mere contradiction with the condition
for metaphysics. Rather, the problem is a general problem faced in the attempt to obey to
this condition.
Chapter 4
The possibility of naturalized metaphysics
This concludes the preliminary clarification required to investigate whether naturalized
metaphysics answers how metaphysics is possible. In the chapter 2, it was argued that such
an answer should instruct how to succeed in the attempts to assert something about the
thing in itself, and it was established that proponents of naturalized metaphysics regarded
naturalized metaphysics to provide such an instruction. Formally, this instruction should
take the form of a restriction that is obeyed by all successful attempts at metaphysics.
The restriction proposed by naturalized metaphysics is that metaphysics should defer to
the findings of science. Consequently, for naturalized metaphysics it should be such that
attempts at metaphysics are successful only if they defers to the findings of science. As was
argued in chapter 3, this does not provide a single answer to how metaphysics is possible
but a range an answers that differ due to different interpretations of ontological naturalism.
This chapter will argue that there is problem facing metaphysics that is not avoided if
metaphysics defers to the findings of science. This problem arise from Carnap’s challenge to
metaphysics and I will argue that it is equally significant to naturalized and non-naturalized
metaphysics alike – ontological naturalism cannot serve as an instruction to avoid this
problem – and therefore metaphysics is neither possible as naturalized nor as a non-naturalized
metaphysics until or unless this problem is solved. The solution is not provided by naturalized
metaphysics
Because of the range of interpretations of ontological naturalism, this argument must
demonstrate how a whole range of position cannot be such an instruction. Rather than
considering one position at a time, the approach will be to make a thorough analysis of
the naturalized metaphysics introduced in Alyssa Ney’s “Neo-positivist metaphysics” as a
solution to the particular problem facing traditional metaphysics. For this investigation, the
systematic account will prove very valuable, since chapter 2 and 3 provide the analytic tools
needed for a detailed study of any naturalization of metaphysics. So in this analysis one must
inquire which sort of naturalism that are introduced and whether in is a revision motivated
by the problems facing metaphysics. Further, attention must be paid to the naturalists
conception of science and the exact nature of the deference of metaphysics to science in
order to achieve a detailed view of the resulting naturalized metaphysics. One must inquire
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whether a scientific realism, anti-realism or instrumentalism is presupposed, whether science
is viewed as true and consistent, whether scientific sanctioning includes logical implications
of science, and whether a truncating or bi-conditional naturalism is imposed. This will
establish exactly the sort of naturalized metaphysics that Ney introduces. It will then be
argued that Ney’s naturalized metaphysics cannot serve an instruction how metaphysics is
possible in the light of the problems facing metaphysics. It then remains to show that non
of the remaining variants of naturalized metaphysics fares any better and this is achieved
by systematically considering variations with an outset in Ney’s naturalized metaphysics.
Arguing that these variations fares no better will then serve to demonstrate than naturalized
metaphysics in general is not an answer to how metaphysics is possible.
4.1 Problems for metaphysics
As previously established, the proponents of naturalized metaphysics regard traditional
analytic metaphysics as problematic. Ladyman and Ross in particular strongly criticise
this tradition and describe it as neo-scholastic metaphysics (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 7),
thereby making a mocking identification between recent work in analytic metaphysics
and the scholastic metaphysics of the late Middle Ages in the style of Thomas Aquinas.
Ladyman and Ross thoroughly review a vast number of problems facing such metaphysics
that, according to them, arise from to the lack of a proper naturalization of metaphysics.
This includes both what they consider to be a complete disregard for the findings of science
and what they call “[p]seudo-scientific metaphysics” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 17).
These problems for metaphysics will not be considered in the present project. Instead,
attention will be given to Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics from “Empiricism, Semantics,
and Ontology”. This is the challenge that I propose is equally significant to both naturalized
and non-naturalized metaphysics and thereby expose that naturalized metaphysics does not
answer how metaphysics is possible.
4.1.1 Linguistic frameworks
As a member of the Vienna Circle and as a prominent logical positivist, Rodolf Carnap is
well known for his suspicion towards metaphysics. Perhaps most famous is his criticism of
metaphysics founded on the verifiability criterion of meaning that is very prominent is his
writing from the early thirties (see Carnap (1932; 1935)). The sort of metaphysics under
suspicion here is the traditional metaphysics ranging from pro-Socratic philosophers such
as Thales, over Plato and up to more recent figures such as Spinoza, Shelling, Hegel and
Bergson. Both monists, dualists, materialists, realists, idealists, and solipsists are attacked
(Carnap 1935, 16), all because their doctrines do not adhere to Carnap’s verifiability criterion
of meaning.
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The challenge considered here, however, is another one. It is a challenge from his later semantic
period primarily developed in his article “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (1956a).
The challenge to metaphysics found in this article has received extensive interest in recent
years. This is manifested in the anthology Metametaphysics (2009) and in the forthcoming
anthology Ontology after Carnap. Both deal extensively with what can appropriately be
called Carnap’s metaontology or metametaphysics. This metametaphysics, however, does not
take the form of a criticism of traditional metaphysics. Carnap’s opponents in “Empiricism,
Semantics, and Ontology” are no longer Hegel, Bergson, and Heidegger, rather, the article
is a reaction to the accusation that his semantics entail Platonism, an accusation that was
made by some of his own logical empiricist friends, who were inclined towards nominalism
(Carnap 1963a, 65). The debate concerns the existence of abstract entities. Carnap’s
semantics includes reference to such entities – classes, properties, numbers, etc. – and this is
problematic, according to the nominalists, because abstract entities do not exist. Carnap’s
reply to this accusation is rather unusual. Rather than arguing in favour of Platonism, he
argues that both Platonism and nominalism are pseudo-statements (Carnap 1956a, 218).
Thus, rather than taking a side in the debate, Carnap rejects the debate altogether, at least
in so far as it attempts to discuss whether abstract entities really exist, and he thereby rejects
the presumption that this debate must be settled prior to the employment of semantics of
terms referring to abstract entities. Carnap’s motivation for this work was to answer the
nominalists’ criticism of his work in semantics, however, since his answer takes the form of
an attack on the philosophical standpoint of his critics, the scope of his answer became more
than a rejection this criticism. By rejecting the question about the existence of abstract
entities as a pseudo-question, Carnap once again challenges a question that belongs to the
field of metaphysics. Indeed, the scope of the challenge reaches beyond the discussion over
abstract entities to all attempts at discussions about the thing in itself.
Though the initial aim is different, this result appears to mirror Carnap’s earlier criticism of
metaphysics, however, it is worth keeping his earlier work apart from this later challenge to
metaphysics. It is debated whether the verifiability criterion of meaning plays any role in
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, and regardless, the role is at most minor. Instead,
this later challenge to metaphysics has its outset in his theories of semantics, which he had
not begun to develop in the early thirties, when the verifiability criterion of meaning was
central to his criticism of traditional metaphysics.1
Carnap founds his arguments on what he calls a linguistic framework. In a minimal
interpretation these are merely language fragments (Haug 2014a, 357), however, they are
probably more adequately regarded as systems that define the syntactical and semantic
rules for linguistic expressions within the framework (Carnap 1956a, 214; 219). With such
1In his autobiography (Carnap 1963a, 60–62), Carnap describes how he regarded an adequate definition of
semantic concepts impossible until conversations with Tarski in the thirties introduced him to the semantic
conception of truth.
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an interpretation, the linguistic frameworks appear similar to what Carnap calls ’semantic
systems’ in Introduction to Semantics (1942): these are systems of rules formulated in a
metalanguage that determine the truth-conditions for every sentence in the object language
(Carnap 1942, 22). Thus, when a sentence is stated within a linguistic framework, it is
the framework that determines the necessary and sufficient conditions for its truth. This
is of course essential for the evaluation of the truth of that sentence. As Carnap writes:
“To know the truth-condition of a sentence is (in most cases) much less than to know its
truth-value, but it is the necessary starting point for finding out its truth-value”. This is the
basic linchpin of Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics.
It might appear to be a technical apparatus, but Carnap’s notion of a linguistic framework
is rather straightforward. Carnap gives the example of the question ’Is there a white piece
of paper on my desk?’ To answer this question we would usually just look at the desk. If
we see a white piece of paper, we would answer the question in the affirmative, and if we
cannot see a white piece of paper, we would answer in the negative. Similarly, we could
ask ’Did King Arthur actually live?’ This is a historical question, and while it may not be
easily answerable, once again some investigation would have to be carried out. About such
questions, Carnap writes: “These questions are to be answered by empirical investigations”
(Carnap 1956a, 207). This can hardly be controversial. Regarding the evaluation of different
answers, in this case either affirmative or negative, Carnap writes:
Results of observations are evaluated according to certain rules as confirming
or disconfirming evidence for possible answers. (This evaluation is usually carried
out, of course, as a habit rather than a deliberate, rational procedure. But it is
possible, in a rational reconstruction, to lay down explicit rules for the evaluation
[. . . ]) (Carnap 1956a, 207).
Essentially, what a linguistic framework does for a sentence is to specify what would count
as possible evidence for or against that sentence. Carnap is well aware that we are usually
not aware of which framework a sentence is uttered in. We evaluate the sentence as a
habit, but consider, as Carnap proposes, someone who does not know who King Author
was. She would not know how to answer the question ’Did King Arthur actually live?’. If
we recognize that it would be possible to explain to her how to assess different possible
answers, we recognize Carnap’s proposal that a rational reconstruction is possible, though
it is perhaps rarely carried out, since the given explanation is nothing but these required
rules for evaluation. The rules of evaluation that are proposed for ’Did King Arthur actually
live?’ are supposedly very similar to the rules that one would present for ’Did King Solomon
actually live?’. The similarity between these rules signifies that they belong to the same
underlying linguistic framework. They have similar rules of evaluation because the same
semantic rules determine them, aside from the fact that one name has been exchanged with
another. It is this linguistic framework that determines the rules of evaluation. If changes
are made to the semantic rules of the linguistic framework, then those changes are mirrored
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in the rules of evaluation.
Carnap regards any sentence asserted within a linguistic framework to be perfectly com-
prehensible, that is, any sentence for which a rational reconstruction can lay down explicit
rules of evaluation can be regarded as perfectly comprehensible. It is not required that the
rules specify whether the sentence is true or false. For instance, the above questions require
empirical investigations. They belong to frameworks that in Carnap’s words are “factual
in nature” (Carnap 1956a, 208). There are also frameworks that are logical rather than
factual. This could be what Carnap calls “the system of natural numbers” (Carnap 1956a,
208). In this linguistic framework we could ask, for instance, ’Is there a prime greater than a
hundred?’. Now, for this question, in the semantic rules of the system of natural numbers
“the answers are found, not by empirical investigation based on observation, but on logical
analysis based on the rules of the new expressions” (Carnap 1956a, 208). There is no need to
consult empirical evidence to answer this question, the answer is determined by the semantic
rules of the language in which it is asked. Indeed, 101 is greater than 100 and it is a prime
number. This appears quite innocent, and must be completely uncontroversial, nevertheless,
nominalists might begin to worry here. They will warn us that we should not be deceived
by such talk to believe that there really are numbers, just because it is correct to say in
this framework ’There is a prime number greater than a hundred’. There are no numbers
or prime numbers, according to the nominalists, though the existential quantifier in these
expressions seems to range over such entities.
The nominalists will propose that this could be allowed for as some sort of fictionalist talk,
as long as it is remembered that ’number’ and ’prime number’ do not refer to tokens of any
truly existing abstract entity. There are no such entities, according to the nominalists. Some
nominalists will perhaps go even further and question whether such talk can be allowed unless
it is demonstrated how it can be translated into a linguistic framework in which reference
is not made to any abstract entities. Though there were other motivation as well, such a
nominalism was a contributing inspiration for Hartry Field’s (1980) attempt to formulate
science without existential quantification over mathematical entities. There are no such
entities and therefore, from a nominalist’s point of view, existential quantification of such
entities must be impossible. It could perhaps be allowed as a manner of speaking, but only
if it can be translated into a linguistic framework with an acceptable ontology. Essentially,
the nominalists’ worry concerns the relation between linguistic frameworks or sentences in
linguistic frameworks and the thing in itself. The problem with the system of numbers,
according to the nominalists, is that it implies commitment to an ontology that does not
correspond to the true ontology of the thing in itself.
4.1.2 Internal and external questions and claims
This worry is also the one Carnap was faced with by some of his own empiricist friends.
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They were simply worried that Carnap appears to commit himself to a Platonist ontology
that includes classes, properties, numbers, etc., none of which really exist, according to the
nominalists. As already mentioned, Carnap’s answer to the nominalists is not an attempt
that is analogous to Hartry Field’s, only applied to semantics. Carnap has no ambition to
carry out semantics without abstract entities, because he finds the nominalists’ criticism
misguided. Their thesis is a pseudo-thesis. Carnap observes that the nominalists’ question
concerning the existence of numbers or abstract entities in general cannot be meant as a
question that is asked within the system of numbers, or within the linguistic framework in
which Carnap carries out his work on semantics. In both frameworks it is true to say that
’There are numbers’, and probably trivially so. In both frameworks, nominalism is false.
The nominalists will probably accept this, but insist that their question is not answered
within the system of numbers. It is a question asked prior to the adoption of this framework,
or at least outside it. The nominalists might stipulate that they are asking whether there
really are numbers – of course with the suspicion that this question must be answered in
the negative. They want to question whether the system of numbers is allowed, or at least
whether this linguistic framework gets the ontology right. Again, since it is true to say that
’There are numbers’ in this framework, the nominalists suspect that the ontology of this
framework is not correct.
The nominalists’ question appears to be an external question – a question asked outside
of any linguistic framework – as opposed to an internal question – a question asked within
a linguistic framework. Internal questions and claims are perfectly acceptable to Carnap.
They are asked within a linguistic framework that determines their truth-conditions. These
conditions ensure that it is determinate what would count as evidence for or against those
claims. In the system of numbers, the linguistic framework even determined that ’There are
numbers’ is true, but generally the linguistic framework only provides truth-conditions, and
empirical evidence must be consulted to determine whether the sentence is true or false in
that framework. Carnap’s suspicion concerns external questions and claims in general. Of
course, in the light of the nominalists’ accusation, his particular interest is those questions
and claims that concern the existence of entities – i.e. ontology. Essentially, Carnap’s
question to the nominalists, and the Platonists for that matter, is what their debate is about.
In the system of numbers and in a Platonist linguistic framework, nominalism would be false
due to the rules of these linguistic frameworks. On the other hand, if the same statement were
internal to a nominalist linguistic framework it would be true, since this linguistic framework
has other semantic rules. Carnap could suggest to the Platonist and the nominalist that they
are both right, but that they are simply talking within two different linguistic frameworks.
Of course, they will not accept that this settles their discussion. They will try to argue
that their discussion concerns whether there really are numbers, and not whether ’There
are numbers’ is true to say in this or that linguistic framework. They want to discuss the
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existence of numbers prior to the acceptance of any linguistic framework, and will maybe
try to stipulate that they are interested in the ontological status of numbers (Carnap 1956a,
209).
This is what Carnap calls an external question, and such questions, he argues, are pseudo-
questions. They contain no cognitive meaning, that is, any “meaning component which
is relevant for the determination of truth” (Carnap 1956b, 237). His argument is quite
simply to ask how this question could have any cognitive meaning. The Platonists and
the nominalists attempt to take their debate outside any linguistic framework and thereby
outside any language. For such an external question, there would be no rules guiding the
evaluation of truth of one or the other statement and consequently, these statements could
not have any cognitive meaning, as long as they are meant as external to any linguistic
framework. To quote Carnap at length regarding this debate between a nominalist and
Platonist:
I cannot think of any possible evidence that would be regarded as relevant by
both philosophers and therefore, if actually found, would decide the controversy
or at least make one of the opposite these more probable than the other. [. . . ]
Therefore, I feel compelled to regard the external question as a pseudo-question,
until both parties to the controversy offer a common interpretation of the question
as a cognitive question; this would involve an indication of possible evidence
regarded as relevant by both sides (Carnap 1956a, 219).
It is not entirely clear what Carnap means here. However, I take him to argue that until
the two parties settle on some possible evidence which would be relevant for the debate, the
questions remains an external question, and therefore a pseudo-question. In giving possible
evidence, it would be necessary to agree on a way to evaluate the truth of the statements.
This is not the principle of verification in disguise, rather, it is the simple observation that
the question of whether there are numbers is a pseudo-question until common rules are
settled for the evaluation of truth of its possible answers. Carnap’s formulation could seem to
indicate that if this could be achieved, such theoretical external question would be allowable
anyway. However, I rather think that this is due to an inaccuracy in his formulation, because
in order to settle the rules for the evaluation of truth, syntactic and semantic rules must
be in place. This is exactly what he emphasizes in the earlier quote from Introduction to
Semantics. Thus, if the Platonist and nominalist meet Carnap’s requirement, their question
will no longer be external but internal to the now common linguistic framework. As a
consequence, if the debate is settled in this way, they will only arrive at the conclusion that
’There are numbers’ is true (or false) in this common framework. It will once again be an
internal question. Thus, until the adoption of a common linguistic framework, the question
is necessarily a pseudo-question. There is simply no way to discuss the existence of numbers
as a theoretical question outside a linguistic framework, according to Carnap.
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Carnap’s alternative suggestion is that the question is perhaps meant as a pragmatic question.
According to this interpretation, when the nominalist asks if there are numbers, this question
is meant to ask which linguistic framework is preferable with respect to certain aims: a
framework where it is true to say ’There are numbers’, or a framework where this assertion
is false. This is what Psillos called an ontic question. It concerns which linguistic framework
to adopt, and this must ultimately be an unforced choice, according to both Psillos and
Carnap. Concerning the adoption of what he calls ’the thing language’, that is, the linguistic
framework in which we asked ’Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?’ and ’Did King
Arthur actually live?’, he writes:
In the case of this particular example, there is usually no deliberate choice
because we all have accepted the thing language early in our lives as a matter of
course. Nevertheless, we may regard it as a matter of decision in this sense: we
are free to choose to continue using the thing language or not; in the latter case
we could restrict ourselves to a language of sense-data and other ’phenomenal’
entities, or construct an alternative to the customary thing language with another
structure, or finally, we could refrain from speaking (Carnap 1956a, 207).
Apparently, what is manifest here is Carnap’s principle of tolerance, which is explicitly
formulated in The Logical Syntax of Language (1934). Carnap writes: “Principle of Tolerance:
It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions” (Carnap 1934a/1937,
51, emphasis in original) and qualifies that: “Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic,
i.e. hos own form of language, as he wishes” (Carnap 1934a/1937, 52). The emphasis on
logic stems from its origin in his syntactical works, however, the idea remains clear. We
may construct and adopt any language that we want. Carnap is certainly aware that certain
languages or linguistic frameworks are adopted for good reasons. He writes:
The decision of accepting the thing language, although itself not of a cognitive
nature, will nevertheless usually be influenced by theoretical knowledge, just like
any other deliberate decision concerning the acceptance of linguistic or other rules.
The purposes for which the language is intended to be used [. . . ] will determine
which factors that are relevant for the decision. The efficiency, fruitfulness, and
simplicity of the use of the thing language might be among the decisive factors
(Carnap 1956a, 208).
Pragmatic questions are not settled arbitrarily. Different aims calls for different means, and
so it is also with languages. Carnap’s point is that only such pragmatic virtues are involved
in the decision. There can be no question such as the one asked by the nominalists of whether
a linguistic framework is allowable. Every framework, according to Carnap, is allowable,
though with respect to a particular purpose a framework might be more or less useful.
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4.1.3 Carnap’s challenge
In summary, Carnap makes two observations: First, theoretical questions, i.e. questions
whose answers are true or false, are only possible as questions internal to a linguistic
framework. And second, external questions are only possible as pragmatic questions that
have no determinate answer. Thus Carnap’s thesis involves two claims: That there are no
theoretical external questions and that the adoption of a linguistic framework is unforced.
As we will see, these two are closely related.
Carnap’s defence of this view is perhaps best summarized by his own example, found in his
replies (Carnap 1963b) to the articles on his work from the Carnap-volume of The Library of
Living Philosophers. Carnap writes: “Let us suppose that two logicians, X1 and X2, discuss,
in the non-formalized everyday language, the properties of two constructed object languages,
L1 and L2” (Carnap 1963b, 872). The two languages differ in the domain which their
variables range over. Both domains contain observable material objects as individuals, as
well as classes of individuals. However, the domain of L1 further includes classes of classes of
individuals. About the logician X1 Carnap writes: “He deliberates whether he should choose
L2 because of its greater simplicity and greater safety [less danger of inconsistency]; but then
he comes to the decision to accept L1 because of its greater wealth in means of expressions
and means of deduction” (Carnap 1963b, 873). Such deliberations are perfectly acceptable
from Carnap’s point of view. It is a pragmatic choice that X1 makes when he chooses to
adopt L1. X2 on the other hand denies to have such a choice between two available languages.
Through careful consideration, X2 claims to have arrived at two ontological results: (6)
’There are classes of objects’ and (7) ’There are no classes of classes of objects’. In this light,
X2 says to X1: “What you regard as semantical rules for L1 contains the phrase ’classes of
classes of objects’, which does not refer to anything. Therefore no semantic rules for L1 have
actually been stated” (Carnap 1963b, 873). X2 supports this remark with the ontological
results he has arrived at. According to X2 there is no choice between two languages, because
one of the languages is not acceptable due to its implied ontological commitments. Carnap,
however, regards the two ontological statements as pseudo-statements. He writes: “I assume
that (6) and (7) are meant absolutely and objectively, i.e. not relative to this or that
language, or relative to this or that person; in other words, that they are meant as external
statements” (Carnap 1963b, 873). X2 regards the difference between himself and X1 as a
difference in theoretical beliefs about the existence of classes of classes of objects. In response
to this attitude, Carnap writes: “If X2 were to believe that he made an assertion by his
utterance of (7), I would challenge him to specify a method by which he and X1 together
could ascertain whether the alleged assertion is or is not true” (Carnap 1963b, 873).
This, in essence, is Carnap’s challenge. If one insists that an utterance is an assertion, then
is must be possible to specify the truth-conditions for the assertion, to indicate what would
count as evidence for or against that claim, or specify how to settle whether the assertion
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is true or false. All of these I regard as indicating the linguistic framework in which that
assertion is made. Thus, Carnap’s challenge to any alleged assertion is to specify in what
linguistic framework the assertion is made. If no such indications can be provided, Carnap
insists that we are entitled to regard it as a pseudo-assertion, i.e. no assertion at all. In terms
of questions, Carnap writes: “Unless or until they provide a clear cognitive interpretation, we
are justified in our suspicion that their question is a pseudo-question, that is, one disguised
in the form of a theoretical question while in fact it is non-theoretical” (Carnap 1956a, 209).
Formulated thus, there is no reference made directly to metaphysics in the challenge. The
challenge is faced by any alleged assertion. However, Carnap proposes that our daily discourse
already takes place inside linguistic frameworks, though they might be implicit. Therefore,
the problem only occurs when one attempts an assertion that is “meant absolutely and
objectively”. The challenge is a challenge to metaphysics because it is metaphysicists, like
the nominalist and X2, who attempt to question how a linguistic framework and sentences
within it relate to the thing in itself. Metaphysicists ask whether there really are numbers,
whether there really are abstract entities, whether there really is a heap when there are
particles or hay arranged heapwise, and so on. As previously argued, ’really’ serves for the
metaphysicists to signify a change in the mode of speech to the mode that is found inside
the ontology room. If these utterances are meant as assertions, Carnap challenges them to
indicate in what linguistic framework they are asserted, of course with the suspicion that
they will be unwilling to provide such a specification. This is accompanied by the suspicion
that if a linguistic framework is specified, most discussions in metaphysics will end up as
the discussion between the two logicians, X1 and X2, which proved, according to Carnap,
to be “merely a practical difference in preferences and decisions concerning the acceptance
of languages” (Carnap 1963b, 873). What will necessarily follow from such a specification
of a linguistic framework is a framework-dependence, where the ontological commitment of
a framework mirrors the framework and therefore not the thing in itself, though to state
the latter would be a pseudo-statement. Carnap’s challenge is a challenge to metaphysics
because it is metaphysics that attempts to transcend ordinary discourse and assert something
objective and absolute about the thing in itself. It is such attempts that Carnap suspects
result in mere pseudo-assertions.
It is important to emphasize that the problem is not with the word ’really’ as such. As
proposed in 2.1, ’really’ is used for a range of purposes, where only one of them is to shift the
mode of discourse to this transcendental metaphysical mode. Initially, it is not problematic
to ask whether there really are ghosts or unicorns, or: ’Are ghosts and unicorns real?’ This
question is perfectly conceivable as a question within the system of things. Carnap writes:
“The concept of reality occurring in these internal questions is an empirical, scientific, non-
metaphysical concept” (Carnap 1956a, 207). Gererally, if semantic rules for ’really’ or ’real’
are provided that determine truth-conditions for a possible answer to the question, then the
questions are cognitively meaningful within the linguistic framework where these semantic
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rules are specified. One would immediately suppose that these are empirical question that
concern whether empirical investigation into existing things will find among them ghosts
and unicorns. According to current zoology, the question must be answered in the negative.
However, a sufficiently insistent metaphysicists might try to ask ’Are ghosts and unicorns
really real?’. This metaphysicist will accept that according to the available evidence and
the rules of this linguistic framework it is true to say that ghosts and unicorns are not real,
but the metaphysicist wants to ask whether it is so in the thing in itself and not relative
to any linguistic framework and convention for what to consider as real. It is this question
that is challenged by Carnap, not the perfectly acceptable empirical question regarding the
existence of ghosts and unicorns as it might be formulated by a child or a slightly crazy
zoologist.2
4.1.4 Responses to Carnap
Taking the challenge seriously, there seems to be two approaches to Carnap’s challenge if
one wants to maintain that an assertion is made objectively and absolutely and not relative
to this or that framework. One approach is to demonstrate how such an assertion can
be made outside a linguistic framework, and another is to demonstrate that only certain
linguistic frameworks are acceptable, i.e. to demonstrate that the principle of tolerance
is false. The former must include some elaborate semantic argument, while the latter
in comparison seems to be a less insurmountable task. While this latter solution would
immediately maintain the framework-dependence, this dependence would not tend to a
framework conventionalism because only a single or a particular range of frameworks are
shown to be acceptable. However, this line of argument quickly reduces to the former
solution. The difference between the two is the difference between the nominalists’ insistence
that ’There are no numbers’ is meant absolutely and objectively, and the proposal that the
nominalist framework is the only allowable framework. The reasons that the nominalists
present for both views would be that there are no numbers in the thing in itself. Only the
nominalist framework is allowed because the ontological commitments of this framework
correspond to the ontology of the thing in itself. This, if anything, is an external claim. It is
exactly made about the relation between a particular linguistic framework and the thing in
itself. Essentially, it claims that the sentences in the framework expressing the ontological
commitments of the framework are true about the thing in itself. According to Carnap, also
the assertion about this relation must be made inside a linguistic framework unless we are
2Of course, there are other proposed interpretations of Carnap’s views in “Empiricism, Semantics, and
Ontology”, for instance, Matti Eklund (2013) defends that a less deflationary reading of Carnap is more
historically correct. I have tried to provide textual evidence for this more deflationary reading that shares
many similarities to to the interpretations of Carnap’s views proposed by David Chalmers (2009) and Huw
Price (2009). While Eklund might be correct, the proposed interpretation results in a stronger challenge to
metaphysics. Whether the challenge is indeed Carnap’s is of no essential importance for the conclusions of
the present project.
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to regard it as a pseudo-assertion. This leads to the same dilemma: Either to maintain that
the assertion is made objectively and absolutely outside any linguistic framework with the
resulting requirement for a semantic argument, or to propose that it is asserted within the
only acceptable framework. Following the already given answer, the latter option would
supposedly involve the stipulation that the assertions ’The nominalist is the only acceptable
framework’ and ’The ontological commitments of the nominalist framework correspond to
the ontology if the thing in itself’ are made within the nominalist framework. As it is well
known, such self-reference might be vicious, however, it must further be remarked that it
is hardly surprising for a framework to confirm itself. If we consider the realist framework,
then it is supposedly true within this framework to say ’Reality is such as it is according to
the realist framework’. However, nothing seems to be achieved with such self-confirmation.
Consequently, there seems to be no way out of the hard question of how to make an assertion
outside any linguistic framework.
One of the primary contentions against Carnap’s challenge is attributed to Quine in his
infamous article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951). Here he questions the distinction
between analytic and synthetic truths. It is claimed that this has traditionally been seen as
a conclusive refutation of Carnap’s challenge, in favour of metaphysics (e.g. Alspector-Kelly
(2001)). However, especially in recent years this proposed refutation has been re-investigated
and most authors conclude that Carnap’s challenge does not depend on this distinction and
therefore remains a significant challenge to metaphysics (Alspector-Kelly 2001; Chalmers
2009; Price 2009; Soames 2009; Ney 2012).
Another attempted refutation of Carnap’s challenge can find its inspiration in the general
attitude displayed by Lowe. He writes that “[t]he attempt to undermine or eliminate the
metaphysical dimension of our thinking is self-defeating, because the very attempt necessarily
constitutes a piece of metaphysical thinking itself” (Lowe 2002, 4). This is what makes Lowe
confident that metaphysics is possible. Among such self-defeating criticisms of metaphysics,
we might find the verifiability criterion of meaning and Hume’s famous dictum: "Commit it
then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (Hume 1748/2011,
706)”. Similarly, we might suspect that Carnap’s challenge is self-defeating. Carnap rejects
that any assertion can be made outside a linguistic framework, however, critics would of
course contend that this is in itself an assertion and that it therefore must be asserted within
a framework. Carnap, however, seems to have an answer for this. He will deny that his
rejection is a theoretical, external truth. Rather, he will argue that anyone is allowed to
make and follow whatever linguistic framework they want to. Thus, there is probably a
linguistic frameworks in which it is true to say that assertions can be made outside any
linguistic framework. However, this is an internal statement just like Carnap’s and will
probably not satisfy the metaphysicist. She wants something objective and absolute and not
just a linguistic framework where ’There are framework independent assertions’ is true to
say, but there is no such objective and absolute point of view. It is impossible, according to
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Carnap, to assert anything outside of all linguistic frameworks. Critics will of course again
question the status of this claim, and Carnap will present the same answer.
Whether Carnap can succeed with this line of defence is debatable and cannot be settled here.
Of course, if this criticism of his challenge were to succeed it would undermine the present
project. It would demonstrate that Carnap’s challenge is not, after all, a significant challenge
to metaphysics that threatens to render metaphysics impossible. I argue in the next to
sections that naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics is equally vulnerable to Carnap’s
challenge. If non of them are vulnerable to the challenge because it can be refuted by other
means, Carnap’s challenge would neither render naturalized nor non-naturalized metaphysics
impossible. Other challenges to traditional metaphysics might then prove that metaphysics
is only possible as naturalized metaphysics. Therefore, I will once again emphasize that I
merely aim to demonstrate that naturalized metaphysics does not solve Carnap’s challenge
and that naturalized metaphysics therefore is impossible until or unless this challenge is
refuted by other means. Based on the number of influential philosophers who regard the
challenge as a significant challenge to metaphysics, no such conclusive refutation is available.3
For those proponents of naturalized metaphysics who claims that naturalized metaphysics
can solve or at least avoid Carnap’s challenge, my conclusion will of course be all the more
relevant. Alyssa Ney, whose work will be the main topic in the next section, is exactly such
a proponent.
4.2 Ney’s naturalized metaphysics
In her article “Neo-positivist Metaphysics” Alyssa Ney (2012) proposes to introduce a
metaphysics that takes seriously Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics from “Empiricism,
Semantics, and Ontology”. As argued, this challenge poses a problem to any attempt at
metaphysics, however, Ney holds the view that her neo-positivist metaphysics can avoid
these problems. In the conclusion to her paper she writes: “I hope here to have outlined
how a version of metaphysics may survive the genuine worries the positivists had about
metaphysics” (Ney 2012, 76). It is exactly an ontological naturalism that Ney thinks can
ensure the success of metaphysics. To the question “what distinguishes the neo-positivist
metaphysical projects from their allegedly problematic rivals” (Ney 2012, 54), Ney answers
that “[o]ne obvious feature characterizing many neo-positivist metaphysical projects is their
serious engagement with the findings of science, particularly fundamental physics” (Ney 2012,
54). A deference to the findings of science in general and fundamental physics in particular
will ensure that the problems for metaphysics that arose from Carnap’s challenge to the
notion of absolute truth will disappear.
3Defenders of Carnap’s challenge as a significant challenge to metaphysics include Chalmers (2009), Eklund
(2011), Hirsch (2007), Hofweber (2005), Ney (2012), Price (2014), Thomasson (2010), and Yablo (1998).
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In the conclusion of her investigation, Ney writes that: “the sort of neo-positivist metaphysics
I have outlined here starts from serious engagement with current physical theory. This is
the only legitimate place to begin if one is trying to accomplish at least one of the main
tasks metaphysicians set for themselves—to establish conclusions about ultimate reality”
(Ney 2012, 76). According to Ney, metaphysics is possible as neo-positivist metaphysics.
This introduces a restriction in the form of a particular engagement with or deference to the
current physical theories, which instructs us how to successfully assert something about the
thing in itself and thereby how to avoid Carnap’s challenge. Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics
is a “metaphysics that is informed by and inherits the justification of science” (Ney 2012,
72). These matters will be considered more closely below.
It will be argued that Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics is a naturalized metaphysics and a
proposed answer to how metaphysics is possible. Specifically, it is an answer that ensures
that Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics is avoided. However, as I will argue in the next
section, Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics cannot avoid this challenge after all. It remains a
significant challenge to both traditional metaphysics and neo-positivist metaphysics.
Before this investigation is undertaken, a terminological remark is called for. Ney primarily
discuss the relation between metaphysics and fundamental physics, however, as is already
evident from the above, she sometimes discusses the more general relation between meta-
physics and science. Ney addresses this apparent inconsistency in a footnote. She writes
that:
[T]he method for neo-positivist metaphysics I am proposing really only explic-
itly concerns how one should settle one’s fundamental metaphysical commitments,
and this is why the science that this method takes to inform metaphysics is
fundamental physics. This leaves open the question of whether or how one should
choose a derivative, i.e. non-fundamental metaphysics (Ney 2012, 61 fn 7).
I take this remark to indicate that there is no important different in this text between the
passages where Ney uses the terms ’physics’ and those where she uses the term ’science’.
However, in order to remain true to the project as described by Ney, I will primarily use the
terms ’physics’ and ’fundamental physics’ below, unless I discuss a quote that uses ’science’
rather than ’physics’.
4.2.1 Neo-positivist metaphysics
Ney’s approach to metaphysics has its outset in an indispensability argument that is analogous
to the classical Quine/Putnam indispensability argument for ontological commitment. Quine
(1948) and Putnam (1975) propose that we have an ontological commitment to any entity
that is indispensable to our best scientific theories. Ney extends this argument to include
structures and principles as well, such that we should have metaphysical commitment to
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any entity, structure and principle that is indispensable to our best scientific theories. Ney
proposes the following argumentative structure:
(P1) We ought to have metaphysical commitment to all and only the entities,
structures, or principles that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(P2) X is indispensable to our best scientific theories.
Therefore,
(C) We ought to have metaphysical commitment to X (Ney 2012, 61).
Apparently, this argument allows us to construct metaphysics from these indispensable
elements of our best scientific theories, however, it presupposes that it is specified what it
is to be indispensable and what to consider as our best scientific theories. Returning to
Psillos, he proposes that indispensability is to be understood as explanatory and predictive
indispensability. The indispensable elements are those that must be posited in order to explain
and predict the behaviour of the commonsensical entities. Ney has a quite different conception
of what it takes to be indispensable. She qualifies “that the sort of indispensability that is
relevant here is what is indispensable to physical theory according to the physics community”
(Ney 2012, 62). There is no criterion of indispensability. Rather, the indispensability depends
on what the physics community takes to be indispensable. Ney writes:
[Indispensability] is not something to be determined by us as philosophers. We
might look at current physics from the outside and say that its explanations would
be incomplete if it did not appeal to this or that of our preferred metaphysical
elements [. . . ], but if the physics community does not build such things into its
theories and thinks that its explanations are satisfactory as they stand, then we
must conclude that such things are not indispensable to current physical theory
(Ney 2012, 62).
It is not the task of philosophers to determine what elements are indispensable to physics.
Particularly, there is no distinctly metaphysical and non-scientific reasoning that is relevant
in determining what elements are indispensable. If the physics community does not find an
element indispensable there is no way that this element can be regarded as indispensable.
In Ney’s view, it is only a change of opinion in the physics community that can change
what entities are indispensable. This raises the important question of how to deal with
contradictions within science. What if the scientific community takes seriously two theories
that contradict each other with regards to their metaphysical commitments?
This appears to be a threatening paradox. On the one hand, there is no metaphysical
reasoning that is relevant in determining what entities are indispensable, only the opinion
of the physics community matters. On the other hand, the physics community will take
seriously more than one theory and these theories will in general have different and even
contradicting metaphysical commitments. Consequently, our metaphysical commitments
threatens to be inconsistent. Ney solution to this paradox is to construct what she calls
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’core metaphysics’. This is the metaphysics that consists of all the elements that the physics
community regards as indispensable to all the theories that they take seriously. The elements
of core metaphysics are indispensable in a strong sense; the physics community finds them
to be indispensable to all their best theories.
As an example of such a strongly indispensable element, Ney suggests that “physicists do tend
to assume that a theory is only relativistic if it involves laws that operate in the same way in
all inertial reference frames. Lorentz invariance does thus appear indispensable to any theory
physicists will count as relativistic” (Ney 2012, 63). Thus, Lorentz invariance is indispensable
because physicists agree that any relativistic theory must be Lorentz invariant. According
to Ney, there might be different relativistic theories available, but since all the relativistic
theories that are taken seriously by the physics community are Lorentz invariant, then
Lorentz invariance is indispensable in this stronger sense. Exactly what counts as competing
theories and therefore what theories must have a common representational element for that
element to be regarded as strongly indispensable is also something that must be settled
by the physics community. The alternatives that must agree are “what physicists count as
alternative formulations of the same physical theory” (Ney 2012, 63). Again, it is not a
task for the metaphysicist to determine whether something is strongly indispensable. This
is determined by the physics community. The physics community takes Lorentz invariance
to be a strongly indispensable representational elements and consequently, we should be
metaphysically committed to Lorentz invariance. As will be demonstrated later, this strict
reliance on the judgements of the physics community is what Ney considers to ensure that
her neo-positivist metaphysics can avoid Carnap’s challenge.
Ney provides another example of a strongly indispensable representational element. She
writes:
Similarly, any theory that is genuinely called a version of quantum mechanics
must, say, support the Born rule, require a discrete set of (mutually orthogonal)
energy states, and so on. These are thus indispensable elements of quantum
mechanics. Determinism (or indeterminism) is not. Physicists take seriously
both deterministic formulations of quantum mechanics (e.g. Everettian versions)
as well as indeterministic formulations (versions positing an objective collapse of
the wave function) (Ney 2012, 63).
We should be metaphysically committed to the Born rule because the physics community
takes it to be indispensable to all formulations that the physics community takes to be
alternative formulations of quantum mechanics.4 The reliance on the judgements of the
physics community is evident. In comparison, there are formulations of quantum mechanics
4Arguably, this is not entirely true since the Born rule is not included in the Everett interpretation, even
though the Deutch-Wallace argument (see Vaidman (2015)) shows how we are rational to expect Born rule
statistics under the assumption of the Everett interpretation.
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both with and without indeterministic collapse of the wave function, and consequently, we
should neither be committed to determinism nor indeterminism. Summarizing Ney’s view,
we should be metaphysically committed to those entities, structures, and principles that the
scientific community takes to be indispensable to all the formulations of a theory that the
physics community takes to be alternative formulations. This is what will be called ’strong
indispensability’ below.
In Ney’s view, these “indispensable elements of our fundamental physics should be the
starting point of a neo-positivist metaphysics” (Ney 2012, 66). However, Ney is aware
that there are many metaphysical questions that are not part of core metaphysics, and
metaphysics can therefore have a relevant task in “filling in the core” (Ney 2012, 66). There
are representational elements of our physical theories that are not strongly indispensable in
the sense that these elements are not taken to be indispensable among all the alternative
physical theories. These elements are not part of our core metaphysics, because they are
not strongly indispensable. Nevertheless, Ney argues that these can be used as a “way of
filling in the core to produce a more complete metaphysical picture” (Ney 2012, 67). This,
however, comes with a price. While those elements that are part of core metaphysics inherit
the justification of physics, Ney argues that “when we move beyond the belief in what is
indispensable to our fundamental physical theories, we cannot pretend that these beliefs earn
justification to the degree that it is reasonable to take them to be true” (Ney 2012, 66). She
continues: “Thus, it may be appropriate for the neo-positivist metaphysician, when moving
beyond the core, to endorse an expressivism about her claims and say they aren’t intended
to assert something that is true or false, but instead express the attitude that such-and-such
a metaphysics is preferred” (Ney 2012, 67). Thus, the filled-in metaphysics cannot be given
the same status as core metaphysics. This matter will be discussed further below.
To exemplify how to fill in the core metaphysics, Ney uses the differences and similarities
between the Everettian quantum mechanics (a many-world interpretation) and Bohmian
mechanics (a kind of hidden variable interpretation). Both of these formulations of quantum
mechanics are deterministic and include a wave function as a representational element, so,
Ney writes, “if it turned out that these were the only two rival formulations of nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics, then one should believe that a correct description of nonrelativistic
systems should include an ontology of at least a wave function (whatever that is) and a set of
laws that is deterministic” (Ney 2012, 67). Core metaphysics should commit to determinism
and include a wave function in its ontology. However, this is not the end of metaphysics,
Ney continues: “Everettian quantum mechanics and Bohmian mechanics have more to say
about the world than merely what they have in common. And it is precisely in evaluating
how one should choose between them that distinctly rationalist, armchair methods may
come into play” (Ney 2012, 67). These armchair methods come into play because we have
to make some choices about how we fill in the core metaphysics based on the competing
suggestions from the physical theories. Thus, Ney recognizes the problem that even in
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our current best physics there are competing theories that are taken equally seriously by
the physics community. Choosing to prefer one or the other must rely on metaphysical
considerations. However, this has the consequence, according to Ney, that the conclusions of
such considerations must remain expressive rather than assertive, because these conclusions
cannot inherit the justification from physics in the same way that core metaphysics does.
Again, Ney gives an example of a question requiring metaphysical considerations arising
from the differences between Everettians and Bohmians. She asks:
Is the wave function, as the Everettian wants to understand it,the right kind
of object to be able to ground the existence of all other (derivative) elements of
one’s ontology? Or should we instead insist that the fundamental ontology be
something more like the particles of the Bohmian, because fundamental ontologies
should include localized bits of matter rather than highly abstract entities like
wave functions? (Ney 2012, 68).
This question about fundamental ontology is not settled by strong indispensability, because
alternative formulations disagree over the matter, and it is here, Ney suggests, that ordinary
metaphysical armchair methods may enter into neo-positivist metaphysics. As an examples
Ney proposes that we might consider which of these ontologies can best explain our macro-
scopic world, and this will include questions about mereology and composition. About such
a discussion, Ney writes:
Armchair methods enter here in two stages. First, work needs to be done
investigating the nature of composition. Work here will not proceed entirely
from the armchair. Philosophers will need to pay attention to particular cases
of composition in the world. But there will also be a lot of conceptual work to
be done involving consideration of whether we could make sense of composition
occurring in such and such counterfactual scenarios (Ney 2012, 68).
These armchair methods, however, do not allow us to to infer that one or the other theory
is true or false. Conclusions following these distinctly metaphysical methods must result
in claims that are expressive rather than assertive. Ney finds a task for the metaphysicist
in completing or filling in core metaphysics by rationally considering and choosing among
the competing metaphysics of the competing theories. This metaphysical reasoning is
relevant because there is no unequivocal judgement in the physics community about the
indispensability of these representational elements. Still, these competing elements are
the only candidates for the filled-in metaphysics. According to Ney, no metaphysical
argument can revoke the judgement of the scientific community. It is the physics community
that determines the indispensable elements of scientific theories. Thus, even for filled-in
metaphysics, it is the physics community that provides the alternative representational
elements that the metaphysicist might choose between.
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Currently, filling in core metaphysics is necessary in order to complete metaphysics. Those
assertions which follow from strong indispensability do not form a metaphysics that contains
all entities, structures, and principles. However, the relevance of filling in this core metaphysics
might dissipate when we get closer to a single recognized physical theory. Ney writes:
What I want to suggest in conclusion is that it is precisely the fact that
physics is not yet complete that metaphysicians right now have something to
contribute. In expressing what they take to be the best ways of filling out current
physics, of working through these theories’ implications and trying to understand
them, this can help the physicist better understand her own theories (Ney 2012,
77).
Thus, once physics is complete there will be no more work for the metaphysicist, because the
core metaphysics will include everything worth saying about metaphysics. There will be no
need to fill in this core metaphysics, because it will be completed along with physics itself.
There might, however, remain the task of considering the implications of this completed
physics and of understanding it. We will return to this question later.
4.2.2 Ney’s naturalized metaphysics
In summary, Ney requires a strong deference to the findings of science. The only metaphysical
assertions are those that concern the representational elements that the physics community
takes to be strongly indispensable. Only these assertions are strictly scientifically sanctioned
as assertions in Ney’s view. In this, Ney displays the proposed naturalist conception of science.
It is science itself that has ensured its success and therefore, it is the physics community that
is the authority on scientific sanctioning. Consequently, this core metaphysics is restricted by
a bi-conditional naturalism: ∀p (M ` p→ SA(p)), where p is an assertion, M is the assertive
part of metaphysics and SA is the one-place, scientific sanctioning predicate. Also, there is
no metaphysical reasoning that can change the dictum resulting from strong indispensability.
We are metaphysically committed to all those representational elements that are strongly
indispensable and again, this strong indispensability it determined by the physics community.
There is no metaphysical reasoning relevant for the adoption of assertions about these
representational elements into core metaphysics. Thus, core metaphysics is also restricted
by the imperative restriction: ∀p (¬(M ` p ∧ SA(¬p))). If an assertion is sanctioned by
strong indispensability and it is a possible member of metaphysics, then it is a member of
metaphysics.
So far, this demonstrates that Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics is founded on an ontological
naturalism. In this respect it is a naturalized metaphysics, however, it remains to argue that
Ney regards neo-positivist metaphysics to be an answer to how metaphysics is possible, i.e.
that she regards neo-positivist metaphysics to instruct us how to succeed with assertions
about the thing in itself. Below, a review will first be made of Ney’s distinction between core
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metaphysics and filled-in metaphysics to emphasize that she regards her metaphysics to be
an answer and that it indeed produces assertions. Afterwards, it will be investigated what
the assertions of core metaphysics are about. Finally, some remarks will be made about
her conception of science/physics and scientific sanctioning that further qualifies the sort of
naturalized metaphysics she defends.
Above it was demonstrated how Ney proposes that there is more to metaphysics than core
metaphysics. The rest of metaphysics is filled-in based on physics as well, but these are the
parts of physics that the physics community does not regard as strongly indispensable. Here
Ney allows for metaphysical and theoretical virtues to decide between the representational
elements of these competing theories, and thereby she allows the necessary abandonment
of the imperative restriction in the light of contradictions in science. However, abandoning
the imperative restriction comes with the price that this filled-in metaphysics cannot be
assertive but must be regarded as merely expressive. These parts of metaphysics are not
true or false, but rather they merely express an attitude, more precisely “the attitude that
such-and-such a metaphysics is preferred” (Ney 2012, 67). This must signify that the filled-in
metaphysics does not candidate as assertive. Exactly what we should make of such an
attitude about metaphysical preferences is not entirely clear, however, she does give the
following qualification in footnote 16:
Price (2011) argues, for broadly positivist reasons, that we should adopt such
an expressivism about all metaphysical claims. Unlike Price, I think that the
justification physics gives us for some fundamental metaphysical claims does
provide grounds for rejecting such a global expressivism, even if [it] does support
a more local version (Ney 2012, 67 fn 16).
This might signify that she regards filled-in metaphysics to be expressive in the same way
that Price regards all expressions to be expressive (a detailed account of Price’s view can be
found in (Price 2013)).5 Filled-in metaphysics cannot be a candidate to how metaphysics is
possible, since even successful filled-in metaphysics does not assert anything about the thing
in itself. Apparently, it does not assert anything at all.
Our interest is then in the core metaphysics, which consists of assertions that adhere to
the bi-conditional and imperative restrictions and where scientific sanctioning is gained
through strong indispensability. Core metaphysics gets its justification from physics, which
allow us to regard it as assertive rather than expressive in Ney’s view. Ney rejects Price’s
global expressivism. She adopts a local expressivism for filled-in metaphysics, but maintains
that core metaphysics consists of assertions. Interestingly, Price’s reason for adopting this
global expressivism is exactly Carnap’s challenge (Price 2011, 13), so by rejecting Price’s
5If this is the case, filled-in metaphysics cannot even be given in terms of possibly true assertions. Whether
Ney adopts this view is unclear.
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argument, Ney proposes that the justification that core metaphysics gets from physics
ensures that this metaphysics avoids Carnap’s challenge. She writes: “[t]his is a metaphysics
that should meet the positivist’s standards for comprehension and justification” (Ney 2012,
61–62). Ney’s rejection of Carnap’s challenge will be the main topic later, but for the
current purposes it is worth noticing that her remarks on Price signify that Ney is worried
about Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics. It is Carnap’s challenge that forces us to adopt
expressivism for filled-in metaphysics. However, the remarks also signify that Ney regards
her neo-positivist metaphysics as a means to accommodate the challenge. Core metaphysics
consists of assertions, however the question remains what these assertions are about.
It seems to be immediately evident that Ney considers an ambitious metaphysics to be the
goal for metaphysicists. She proposes that “one of the main tasks metaphysicians set for
themselves [is] to establish conclusions about ultimate reality” (Ney 2012, 76). Metaphysics
does not aim at conclusions about the way we speak. Also, in the already quoted discussion
about the ontological implications of Everettian and Bohmian quantum mechanics, Ney
discusses which of them best describes “fundamental ontology”. With metaphysics concerned
with ultimate reality, it would as previously argued be futile to insist that this is anything
but the thing in itself. This reality has to be the mind-independent, experience-transcending,
objective world. I think that we are therefore entitled to regard the members of core
metaphysics as attempts at assertions about the thing in itself.
This receives further support from Ney’s view of the aim of physics. It seems to be beyond
doubt that Ney is a scientific realist. She directly writes: “As should be clear from this
essay, I side with the realists” (Ney 2012, 64 fn 14). Ney finds support for her realism in
the physics community. She writes: “physics as a whole makes it clear that what they are
attempting to do is to construct an accurate theory about what the world is like” (Ney 2012,
64). Ney then emphasizes that this is exactly the reason why it is worthwhile to found a
metaphysics on our best scientific theories. Ney puts it this way:
Now, if the physics community as a whole were instrumentalists about their
theories, then I grant there would be something seriously wrong with trying to
using fundamental physical theories to inform metaphysical claims. [. . . ] Our
metaphysical project depends on the attitude in general of the physics community
being realist (Ney 2012, 64).
It is because “physics claims to be aimed at giving us a general theory of fundamental reality”
(Ney 2012, 71)that we find “[t]he motivation for using physics to inform metaphysics” (Ney
2012, 71). On Ney’s view, both physicists and metaphysicists aim to establish truths about
fundamental reality, and this is why, according to Ney, it may prove worthwhile to use
physics to inform metaphysics. If instrumentalism were adopted in the physics community,
then it would be wrong to attempt to inform metaphysics by physics. They would simply
have deviating aims. In Ney’s view it is a prerequisite to assume realism if it is to be
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reasonable to inform metaphysics by physics. Such remarks are exactly what proves Ney’s
neo-positivist metaphysics to be vulnerable to Carnap’s challenge.
To argue that physics and metaphysics are concerned with the same reality does not
immediately settle who should inform the other. However, as is already evident, Ney defends
that physics should inform metaphysics. This is explicitly stated, but it must also follow
implicitly from her worry that most of metaphysics is problematic to such a degree that even
the scientifically informed filling in of core metaphysics cannot be regarded as assertive, but
that we must adopt an expressivism towards it. Physics on the other hand does not have
the same problems. Ney writes:
For epistemological reasons, the sort of neo-positivist metaphysics I have
outlined here starts from serious engagement with current physical theory. This
is the only legitimate place to begin if one is trying to accomplish at least one
of the main tasks metaphysicians set for themselves—to establish conclusions
about ultimate reality (Ney 2012, 76).
According to Ney, physics is exactly epistemologically superior to metaphysics, and this is
why physics is the “only legitimate place to begin” metaphysics. This epistemic superiority
is not accidental, as also quoted in 3.1 Ney writes: “physics has a good claim to superior
epistemic standing due to its use of mathematical precision, sophisticated experimental
techniques, high standards for confirmation, and a discipline engaging in good practices like
peer reviews of publications” (Ney 2012, 71). She also emphasizes “that physics has a proven
track record of success making it a good place to begin metaphysical inquiry” (Ney 2012, 62).
Again this displays her naturalist conception of physics. Ney sets forth the good reasons
we have for regarding physics to be epistemically privileged in comparison to metaphysics.
Physics, contrary to metaphysics, has a track record of success and this track record of
success is not an accident. It is institutional error filters, mathematical precision and the
central place of experiments in physics that have secured this success. Ney is well aware
that physics is not yet completed and that some of our current best physical theories will
prove to be false, but it is her overall view that physics is the best we have got. This is why
physics is the only legitimate place to begin metaphysics.
Accordingly, Ney’s adoption of a biconditional naturalism implies that she takes physics
to be even more than the best we have got. Physics, apparently, is the only starting point
available for inquiries into the thing in itself, or “ultimate reality”, as she calls it. Scientific
sanctioning is the only way to sanction assertions about the thing in itself; such assertions can
only get their legitimacy as assertions from physics. This signifies a biconditional naturalism
and this also signifies that the assertions of core metaphysics are intended as metaphysical
assertion that adhere to the proposed condition for metaphysics. Metaphysics is possible
as core metaphysics according to Ney and therefore, core metaphysics must avoid Carnap’s
challenge.
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4.2.3 The scope of scientific sanctioning
As is the case for all tokens of naturalized metaphysics and as is clear particularly from
Ney’s naturalized metaphysics, the status of science has very strong implications for the
character of naturalized metaphysics. Ney is a declared scientific realist. According to Ney,
physics in particular aims to disclose ultimate or fundamental reality, and only by founding
metaphysics on physics is it possible for metaphysics to follow this aim as well. However,
there remain some interesting and so far unmentioned aspects relating to Ney’s view of
scientific sanctioning.
Metaphysical commitment to an entity, structure, or principle is scientifically sanctioned if
the representational elements are strongly indispensable. This must be clear evidence that
Ney regards the scientific sanctioning to extend to assertions expressing the metaphysical
commitment to these strongly indispensable entities, structures, and principles. The same is
seen in Ney’s conclusion, where she writes: “The best way to have science inform a project
of metaphysics is for us to seek what sorts of representational devices are indispensable to
physics” (Ney 2012, 76). In so far as the metaphysics in question here is core metaphysics and
not filled-in metaphysics, then metaphysics is constructed from the representational elements
that the physics community takes to be strongly indispensable. In doing metaphysics we
should not study the thing in itself directly, instead Ney quotes Carnap’s suggestion to take
science itself as the object of study (Ney 2012, 76; Carnap 1984, 6).6 Perhaps it would
even be appropriate to qualify that metaphysics should take the physics community as
the object of study. Ney takes this suggestion by Carnap to be that metaphysics will be
successful only if it establishes its assertions about the thing in itself by looking at science,
and particularly physics, which then in turn investigates the thing in itself. The legitimacy
and consequently the scientific sanctioning of the assertions of the physics community is then
closed under strong indispensability and thereby, core metaphysics can make legitimate and
scientifically sanctioned assertions about the thing in itself, if these assertions are formed
from those representational elements that are taken to be strongly indispensable by the
physics community. The beliefs about indispensable elements in the physics community is in
this sense the object of study for metaphysics. The task of the metaphysicist is then merely
to take the beliefs already formed by the physics community – the metaphysicist cannot, as
argued, suggest what might be a strongly indispensable representational element – and then
elevate these assertions about representational elements to assertions about ontology.
However, Ney appears to be even more restrictive with her requirement for scientific sanc-
6The Carnap article cited by Ney here is originally published in 1934 under the same title. This is the same
year as the original German edition of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language. Following Carnap’s intentions in
these two works, he will insist that philosophy has science as its object. Ney takes this to imply that science
is the preferred evidence for metaphysics, whereas Carnap’s intention is that philosophy and within the little
part of metaphysics that Carnap regards acceptable should have science as its subject matter. Philosophy
primarily involved in developing languages for science (Carnap 1934a/1937, 277–284).
Chapter 4. The possibility of naturalized metaphysics 102
tioning. She makes the following immediately innocuous observation: “The indispensability
arguments presuppose not only that we may draw metaphysical conclusions from our best
physical theories, but that we may do so whenever we find indispensable representational
elements” (Ney 2012, 64). As soon as the physics community regards a representational
element to be strongly indispensable, we may, as it is, draw metaphysical conclusions from
this. Two things are worth noting: First, Ney uses ’may’ rather than ’must’, which indicates
that the imperative restriction might not be imposed here. The formulation indicates that
the metaphysicist might have the choice of whether to draw these metaphysical conclusions.
Second, one might worry that even though Ney presupposes a global scientific realism, the
physics community might adopt local instrumentalism. Ney writes:
For even if we grant that the physics community as a whole intends to be
engaged in the project of describing fundamental reality, of producing justified,
true claims about the world, we may ask if it also follows that the physics com-
munity intends every representational element of its best theories to correspond
to something in reality (Ney 2012, 64).
The physics community might have opinions about whether it is all the representational
elements in their theories that represent something in reality. Even though they embrace an
overall realism, they could be fictionalists with respect to particular entities, structures or
principles. Physics might include assertions about what parts of a theory has an appropriate
metaphysical significance for metaphysical conclusions to be drawn from it. It could perhaps
be argued that such assertions cannot be a part of physics, but such an argument is unavailable
under a strictly naturalist conception of science where physical assertions and theories are
conceived of as that which is endorsed by the physics community. Ney asks:
If we grant that we want our metaphysics to be informed by current physical
theory as it is endorsed by the physics community, then is the suggestion that
we ought to seek out not merely those elements that are indispensable to current
theories, but instead only those elements that are indispensable and taken to
have metaphysical significance? (Ney 2012, 65).
If the physics community forms beliefs about what representational elements of their theories
that are metaphysically significant, then metaphysics should adhere to these due to the bi-
conditional naturalism. Assertions of the form ’x is (is not) metaphysically significant’ can be
endorsed by the physics community and therefore be scientifically sanctioned. Consequently,
metaphysics must adhere to these assertions. This leads Ney to alter the premises of the
indispensability argument. She suggests: “We ought to have metaphysical commitment to
all and only the entities, structures, or principles that are indispensable to our best scientific
theories, and taken by the physics community to have metaphysical significance” (Ney 2012,
65, emphasis in the original). We can only take representational elements as evidence to
inform our metaphysics if it is sanctioned by science that these representational elements
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indeed have metaphysical significance.
This might in turn suggests why Ney all of a sudden seems to abandon the imperative
restriction by using ’may’ rather than ’must’ when we draw metaphysical conclusions from
strongly indispensable representational elements, and the conclusion is that she does not
abandon this restriction. Physics includes assertions about which representational elements
are metaphysically significant. Metaphysics is already in place within the physics community.
Indeed, the work to be done by metaphysicist is very limited indeed. Science sanctions
metaphysical assertions about the thing in itself that are formed from representational
elements that are strongly indispensable, and which the physics community takes to be
of metaphysical significance. The work left for the metaphysicist is to ask the physics
community what these metaphysically significant, strongly indispensable representational
elements are, and then list them as core metaphysics. The metaphysics itself is already there
among the beliefs of the scientific community.
As will we demonstrated below, these measures to ensure that metaphysics relies very
strongly on the beliefs of the physics community are imposed such that the core metaphysics
of neo-positivist metaphysics might avoid Carnap’s challenge. By relying on nothing but
physics and by leaving no room for metaphysical reasoning, Ney ensures that metaphysics
inherits the legitimacy of physics.
4.3 Ney’s response to Carnap’s challenge
Indeed, Ney very directly addresses how her adoption of ontological naturalism with her
biconditional naturalism is an attempt to answer how metaphysics is possible. She argues
that “the goal is to get out a metaphysics that has established its semantic and justificatory
credentials via physical theory itself” (Ney 2012, 64). Only adequately restricting metaphysics
by a deference to physics ensures that metaphysics can inherit these credentials of physics.
In Ney’s view, it is exactly these credentials of physics that allow neo-positivist metaphysics
to avoid the problems due to Carnap’s challenge. Ney’s idea is immediately simple, she
writes: “As Carnap and the Vienna Circle took the claims of physicists, unlike those of
metaphysicians, to be in good epistemological standing (if in need of clarification), neo-
positivist metaphysicians seek only to make metaphysical claims that can inherit such
justification” (Ney 2012, 54). While most traditional metaphysics is problematic as a
result of Carnap’s challenge, some metaphysics remains possible; that which can inherit its
justification from the sciences.
4.3.1 The epistemological and the semantic Carnap
Ney is aware that merely accepting Carnap’s challenge restrains us from making assertions
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that are evaluated in any absolute or “objective” sense. Ney writes:
As metaphysicians, don’t we seek objective truth? But how can we achieve
this goal if there will always be rival frameworks offering competing accounts
of the truth and no objective way to choose between them? If we agree with
Carnap, we must deny we possess any way to verify which ontology is correct
(Ney 2012, 59).
Obviously, this poses a problem to the metaphysicist. Successful metaphysics are assertion
about the thing in itself. The truth of these assertion cannot be dependent on the framework-
dependent. They must be evaluated with respect to the thing in itself. Metaphysics is
impossible if the metaphysical assertions are ultimately framework-dependent. This has
already been established and Ney accepts this condition for metaphysics. Further, she
recognizes that Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics threatens exactly to establish that any
claim is framework-dependent and therefore, that metaphysics is impossible. According to
Ney, the problem is that all we have are “competing accounts of the truth and no objective
way to choose between them”.
Interestingly, this formulation might suggest a weaker conception of Carnap’s challenge. Ney
suggests that Carnap’s challenge introduces an epistemological problem; that one of the
accounts of the truth is the correct account, but that we have no way of knowingwhich of them
it is: There is a fact of the matter, there is an ontology that is the correct ontology. There is
a framework which gets the thing in itself right, whereas the other frameworks get it wrong.
Though Ney will still regard this debate to be problematic, it is instructive to return to the
Platonist and nominalist debate about abstract entities. Ney’s remark above suggests that
she regards the problem to be that there is no way in which to evaluate whether frameworks
such as the Platonist or nominalist framework have the correct ontology. Minimally, these
two frameworks differ with respect to the assertion ’there are abstract entities’. This assertion
is true in the Platonist framework and false in the nominalist framework. By describing
such frameworks as competing accounts of the truth, we might take Ney to endorse such
assertions as ’There are abstract entities’ is either objectively true or false, and therefore
that one of the frameworks is right and the other wrong. According to this reading of Ney,
Platonism and nominalism might be different rival frameworks that can be regarded as
competing theories where no evidence available will settle the matter. Ultimately, this is
why one cannot choose the correct one. This problem is essentially epistemological.
Interestingly, this is not the challenge that I have posed under the name of Carnap’s challenge.
I presented Carnap’s challenge as a semantic problem. According to this reading of Carnap,
no framework-independent point of view is available from which to make theoretical assertions.
Any assertion is made within a framework, any assertion must be an internal assertion.
An external question or claim regarding which of these linguistic frameworks to prefer is a
pragmatic question or claim. They compete on pragmatic virtues and not on theoretical
Chapter 4. The possibility of naturalized metaphysics 105
correctness or even truth: There is no fact of the matter as to which of them is the true
linguistic framework, and consequently, there cannot be a correct ontology. To ask which
of these frameworks correctly represents the ontology of the thing in itself is not only
unanswerable, the question itself is cognitively meaningless. It is a pseudo-question in so far
as it is intended as a theoretical, external question. This is what signifies the problem as
a semantic problem rather than an epistemological problem. The problem is not that we
have no means to answer the question, the problem is that we cannot ask the question in
the first place. Any question about which framework to adopt is a pragmatic question. The
ontology of a framework merely mirrors the preference for a particular conceptual scheme.
In comparison, the epistemological problem that Ney appears to be concerned with allows
the ontology of a framework to represent the thing in itself.
It is important to keep this distinction in mind. As a semantic problemit is not even a
proposal for a solution to Carnap’s challenge to suggest that a particular framework is the
true framework. This will presuppose that it has already been answered how the adoption of
a framework can be a theoretical question in the first place. The problem is not that we do
not “possess any way to verify which ontology is correct”. Rather, the problem occurs already
in the attempt to ask the question that we want metaphysics to answer. When one attempts
to ask which framework accords with the thing in itself, which framework gets ontology right,
these attempts are unsuccessful as attempts at cognitively meaningful questions. Indeed,
it is not even appropriate to answer that there is no fact of the matter. Rather, Carnap’s
response is the suggestion that these questions ask which framework it is preferable to adopt
for different purposes, and if this proposal is not accepted, then he insists that he does not
understand what the questions ask. These external questions are pseudo-questions. There
is no question to be asked about whether there are abstract entities, beside whether the
assertion is true in this or that framework, and whether it is pragmatically preferable with
respect to some aim to adopt a framework where this assertion is true.
4.3.2 Ney’s approach to Carnap’s challenge
Nevertheless, Ney’s approach to Carnap’s challenge is to defend that there is a preferred
framework. Ney is confident that there is only one framework or family of frameworks that
it is “rational” to prefer. Being a naturalist, her proposal for this framework is obvious, Ney
suggests “to select whatever linguistic state fundamental physics is in when we find it and
take that to determine our ontology” (Ney 2012, 59), because “[t]his strategy of getting out
of the positivist dilemma wouldn’t necessarily have the choice of ontology be subjective or
arbitrary because those physical theories that physicalists use to inform their metaphysics
have already met high standards for justification and acceptance” (Ney 2012, 59). According
to Ney, the framework constituted by fundamental physics is preferable. If the positivist
dilemma is the problem of choosing a framework, then Ney once again emphasizes that she
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immediately regards this to be an epistemological problem. Fundamental physics has proven
its epistemic superiority and consequently there are good reasons why our ontology should
be determined by “the linguistic state of fundamental physics”. Ney claims that this would
“thereby make the choice between frameworks rational, as opposed to merely pragmatic” (Ney
2012, 59). Choosing the framework of fundamental physics is not a pragmatic choice because
this framework has proven itself in such a way that it is rational to prefer this framework over
others. Presumably, it is rational to choose this framework, because this framework has “met
high standards for justification and acceptance”. Being the preferred framework, the correct
ontology is then the ontology implied by this framework. The ontology of this framework is
not merely adopted as a linguistic convention, it is the ontology. This framework gets the
ontology of the thing in itself right.
Granting for now that there might be reasons to prefer the framework of fundamental physics,
there are still competing theories within theoretical physics. Ney is aware of this problem
and the solution is the introduction of strong indispensability. To quote her at length:
Even if we agree we should start with fundamental physical theories, because
those are (a) the theories that aim to give a complete account of our world,
and (b) those that deliver the best justified theoretical frameworks, there is no
genuine question about which overall ontology is correct. Still, there may be
certain elements of these rival ontologies that are repeated. Perhaps certain
representational elements are found in every formulation of fundamental physics
that meet criteria of theory choice accepted by the physics community. There
might be some representational features that are as a matter of fact indispensable
to our best physical theories as they are actually understood. If one could show
that, to state our fundamental physics clearly, precisely, and accurately, one
must use certain kinds of representing devices, then perhaps this would show
something that had genuine significance and justification, something that went
beyond merely expressing one’s preferences for a particular kind of conceptual
scheme or linguistic framework (Ney 2012, 60–61).
The different theories of fundamental physics generally entail different ontologies. More
precisely, Ney regards these different theories to constitute different linguistic frameworks
and generally, these frameworks will have different representational elements. However,
there might be some representational elements that all these frameworks include and which
therefore could be regarded in Ney’s words as more than an expression of a preference
for a certain linguistic framework. These are the strongly indispensable representational
elements of core metaphysics, and Ney’s suggessts that they might more than an expression
of conceptual preference, they are representations of “genuine significance”; presumably,
representations of the thing in itself. This is supported by her remark that these elements
originate in theories that try to give “a complete account of our world”. These strongly
indispensable representational elements are part of the metaphysics of all the relevant
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frameworks, i.e. those frameworks that can be adopted rationally rather than arbitrarily. No
matter which of these linguistic frameworks and thereby which metaphysics we adopt, there
are elements that are part of the metaphysics of all these frameworks and in this sense, they
are strongly indispensable. There is no acceptable framework in which these elements are not
posited. Because they are common to all frameworks they are not framework-dependent and
therefore more than an expression of linguistic preferences. Rather, they are indispensable
and therefore representational features of the thing in itself. Ney summaries the advantage
of her method thus: “Using this method, all ontological claims will be given sense and
justification using the standards of our best science. Nor are the ontological results achieved
trivial or arbitrary, since we have not merely selected one system and read our results off.
We have only followed what is common to all systems” (Ney 2012, 62). Being common to all
systems these ontological claims are sensible as ontological claims, i.e. not as claims about
conceptual preferences. If something in part of core metaphysics, if it is a feature common
to all systems, then this feature is more than a linguistic convention adopted for pragmatic
reasons. This convention then mirrors the ontology of the world.
This method does not involve answering any metaphysical question as external theoretical
questions. All questions are asked within a framework, but when all frameworks give the
same answer to a question, this is taken to signify that the answer is more than a linguistic
convention. Ney tries to avoid Carnap’s challenge simply by avoiding the problematic
external questions. The questions are instead answered as internal questions to frameworks
that are preferable and rationally chosen because they are the “best justified theoretical
frameworks”. Even with a number of frameworks that all are entitled to this priority, there
turns out to be representational elements that are indispensable to all of them. These are
the ontological commitments that are shared among all the frameworks that are justified
in such a way that they are rational to adopt. Even though the ontological commitments
of frameworks generally just express preferences for linguistic conventions, these shared
commitments are regarded as more than that. They are features of the true ontology.
Formulated like this, Ney’s solution is a solution to the epistemological problem introduced
above. This is supported by Ney’s own speculations on why Carnap did not himself suggest
such a solution that built on the findings of fundamental physics. As an answer Ney proposes
that Carnap regarded there to be too many differences among our best physical theories for
there to be consensus about very many representational elements. It is here that Ney, on
the other hand, is more optimistic. She writes:
It is my view that there are actually not so many different ways of formulating
physics as Carnap suggested. In particular, one doesn’t find either phenomenalist
or physicalist (in Carnap’s sense of physical-object language) formulations of
fundamental physical theory. Fundamental physics tends to be formulated
today in much more abstract mathematical terms than was the case in the
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early twentieth century. And rival formulations share much of this common
mathematical language. As a result, this makes it much more likely there will be
features common to all acceptable rival formulations (Ney 2012, 63).
These common features ensure that core metaphysics is non-empty. Metaphysics is possible
because consensus is found with respect to the representational elements among the rival
frameworks of fundamental physics. Ney proposes that Carnap was simply more pessimistic
in this respect. According to her, Carnap regarded metaphysics to be impossible even as
naturalized metaphysics because he saw no prospect of settling on an agreement among the
different formulations of fundamental physics. Now, Ney argues that the physics community
actually has settled on a shared mathematical language and there are no rival formulation
in either phenomenalist or physicalist frameworks. It seems to be Ney’s point of view
that if Carnap had been aware of this current agreement in the physics community, he
would have withdrawn the conclusion that metaphysical discussions were impossible, because
it is now evident how they can be resolved through features common to the answers to
internal questions asked within the frameworks of fundamental physics. Ney writes: “Part
of Carnap’s point in ’Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’ was that there were multiple
ways to accomplish this task for physics and so there is no simply reading an ontology off
physics as contemporary statements of physicalism would suggest” (Ney 2012, 59). With
the agreement that Ney claims to find in the physics community, this worry of Carnap’s is
unwarranted.
These remarks indicate that Ney has a very particular reading of “Empiricism, Semantics,
and Ontology”. In her reading, the choice of metaphysics that is entailed by the adoption
of a linguistic framework is a pragmatic question only because Carnap saw no prospect in
giving a theoretical answer to the question. Though Carnap, according to Ney, adopted the
view that the linguistic state of physics would give the correct ontology, these prospects were
blocked by the different formulations of fundamental physics in either a phenomenalist or
physicalist framework. The frameworks taken seriously by the scientific community were
so different at that time that there appeared to be no prospect for any shared metaphysics
among these rival frameworks. Therefore, any proposal for a metaphysics would merely
express a preference for one framework or another. However, Ney observes that in the course
of time things have changed so that the rival frameworks of fundamental physics are now
more similar and share certain representational elements, which entail ontological claims
that are more than mere expressions of preference for a certain conceptual scheme.
Ney conceives of Carnap’s challenge as a challenge that originates in the epistemological
problems of determining the true framework. Ney further proposes that Carnap endorsed
the view that this problem was restricted to a choice between the different frameworks of
fundamental physics, and that his conclusion simply displays his belief that these frameworks
were too different. It is merely this problem that Ney immediately proclaims to avoid with
her neo-positivist metaphysics. In Ney’s reading, Carnap would agree that the framework
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of fundamental physics is preferable, and consequently Carnap’s challenge, according to
Ney, amounts to no more than the challenge to show that there are certain representational
elements that the physics community takes to be indispensable to all the rival formulation
of fundamental physics. If Carnap’s challenge amounted to this, then there would certainly
be a prospect for Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics to meet this challenge. She simply has to
demonstrate that there are such strongly indispensable representational elements.
4.3.3 Carnap’s challenge to Ney
However, Carnap’s challenge as I have presented it is not concerned with this question
regarding the differences and similarities between the frameworks taken seriously by the
physics community. The challenge is that any assertion must be an assertion within a
framework, and that there is no theoretic question concerning which framework to adopt.
The problem is not how to justify that a particular framework is the true framework in an
objective and absolute sense. The problem is what semantics govern such formulation. At
the outset, core metaphysics might be perfectly acceptable to Carnap. Based on Ney’s own
suggestions, core metaphysics includes assertions such as ’Reality is such that it obeys Lorentz
invariance’ and ’Reality is such that it obeys the Born rule’. To say that these assertions are
contained in core metaphysics presumably means that in all linguistic frameworks currently
taken seriously by the physics community, it is true to say ’Reality is such that it obeys
Lorentz invariance’. Similarly, to say that the assertion ’Reality is deterministic’ is not part
of core metaphysics means that there is at least one linguistic framework taken seriously by
the scientific community where is it false to say ’Reality is deterministic’. Whether these
assertions are analytic or synthetic in their respective framework does not matter to Carnap.
They are perfectly unproblematic as they are asserted within a framework such that their
conditions of truth are determined.
Carnap also finds the assertion ’There are abstract entities’ perfectly acceptable when it is
asserted within a linguistic framework. As an internal claim to a Platonist framework it is
true and internally to a nominalist framework it is false. Both a Platonist and a nominalist
will agree to this, however, they will insist that this is not what they were discussing. They
were discussing whether abstract entities really exist, not what is true to say in this or
that framework. Perhaps, they will propose that they are disagreeing on whether ’abstract
entity’ in the Platonist framework refers to something in the thing in itself, or perhaps,
whether the Platonist or the nominalist framework as such has the correct ontology. As
previously argued, it is these latter attempts that Carnap’s challenge concerns. Externally
to a linguistic framework, nominalism and Platonism can merely express the pragmatic
preference for different linguistic frameworks. Now, let us consider someone saying ’Reality
is really deterministic’. Since ’Reality is deterministic’ is not a member of core metaphysics,
Ney will agree with Carnap and interpret this as a pseudo-statement, if it is an attempt at an
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external statement, it must be expressive rather than assertive. It expresses the pragmatic
preference for a particular linguistic framework or alternatively, it is made within one of
the frameworks of fundamental physics. In some of them it is true to say this, and in some
it is false. Presumably, Ney agrees with Carnap that there is a semantic challenge facing
’Reality is really deterministic’ if it is an attempt at a framework-independent assertion. As
an external statement it must be regarded as expressive rather than assertive.
This is interesting since Ney does not consent to the same proposal for the claim ’Reality is
such that it obeys Lorentz invariance’. While this is true to say in all linguistic frameworks
that are taken seriously by the scientific community, Ney seems to think that there is
more to it. Being strongly indispensable, Lorentz invariance is one of the representational
elements that have “genuine significance” such that they are “beyond merely expressing one’s
preferences for a particular kind of conceptual scheme or linguistic framework”. Perhaps
Ney would stipulate that reality really is such that it obeys Lorentz invariance. If this
means nothing but that Lorentz invariance is strongly indispensable, then Carnap would
accept this stipulation as perfectly meaningful, since this would indicate what would count as
possible evidence for or against the claim. It would demonstrate that the claim was internal
to a framework after all. However, by proposing this “genuine significance” for strongly
indispensable representational elements, Ney seems to suggests that these elements represent
an aspect of the thing in itself, and that this is not meant relative to any framework but in an
absolute sense. Ney might maintain that these are still assertions made within a framework,
but at least the claim ’The strongly indispensable representational elements have genuine
significance’ seems to be made as a theoretic, external claim. This is not just true to say within
some frameworks, this will not do for Ney. Neither is hers a suggestion to adopt a framework
in which this claim is true. The claim is an attempt at a framework-independent assertion
about the representational relation between the linguistic frameworks taken seriously by the
scientific community and the thing in itself. Similar problems occur when Ney discusses
frameworks as “competing accounts of the truth”, discuss whether it is possible between
competing frameworks to “verify which ontology is correct” and when she discuss whether
it is such that all representational elements “correspond to something in reality”. All are
attempts to assert something framework-independent about the relation between certain
frameworks and the thing in itself. According to Carnap these are pseudo-questions and
-claims. It is impossible to assert anything outside a linguistic framework. Ney’s problem
is to argue how the assertions of core metaphysics can be more than something that is
true to say within particular frameworks. How is it not a pseudo-statement to say ’The
strongly indispensable representational elements have genuine significance’? Why is ’Reality
is deterministic’ an expression of linguistic preference, whereas ’Reality is such that it obeys
Lorentz invariance’ succeeds as a framework-independent assertion about the thing is in
itself?
Ney seems to be aware that this calls for extensive semantic theorizing, however, she rather
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attempts to circumvent the problem:
[T]he relevant semantic and epistemological claims I mean to endorse here are
only the following. First, the claims of our best, fundamental physical theories
are meaningful. Second, the claims of our best, fundamental physical theories
are justified. How they come to be justified, how they come to be accepted in
the first place: these are issues that this account of methodology in metaphysics
need not take a stance on. The point is that physics has a proven track record of
success making it a good place to begin metaphysical inquiry (Ney 2012, 62).
The theories of fundamental physics are meaningful, and being a proclaimed realist Ney
supposedly regards them to be meaningful as assertions about the thing in itself. This is
proven by “the track record of success”. There is no need for neo-positivist metaphysics to be
concerned with these methodological issues, because the close relation to fundamental physics
ensures that this metaphysics can simply inherit these credentials. Core metaphysics can
make successful assertions about the thing in itself, because fundamental physics succeeds
in making such assertions. There is no semantic theory that demonstrates how this is
possible. Rather, Ney ensures that the imposed ontological naturalism is strong enough
that neo-positivist metaphysics will succeed with such assertions if fundamental physics
succeeds with them. She then in turn denies to give a semantics for fundamental physics,
because its success with assertions about the thing in itself is demonstrated by its track
record. This track record proves that there is an adequate relation between the frameworks
of fundamentals physics and the thing in itself. It proves that the assertions of physics can
be evaluated in an objective and absolute sense.
This success is obtained through the institutional error filters found in physics. It is the
critical self-regulation of physics that has ensured this success, and consequently Ney has
to adopt the view that it is the physics community which ultimately decides on what
representational elements that are metaphysically significant and strongly indispensable. It
is the physics community that has the proven track record and therefore their sanctioning
that can ensure the meaning and justification of theories and indispensability. Ney is aware
that this is very restrictive, and that one could be more open minded when it comes to what
theories to consider. Ney writes:
One could (a) allow for more alternative formulations of physical theory
beyond those which have actually been developed, (b) allow for more alternative
formulations than those physicists have actually endorsed as a community, (c)
rest the decision for what does and does not count as alternative formulations of
the same physical theory elsewhere than on the physics community, or all of the
above (Ney 2012, 63).
However, she exactly emphasizes that this will not do. “I have adopted the more restrictive
approach outlined above because the goal is to get out a metaphysics that has established
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its semantic and justificatory credentials via physical theory itself, without having to also
develop a semantic theory and epistemology for physics” (Ney 2012, 64). There is no need
for a semantic theory and an epistemology for physics because physics has proven itself via
its continuous success. However, it is the physics of the physics community that has proven
itself, so to inherit the credentials of physics, metaphysics must take this physics as all the
available evidence. Anything else would reinstate the requirement of a semantic theory for
metaphysics. Ney’s idea is to avoid the need of a semantic theory altogether and this can
only be achieved by making physics the evidence used in metaphysics, and then argue based
on its track record that physics succeeds with assertions about the thing in itself. It is the
linguistic frameworks of the physics community in which assertions succeed in being about
the thing in itself.
4.3.4 Realism and Carnap’s Challenge
This appears to be Ney’s suggestion of how neo-positivist metaphysics avoids Carnap’s
challenge and why it remains significant for the rest of metaphysics. Only the physics
framework has the appropriate relation to the thing in itself. If one wants to collect
assertions about the thing in itself, i.e. if one want to build metaphysics, then the physics
framework is the only rational and legitimate place to begin because this is proven to be
the true framework. One cannot allow metaphysical reasoning done by metaphysicists to
be relevant to this work, since Ney is aware that such reasoning would be accused of being
pragmatic rather than theoretic. Any metaphysical discussion, even one taking place with
an outset in physics, is under suspicion for being concerned with preferences for conceptual
schemes. The appropriate relation between metaphysics and physics is ensured by the
biconditional and imperative restriction, since this entails that metaphysics can only rely on
what are ultimately the beliefs of the scientific community. Their beliefs are not subjected to
epistemological or semantic scrutiny by Ney, because they have their track record of success.
The scientific community is a black box out of which theories emerge, and if there is an
agreement in all of the scientific community about the indispensability of a metaphysically
significant representational element, then we have genuine metaphysical commitment to
this element. These are not linguistic preferences, but take the form of assertions about
the thing in itself. This success is not ensured by a semantic theory for the beliefs of the
physics community, but it is rather defended by the track record of physics. Despite being
evidently dependent on the framework adopted by the physics community, the assertions
of the resulting core metaphysics are regarded as the fundamental ontology rather than as
expressions of preference for a particular conceptual scheme. They are assertions within a
framework which Ney nevertheless suggests that we treat as external claims, claims that are
made from the true point of view such that they get the thing in itself right. Ney achieves
this by rejecting to answer how assertions of core metaphysics succeed to be about the thing
in itself. She does not, ultimately, address Carnap’s challenge. Rather, she simply insists
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that physics has proven its semantic credentials so that it avoids the challenge, and that a
metaphysics relying on physics as its evidence can inherit these semantic credentials.
Ney’s strategy to avoid Carnap’s challenge is to answer any question regarding the semantics
of the assertions of core metaphysics with reference to them inheriting their semantics from
the beliefs of the physics community, and then to deny answering any questions regarding
the semantics of this community with reference to the success of physics, which is supposed
to make such a question obsolete. The success of physics proves the beliefs of the physics
community to be such that if there is something that the whole community agrees about,
then this is true and not just in the sense that they all believe it or regard it to be true. But
we must insist on asking how this track record proves physics in such a way that we are
entitled to regard the assertion of physics to be assertions about the thing in itself. Ney’s
response will probably be that it is because the physics community takes their assertions
to be about the thing in itself that we are entitled to regard them as assertions about
the thing in itself. There is no argument that directly demonstrates why this realism is
entitled. Rather, the track record of physics proves that the beliefs of the physics community
are correct or perhaps even true, at least when it is a belief that is shared by the whole
community. It is because the whole physics community is realist that we are entitled to
take physics to succeed with assertions about the thing in itself. This is what the physics
community believes their assertions are about. Realism is not defended by a direct argument,
rather it is supported by the general acceptance of the physics community, whose judgement
generally earns its credential from the track record of physics.
Ney appears to be aware that the general adoption of realism in the physics community is
therefore essential to the whole project. She writes: “Our metaphysical project depends on
the attitude in general of the physics community being realist” (Ney 2012, 64). While the
combination of the biconditional and the imperative restriction might allow Ney to deflect
the requirement of a semantic theory for core metaphysics with reference to its reliance
of physics, I think this in turn supports the insistence that more must be said about the
semantics of physics. How is it that realism can be an unproblematic position when it is
adopted by the scientific community?
I have previously quoted Psillos’ proposal that scientific realism cannot be an empirical
theory whose evidence is the track record of science. The no miracles argument infers that
scientific realism is the best explanation of this track record of success, but according to
Psillos “[f]or the no-miracles argument to work at all it is presupposed that explanation –
and in particular explanation by postulation – matters and that scientific theories should
be assessed and evaluated on explanatory grounds” (Psillos 2011, 312). Following the
discussion in section 2.1, scientific realism introduces a criterion of reality – to be real is to
be indispensable in an explanation by postulation – that must be in place for the no miracles
argument to work. Psillos concludes: “Hence, the no-miracles argument works within the
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realist framework; it’s not an argument for it” (Psillos 2011, 312). From the Carnapian point
of view it is important to stress how the argument requires a criterion of reality. It requires
a linguistic convention about what counts as real. Ney is certainly right that the realist
interpretations of the theories of fundamental physics are both meaningful and justified if
these theories are about the realist reality, that is, if they are asserted within the realist
framework. It is certainly correct to say that this realist reality is Lorentz invariant because
all this means is that Lorentz invariance is indispensable as an explanation by postulation
of commonsensical objects or events. However, what Ney further claims is that this realist
reality is the true reality. In Ney’s view, this realist reality, or perhaps more appropriately
the realist framework, represents the thing in itself. Ney might just say that the realist
framework is true. But as already argued the same semantic problem reoccurs for this claim
as the one that faces a first order assertion such as ’Reality is such that it obeys Lorentz
invariance’. For this to be an assertion it must be made within a linguistic framework such
that its truth conditions are determined. Similarly, to say ’The realist framework represents
the thing in itself’ must be asserted within a framework, however, the claim appears to be
an external claim. It is not made inside any framework and appears to be meant in an
objective and absolute sense. Of course this will not do for Ney. Following Carnap, she
must regard external questions and claims to be meaningless, so the claim must be made
within a framework. In this unknown framework it is true to say that realist reality is the
thing in itself. For this to be the case semantic rules must be in place for ’realist reality’ and
’the thing in itself’ – perhaps these two terms simply have the same semantics, such that
this amounts to the same as saying that all bachelors are unmarried. In another framework,
the sentence ’Realist reality is the thing in itself’ might be false because ’the thing it itself’
has semantic rules such that it mirrors an empiricist reality. In this case it is false to say
that realist reality is the thing in itself. The same applies to scientific realism as that which
applies to nominalism or Platonism. Scientific realism cannot be asserted independently of a
linguistic framework.
Carnap’s challenge results in a semantic problem. Despite the track record of physics, the
physics community cannot endorse realism as an external theoretic claim. Such claims
are pseudo-statements or alternatively, they are pragmatic claims about which linguistic
framework is pragmatically preferable. We cannot rely on the physics community being
realist, because realism as a position is meaningless.
This is to emphasize that Carnap’s challenge cannot be avoided by adequately relating
metaphysics to science. The semantic problem is just as relevant to science as it is to
metaphysics. Further, adopting the framework of the scientific community, such that scientific
and metaphysical questions and claims are internal to a framework, has the consequence
that a framework-dependence is introduced which cannot be removed, because there are no
theoretical grounds on which to adopt a framework. The adoption of a linguistic framework
is a pragmatic question.
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It might be objected that Ney very openly states that the whole project depends on the
assumption of realism. Neo-positivist metaphysics builds on science because science aims at
giving a complete description of the objective world (Ney 2012, 60). As previously stated,
without this realist point of view in the scientific community a metaphysics founded on science
would be impossible. It is the good fortune of metaphysics that the scientific community
embraces realism. Ney writes: “Fortunately, physics as a whole makes it clear that what they
are attempting to do is to construct an accurate theory about what the world is like” (Ney
2012, 64). I read Ney as supposing that the physics community has good reasons for their
realism, but as long as Ney denies that it is relevant to provide a semantic theory for the
beliefs sanctioned by the scientific community, it must be a leap of faith that this realism is
true. Accordingly, we might view Ney as simply assuming scientific realism. More generally,
it might simply be viewed as an assumption when she writes that the “fundamental physical
theories are meaningful” (Ney 2012, 62), in the sense that they are meaningful as assertions
about the thing in itself. This is essentially an attempt at a leap of faith.
Under the assumption that scientific realism is true, our metaphysical commitments can
be inferred from the strongly indispensable representational elements of frameworks taken
seriously by the physics community. According to this reading of Ney, her argument concerns
the possibility of metaphysics in a possible world where scientific realism is true. It is a
world where physics succeeds at its attempt at assertions about the thing in itself, and
where such assertions are meaningful. The metaphysical conclusions arrived at via strong
indispensability are true of this possible world. It is then a leap of faith that this possible
world is the actual world, so that these metaphysical conclusions are actually true of the
thing in itself and not just possibly true.
This position introduces a scientific underdetermination between realism and anti-realism,
and differs from the position attributed to Ney above in that it suggests that realism cannot
be scientifically sanctioned. Importantly, it regards the metaphysical assertions inferred from
physics to be merely possibly true in the sense that the negation of these assertions is equally
possible. Ney is very clear that any expression not sanctioned by strong indispensability
cannot be assertive. Such statements must be expressive. It would revoke naturalism to
propose that strong indispensability merely provides one possible way that the world may be,
among many other proposals that could be arrived at by different means or by negating the
conclusions. This would eliminate the requirement that metaphysics should defer to science.
Such a move cannot be allowed from Ney’s perspective. Non-naturalized metaphysics is
defective. It is not metaphysics at all but rather non-assertive expressions, and this follows
from Ney’s own view on the significance of Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics.
The sort of view that Ney might adopt is that the metaphysical conclusion of the indispens-
ability argument is only true about the thing in itself if realism is true. Only two possible
worlds are introduced, one where realism is true and one where anti-realism is true. In
the anti-realist world metaphysics is impossible altogether, whereas in the realist world
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metaphysics is possible as a naturalized metaphysics. With this position, all metaphysical
assertions are conditionals inferred from strong indispensability and take the form: ’If the
metaphysically significant representational elements of physics represent entities in the thing
in itself, then . . . ’, where the consequent is the particular metaphysical assertion. In the
possible world where the antecedent is true, the consequent – a metaphysical assertion
inferred from the indispensability argument – is true.
However, stating naturalized metaphysics in terms of such conditionals or alternatively
as the metaphysics of a possible world that might be the actual world is not available to
Ney, either. The statement ’The metaphysically significant representational elements in
physics represent entities in the objective world’ is the cause of the problem. From Ney’s
point of view, this statement is not endorsed by the scientific community and therefore it
cannot be part of core metaphysics; this is the assumption behind the move to avoid the
problems for Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics resulting from Carnap’s challenge. However,
all metaphysical statements that are not sanctioned by science by strong indispensability
can only express our preferences for a conceptual scheme and must be part of the filled-in
metaphysics. Filled-in metaphysics does not consist of assertions, rather, Ney adopts a local
expressivism when it comes to filled-in metaphysics of the sort globally embraced by Price.
One cannot in this light assume realism as true, because the statement ’The metaphysically
significant representational elements in physics represent entities in the objective world’ is
not an assertion, it is merely expressive. But then any conditional having this statement as
an antecedent must be merely expressive as well. By Ney’s own standards, there is no way
in which she can assume realism to be true, and these standards are adopted by Ney exactly
due to Carnap’s challenge, which she regards as a significant challenge to all non-naturalized
metaphysics.
Following Carnap, there are even good reasons for being suspicious of simply assuming
realism to avoid the problems facing metaphysics. From a Carnapian point of view there
is no such assumption. If stating ’p’ is problematic then stating ’possibly, p’ is just as
problematic.7 Taking the particular example of realism, there is no way in which realism
can be true in an absolute sense. Rather, a framework can be a realist framework. However,
even the second order claim that this framework then represents the thing in itself must
be a pseudo-statement. This problem is not avoided by moving from the actual world to
all possible worlds. This would solve the epistemological problem that Ney takes Carnap
to introduce. By assuming realism, we simply assume that the framework of the scientific
community is the true framework, or analogously, state something about the possible world
where this framework is the true framework. The problem, however, is not an epistemological
problem. It cannot be avoided by assumption or by moving to a certain possible world, since
7Evidently, the whole Lewesian possible world semantics must be treated carefully from a Carnapian point
of view. This is not to say that modal langauges are disallowed, this would be in direct contradiction to
Carnap’s principle of tolerance.
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the problem is ultimately a semantic problem. There is no notion of objective and absolute
truth, there are no framework-independent assertions. Thus, assuming realism supposedly
amount to explicating the sort of linguistic framework in which certain statements are made.
Similarly, to say ’possibly, p’ might be suggested to mean that there is a linguistic framework
in which it is true to say that p, or merely that p is synthetic a posteriori and therefore only
empirical evidence can settle whether p or ¬p it the case within some framework. These are
merely proposals as to how these statements might be understood. There are many other
ways to analyse the employment of such linguistic expressions within frameworks. The point
is just that realism involves an assertion that must be evaluated within a framework like
every other assertion, as there is no framework-independent point of view. This is also the
case when making assumptions or when one is asserting something about possible worlds.
Statements about the possible world in which realism is true are still statements within a
framework. ’Is there really such a world?’ is without cognitive meaning if it is meant as
a theoretical, external question. The suggestion, as above, could be that what is asked is
rather whether there is a linguistic framework in which it is true to say ’The metaphysically
significant representational elements in physics represent entities in the thing in itself’. If
Psillos is right, then we can answer this question in the affirmative; this framework is the
realist framework. However, adopting the realist framework is a pragmatic matter, any
framework is allowable. While assuming realism to be true of the actual world can prove to
be a viable strategy to avoid epistemological difficulties, the semantic difficulties following
Carnap’s challenge block even such a leap of faith. According to this challenge realism is
unavailable as a theoretical position.
A footnote with a remark about Carnap and Quine summarizes Ney’s view and expose her
problem. She writes:
Note that this does involve in one sense at least siding with Carnap against
Quine. Quine, recall, argued that we don’t even have objective, not-merely-
pragmatic standards of verification within science. So, Quine was a pragmatist
about all matters, not just metaphysical matters. The present view depends
on rejecting such a global pragmatism. Science can provide us with objective
justification for its claims (Ney 2012, 62 fn 9).
Ney rejects global pragmatism. She adopt the view that science is objective. According to
Ney, science makes claims that are not framework-dependent. As I have presented Carnap’s
challenge, Ney’s sides with neither Carnap nor Quine on this. Following Carnap’s challenge
every evaluation of the truth of an assertion must be conduction within a framework. In this
sense the evaluation can never be objective and non-pragmatic. According to both Quine
and Carnap one must for semantic reasons adopt a global pragmatism. Ney simply rejects
this. Ultimately, no reasons can be provided for this rejection. She might seem to take is as a
leap of faith that science is relevantly objective, but as I have argued not even such a leap of
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faith is available. Evidently, this emphasizes how Carnap’s challenge is a challenge not only
to metaphysics but to all attempts at assertion made outside any framework, claims that
are supposed to be objective assertions about the thing in itself. In this sense both global
pragmatism and the rejection of this are pseudo-statements. There is not such position
stating ’No representational elements of a linguistic framework represent the thing in itself’.
This statement would be just as problematic as Ney’s rejection of it. According to Carnap,
framework-independence is impossible. All evaluations of truth are made in a linguistic
framework. This includes evaluation of metaphysical and scientific assertions alike. Quine
summarizes the view quite nicely in Theories and Thing. He writes: “The scientific system,
ontology and all, is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory stimulation to
sensory stimulation” (Quine 1981, 20). This however, does not result in relativism. To quote
Quine at length:
But it is a confusion to suppose that we can stand aloof and recognize all the
alternative ontologies as true in their several ways, all the envisaged worlds as
real. It is a confusion of truth with evidential support. Truth is immanent, and
there is no higher. We must speak from within a theory, albeit any of various [. . . ].
What evaporates is the transcendental question of the reality of the external
world – the question whether or how far our science measures up to the Ding an
sich (Quine 1981, 21–22, emphasis in original).
Quine signifies how metaphysics is impossible if it is a condition that successful attempts
at metaphysics are assertion about the thing in itself. There are no such assertion. They
must be pseudo-assertions. The whole discussion regarding “whether or how far our science
measures up to the Ding an sich” is a pseudo-discussion if it is supposed to be conducted
outside any framework. All this follows from Carnap’s challenge as I have presented it.
I propose that this demonstrates that Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics cannot avoid the
challenge either. Ney’s variant of ontological naturalism does not succeed as an answer
to how metaphysics is possible, because the instruction provided does not guide us to
succeed at attempts at metaphysics. The metaphysics following Ney’s variant of ontological
naturalism is just as vulnerable to Carnap’s challenge as non-naturalized metaphysics. Ney’s
neo-positivists metaphysicist is no better off than those who discuss the existence of abstract
entities or mereological sums while keeping their distance from the findings of science.
This does not allow the conclusion that naturalized metaphysics is not an answer to how
metaphysics is possible. There are many other variants of such a metaphysics. With an
outset in Ney’s naturalized metaphysics, some of these variants will be considered below. It
will be argued that none of them fares any better than Ney’s variant.
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4.4 Turning the knobs of naturalized metaphysics
In very general terms, Ney’s answer to how metaphysics is possible follows an idea suggested
by Blackburn in a brief remark about naturalistic metaphysics. He writes: “It is easy to
understand why the naturalistic self-image is so popular. First of all, it answers the question
of how metaphysics is possible. It is continuous with science, and, since science is possible,
so is metaphysics” (Blackburn 2002, 76). Relating metaphysics adequately to science will
ensure that metaphysics is possible just like science: this is the guiding idea behind Ney’s
response to Carnap’s challenge and I will assume that any variant of naturalized metaphysics
attempts such a solution to the problems facing metaphysics, as one might question what
else could be achieved by requiring that metaphysics should defer to the findings of science.
Carnap’s challenge argues that any metaphysical assertion must be framework-dependent.
The truth of the assertion can only be evaluated within a linguistic framework. To use
Quine’s phrase: “Truth is immanent”. Some essentially semantic argument would be required
to reject this claim. As argued, even attempting to assert the rejection is initially semantically
problematic. Requiring that metaphysics defers to the findings of science does not appear
to be the beginning of an elaborate semantic argument, and therefore I find that we are
entitled to regard naturalized metaphysics to be an attempt to avoid the problem, rather
than to address it. Just like Ney, I therefore propose that any naturalized metaphysics follows
Blackburn and ultimately takes naturalized metaphysics to be possible because science is
possible. Ney attempts to avoid Carnap’s challenge, not by giving a semantic argument,
but by relating metaphysics to physics. She generally regards Carnap’s challenge to be
significant, but physics nevertheless avoids it. This is the general argumentative scheme that
I take to be available to variants of naturalized metaphysics in the attempt to answer how
metaphysics is possible when specific interest is bestowed to Carnap’s challenge.
In the following, I will investigate how variations in naturalized metaphysics might affect
attempts to avoid Carnap’s challenge following this scheme. The outset will be Ney’s attempt,
and the variations will be considered in relation to Ney. I will therefore briefly review the
role of different elements of Ney’s naturalism in her attempt to avoid the challenge and
thereby indicate what knobs that might be turned to approach the problem differently.
4.4.1 Reviewing Ney’s attempt to avoid Carnap’s challenge
Ney defends a closed, biconditional naturalism. She does this to ensure that metaphysics
relates to physics in such a way that metaphysics can inherit the semantic credentials of
physics. It is the assertions endorsed by the physics community that stand as candidates to
being assertions that are “objective and not-merely-pragmatic”. It is the physics community
that has a proven track record of success in the sense that it is their beliefs that have proven to
be successful. Supposedly, this is to emphasize that any metaphysical reasoning and thereby
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the opinion of the metaphysics community has never brought any of these successes about.
Therefore, Ney restricts the scientific sanctioning to those assertions that are endorsed by the
physics community. Further, when the aim is metaphysical assertions, Ney even requires that
such assertions can only be made about strongly indispensable representational elements that
are regarded to be of metaphysical significance by the whole physics community. As argued,
this implies a very strong ontological naturalism. The physics community must be realist with
respect to the particular representational element for it to be of metaphysical significance.
Ultimately, only common agreement about metaphysics in the physics community scientifally
sanctions metaphysics that is assertions about the thing in itself. In Ney’s view, any other
metaphysical statement is a pseudo-statement that merely expresses the preference for a
particular conceptual scheme. These remarks suggests two related knobs to turn, both of
which concern the strength of the imposed ontological naturalism. First, one might instead
endorse trumping naturalism, and second, the requirement for scientific sanctioning might
be changed.
Ney is generally optimistic that some consensus can be found among the different frameworks
taken seriously by the physics community. This is what ensures that there are strongly
indispensable representational elements and therefore, what ensures core metaphysics is not
empty. However, she is also aware that physics is largely inconsistent. This is manifest for
instance with the different interpretations of quantum mechanics that are all taken seriously
by the physics community. Ney tries to accommodate these inconsistencies by requiring
strong indispensability. This, however, she does to accommodate an epistemological problem
such as the one proposed by Monton. Monton requires that “metaphysics is meant to get at
truth” (Monton 2011, 156). In relation to the question of the consistency of science, strong
indispensability is supposed to pick out assertions that are indeed true. Carnap’s challenge
on the other hand is not such an epistemological problem. The problem is not whether it
is possible to infer from science any true assertions about the thing in itself. Rather, the
challenge questions how any attempts at an assertion about the thing in itself is possible. In
this regard, the optimism or pessimism regarding the current state of science is an irrelevant
aspect when it comes to a solution to Carnap’s challenge. Consistency is only relevant in so
far as science sanctions both an assertion and its negation such that any assertion might be
inferred from them. If scientific sanctioning then is closed under deductions, science will then
sanction any assertion, which of course would render any ontological naturalism obsolete.
This problem, however, must be solvable by adequately qualifying scientific sanctioning in
the presence of inconsistencies.
As argued, Ney’s closed, biconditional naturalism might be such that she can avoid Carnap’s
challenge for the assertions of core metaphysic by deflecting the problem to physics. Physics
contains successful assertions about the thing in itself and by adequately basing metaphysics
on these assertions, metaphysics avoids the challenge: this is her simple idea. Again, this is
the strategy proposed by Blackburn. The physics community as a whole endorses scientific
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realism and this scientifically sanctions scientific realism. Wanting no more from metaphysics
than what can be achieved with the assumption of scientific realism, Ney finds scientific
realism to entitle realism with respect to core metaphysics. However, Carnap’s challenge
finds positions exactly such as realism problematic. Any attempt to stipulate the relation
between the linguistic frameworks endorsed by the physics community and the thing in
itself is either an assertion within a framework, which would deflate the claim, or merely
interpreted as a pragmatic suggestion for the adoption of a particular linguistic framework.
From this perspective, it might be better for the naturalist to back down on scientific realism,
if this is the cause of the problem. This is the third knob, which will be turned below.
4.4.2 Changing the ontological naturalism
The first proposal above was to see what might be achieved by changing the imposed
ontological naturalism. While Ney imposes a very strong ontological naturalism with strong
requirements to scientific sanctioning, it might perhaps be fruitful to loosen both.
Loosening the biconditional restriction itself would result in the weaker trumping naturalism.
As an imperative, this was explicated as: Accept p, if science sanctions p. Along with
the imperative restriction, trumping naturalism introduced the trumping restriction that
that there is no assertion, p, such that p is a logically implied by metaphysics and ¬p is
scientifically sanctioned: ∀p (¬(M ` p ∧ SA(¬p))). Following trumping naturalism, there
might be assertions in metaphysics that are not sanctioned by science as long as science does
not sanction its negation. Metaphysics has a significant autonomy form science. As long as
metaphysics distances itself from science, it can avoid any intervention from science. For a
metaphysicist this might be good news, but as a means to follow Blackburn’s argumentative
scheme, trumping naturalism is not strict enough. The naturalist wants to defend the
possibility of metaphysics with reference to the possibility of science and an adequately close
relation between science and metaphysics. Arguably, this is not achieved with trumping
naturalism. Blackburn’s argumentative scheme can simply not be carried out under the
assumption of trumping naturalism. It seems that biconditional naturalism is required for
this scheme. Therefore, trumping naturalism is not a solution to the problems faced by Ney
in the light of Carnap’s challenge. Trumping naturalism makes things even worse.
The other knob one might turn concerns the requirements for scientific sanctioning. For an
assertion to be scientifically sanctioned as a metaphysical assertion, Ney requires that it
asserts something about a strongly indispensable representational element that is regarded
to be metaphysically significant by the physics community. From the point of view that one
merely wants the scientifically sanctioned assertions to be those assertions that stand in an
appropriate relation to science such that in can inherit the legitimacy of science, this seems
to be unnecessarily restrict. An assertion made about a representational element that is not
strongly indispensable is regarded by Ney to be merely expressive; it is regarded as something
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that expresses the preference for a particular conceptual scheme. It is quite curious why Ney
does not regard these to be assertive as well. It is not claimed that these are true. Such
assertions about representational elements that are not strongly indispensable cannot be
sanctioned as true because this would imply that both an assertion and its negation were
sanctioned as true. This has the aforementioned consequences. However, such a statement
might nevertheless be sanctioned as an assertion whose truth-value it yet undetermined.
Ney appears to deny this. She maintains that such statements cannot be assertive, and
that this results from them being subject to Carnap’s challenge. Instead, they must be
regarded as expressive. In this way a representational element might undergo a curious
transformation. As long as there are more competing frameworks that disagree about a
particular representational element, any statement about the this representational element
is expressive. However, as physics develops, one of these frameworks might perhaps be
abandoned by the physics community. All of a sudden, the representational element has
genuine significance and assertions can be made about it. Regarded thus, it is very difficult to
see what changed about the statement since it went from being expressive to being assertive.
A framework was abandoned, but the claim, supposedly, was made in the same way and
in the same framework. Why then, would it suddenly be assertive rather than expressive?
Why was it not assertive all along?
Presented in this way, it is difficult to see how Ney can require strong indispensability as
a condition that must be met for a claim to be scientifically sanctioned as an assertion.
It is simply arbitrary to distinguish between the strongly indispensable representational
elements, and those representational elements that are not strongly indispensable. This
suggestion also fits well with Ney’s description of the frameworks of fundamental physics as
competing accounts of the truth. Being such competing accounts, their respective implied
metaphysics must similarly be different proposals for the correct metaphysics. Nothing
is lost for Ney, I argue, by changing the restriction on scientific sanctioning in this way.
However, nothing is achieved either. Loosening the scientific sanctioning this way does not
avoid the external claims that are problematic due to Carnap’s challenge. Rather, they
become more numerous. To abandon the requirement for strong indispensability for scientific
sanctioning merely allows that many more claims are sanctioned as assertions about the
thing in itself. The problem according to Carnap is that there are no such assertions. These
are pseudo-assertions that at worst are cognitively meaningless and at best are pragmatic
proposals for the adoption of a linguistic framework.
Another way of loosening the requirements for scientific sanctioning are those already
mentioned by Ney. She discusses whether to allow for more physics-based metaphysical
reasoning. This might involve metaphysical judgements about what representational elements
are metaphysically significant, to allow metaphysicists to decide between competing theories,
and perhaps even to allow metaphysicists to develop or re-include theories that are not
taken seriously by the physics community. None of these can be allowed, according to Ney,
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because it is the physics community that has proven itself by its track record of success. To
allow for such metaphysical reasoning would make any result of this reasoning suspicious
because metaphysics is the primary subject of Carnap’s challenge. Every judgement must
ultimately be made by the scientific community because it is the beliefs of this community
alone, according to Ney, that avoids Carnap’s challenge. But these beliefs do not in fact
avoid Carnap’s challenge, nevertheless, Ney’s remarks still signify why such a loosening of
the requirements to scientific sanctioning would not achieve anything if the aim is to show
how naturalized metaphysics is an answer to how metaphysics is possible.
If anything, the already strong requirements imposed by Ney must be strengthened further.
The essence of Ney’s requirements is that a claim is only sanctioned as an assertion about
the thing in itself if the scientific community endorses that claim as such an assertion. To
strengthen Ney’s requirement, one must therefore try to impose restriction of what beliefs
held by the scientific community justify such a scientific sanctioning. Perhaps, the most
obvious suggestion would be to insists that the sanctioning should be limited to assertions
with empirical content that are also endorsed by the physics community. However, this
will not solve the problem for naturalized metaphysics either. The problem is the one
that Ney attributes to Quine that “we don’t even have objective, not-merely-pragmatic
standards of verification within science” (Ney 2012, 62 fn 9). The framework-dependence
is not avoided by empirical assertions. Every attempt at an assertion made outside all
linguistic frameworks is vulnerable to Carnap’s challenge. Such assertions are simply pseudo-
assertions. This is so regardless of whether they are empirical or non-empirical. The only
viable solution would be to require that only assertions made within a linguistic framework
are scientifically sanctioned. This would indeed avoid the problem that some scientifically
sanctioned assertions are pseudo-assertions. However, it would in turn mean that none
of the scientifically sanctioned assertions were possible members of metaphysics, as they
would not be about the thing in itself. There would be no metaphysical assertions among
the scientifically sanctioned assertion. Consequently, imposing the biconditional restriction
would make the collection of metaphysical assertions empty, as it would restrict the assertions
available as metaphysical assertion to those that are scientifically sanctioned.
This indicates how changing the requirements for scientific sanctioning is not a way for the
proponents of naturalized metaphysics to demonstrate how a particular variant of naturalized
metaphysics is actually possible.
4.4.3 Backing down on scientific realism
As I have established, any attempt to state realism as an objective and not-merely-pragmatic
position fails. There is no way to state scientific realism outside a framework. There is
no such point of view available. Scientific realism shares similarities with nominalism and
Platonism. In a realist framework, scientific realism is true, just like ’There are abstract
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entities’ is true in the Platonist framework. This framework-dependence is unavoidable
despite stipulations such as ’Realism is really true’. There is no such position as scientific
realism and therefore, this position cannot be endorsed by the scientific community. With
scientific realism, science is just as problematic as metaphysics.
The naturalists who follow Blackburn’s argumentative scheme might therefore back down
on this scientific realism. As argued in section 3.1, this is allowable for the naturalist since
nothing in ontological naturalism and the naturalist view of science requires scientific realism.
The first suggestion would perhaps initially be to adopt scientific anti-realism. Of course, if
Ney is right, this is not the view adopted by the scientific community, however, as argued
the scientific community cannot adopt scientific realism anyway, at least not as anything
but an unforced choice of framework. In this sense, scientific realism cannot be sanctioned
by science either. As already explicated, scientific anti-realism states that science is not
about the thing in itself. The thing in itself is regarded as underdetermined by scientific
investigations. Scientific anti-realism is, as expected, the negation of scientific realism. This,
however, pose a problem for scientific anti-realism. If scientific realism is a pseudo-statement,
then the negation of the position must be a pseudo-statement as well. Scientific anti-realism
rejects that there is a direct representational relation between assertions within the scientific
framework and the thing in itself. The thing in itself is unavailable in such a way that
scientific assertions are not about the thing in itself, but the problem is an epistemological
one, according to the scientific anti-realists. Explicated thus, it is evident why scientific
anti-realism must be just as problematic as scientific realism. A claim is still made about the
relation between the assertions within the scientific framework and the thing in itself, a claim
that appears to be an attempt at a theoretic, external claim. If it is merely claimed that
there is a framework in which it is true to say that the framework of science does not directly
represent the thing in itself, then it can be regarded as an assertion, but one that as signified
is made internally to a framework. This, however, is not what scientific anti-realism seems
to amount to. Scientific anti-realism as a thesis is a pseudo-statement just like scientific
realism. It is no more available as a thesis than scientific realism.
If a proponent of naturalized metaphysics wants to avoid the problems resulting from
scientific realism, she must instead adopt instrumentalism. This is the position that rejects
the discussion between the scientific realists and anti-realists over the relation between science
and the thing in itself. According to the instrumentalist, there is no such discussion. We
can employ any linguistic framework that we want for science. This includes both realist
and anti-realist frameworks. As suggested by Quine above, this is not the same as adopting
conventionalism. In Quine’s words this would be to confuse truth with evidential support,
however, it is ultimately a pragmatic question which framework to adopt. Once a framework
is adopted, there are theoretical questions and claims, some of which are true and some of
which are false, some of which are synthetic and some of which are analytic. However, as
assertions they must be evaluated within the framework in which they are asserted. Adopting
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instrumentalism would still allow for discussions such as the one conducted by Ney over the
metaphysical significance of every representational element of a physical theory. It could still
be asked whether “the physics community intends every representational element of its best
theories to correspond to something in reality” (Ney 2012, 64). However, it would require
that a framework was in place with semantic rules for the term ’reality’. If the discussion,
on the other hand, is intended to question whether to adopt a local scientific realism or
anti-realism, the instrumentalist, just like Carnap, will reject the discussion as meaningless.
If the debate concerns how this representational element relates to the thing in itself, then
there must either be a framework in place with semantic rules for ’the thing in itself’ or
the debate must be regarded as meaningless unless it concerns what framework would be
pragmatically preferable with respect to some given aim.
Such an instrumentalism is certainly available even in the light of Carnap’s challenge. Thus,
with this view of science, science avoids the problems that it faced with the attempted
assumption of scientific realism. The instrumentalist simply takes the question regarding the
relation between science and the thing in itself to be a pseudo-question. The instrumentalists
view is the view endorsed by Quine above. However, once instrumentalism is adopted it is
difficult to see how a deference of metaphysics to instrumentalist science will instruct how
metaphysics can succeed with assertions about the thing in itself. What is this deference
to the findings of science supposed to achieve? As already argued in 3.1, a metaphysics
based on instrumentalist science will supposedly be an instrumentalist metaphysics. This
point is also made by Ney. To quote her again: “if the physics community as a whole were
instrumentalists about their theories, then I grant there would be something seriously wrong
with trying to using fundamental physical theories to inform metaphysical claims.(Ney 2012,
64). If the physics community adopts instrumentalism, then naturalized metaphysics must
adopt the resulting framework-dependence of physics and thereby not adhere to the proposed
condition for metaphysics. Denouncing scientific realism and adopting instrumentalism is
not a viable strategy in the attempt to establish that naturalized metaphysics is an answer
to how metaphysics is possible. The resulting naturalized metaphysics would not instruct us
how to succeed with assertions about the thing in itself. A metaphysics of instrumentalist
science would be a metaphysics of linguistic frameworks; not of the thing in itself.
4.5 Naturalized metaphysics is impossible
The previous section considers a number of variations that can be made to Ney’s naturalized
metaphysics, and it is demonstrated how none of them fares any better in avoiding Carnap’s
challenge. Naturalized metaphysics is an answer to how metaphysics is possible if meta-
physics is possible only when ontological naturalism is obeyed. However, as demonstrated,
metaphysics is no more possible with respect to Carnap’s challenge as naturalized meta-
physics than as non-naturalized. Therefore, naturalized metaphysics is not an answer to how
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metaphysics is possible unless or until Carnap’s challenge can be refuted. For now at least,
metaphysics is not possible as naturalized metaphysics. Relating metaphysics to the findings
of science does not instruct us how to succeed with assertions about the thing in itself. Just
as emphasized by Quine, the problem is ultimately that science is just as vulnerable to
Carnap’s challenge as metaphysics. Therefore, to require a deference of metaphysics to the
findings of science achieves nothing. Neither metaphysics nor the findings of science can be
assertions about the thing in itself, or more appropriately, since the former statement is also
a pseudo-statement, both the assertions of metaphysics and those of science must be made
within a framework.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
No assertion can be made objectively and absolutely. No assertion can be made about
the thing in itself. Indeed, these assertions cannot be made either. They are also pseudo-
assertions. Strictly, it is unavailable to us to say what these alleged assertions attempt to say.
All we can do is to ask which linguistic framework they are asserted in. If no indications are
given, we must simply capitulate and maintain that we do not understand what is said. This
proves the strength and scope of Carnap’s challenge. It is not just a challenge to metaphysics
but to all assertions including those of science. This is why it is impossible to overcome with
naturalized metaphysics.
This project has established a necessary condition for metaphysics that was shared by the
proponents of naturalized metaphysics: ’Attempts at metaphysics are successful only if they
result in assertions about the thing in itself’. For this to be an assertion, it must be an
assertion within a linguistic framework. For this to be an assertion, there must be semantic
rules in place for ’metaphysics’, ’assertion’, and ’the thing in itself’ among many others. Any
attempt made throughout this project at objective and absolute reference to the thing in
itself has been a pseudo-statement. Indeed, this makes pseudo-statements rather numerous
in the present project. There is no way to assert that metaphysical or scientific assertions do
or do not represent the thing in itself. So what then is the conclusion of the present project?
Simply that when alleged metaphysical assertions are challenged to somehow indicate in
what linguistic framework the assertions are made, no metaphysically acceptable answer can
be provided; this is the case for both naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics. Any
answer will prove the apparently metaphysical disputes to be non-theoretical pragmatic
disputes concerned with linguistic conventions of different linguistic framework or perhaps
ordinary assertions within a framework like ’There is really a white piece of paper on my
desk’ and ’There is a prime number greater than a hundred’. While the question might
immediately be avoidable by appropriately relating one’s metaphysics to science, this merely
deflects the question to science. Essentially, what has been demonstrated in the previous
chapter is that Carnap’s challenge is equally significant to metaphysics and to realist science
with the consequence that deference to the findings of science does nothing to avoid this
challenge. Similarly, it has been argued that it is not an alternative to explicate how the
metaphysical assertions are made within the linguistic framework of the scientific community.
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This will reinstate the framework-dependence, because second order assertions about the
relation between linguistic frameworks and the thing in itself are equally problematic. Also
they must be pseudo-assertions unless they are made within a framework. This problem, as
argued in section 4.4, cannot be avoided no matter what variations of ontological naturalism
that are defended.
Metaphysics is an attempt to change the mode of speech and particularly to change the
mode of evaluation so that it is not conducted within linguistic frameworks. It is this move
that causes the problems of metaphysics with respect to Carnap’s challenge. This move
is simply impossible. It is not only impossible for metaphysics but for any field of inquiry.
Carnap’s challenge is a challenge to metaphysics because it is metaphysics that attempts
this move. It is a problem for naturalized metaphysics because naturalized metaphysics
attempts to make this move for science, or argues that the move is already made in science
qua possible. In that case, relating metaphysics to science should solve the problem. This,
however, is not a way to avoid Carnap’s challenge. Again, it is just as significant for science
as it is for metaphysics. It is equally significant for any inquiry that attempts to move
beyond the discourse internal to frameworks. Again, in Quine’s words: “What evaporates
is the transcendental question of the reality of the external world – the question whether
or how far our science measures up to the Ding an sich” (Quine 1981, 22). This question
about the thing in itself is a pseudo-question whether it is asked with respect to metaphysics
or to science. Ultimately, this is why naturalized metaphysics is no solution to Carnap’s
challenge and consequently, Carnap’s challenge is the reason why naturalized metaphysics is
not a successful answer to how metaphysics is possible. In the light of Carnap’s challenge,
naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics are equally impossible. When the proponents
of naturalized metaphysics are suspicious towards traditional analytic metaphysics, they
should be just as suspicious towards their own naturalized metaphysics and even towards
their precious realist science. All are equally vulnerable to Carnap’s challenge because they
all require that their successful assertions must be about the thing in itself. With this
requirement, there is apparently no way out of Carnap’s challenge, any attempt to assert
how an assertion relates to the thing in itself must itself be asserted within a linguistic
framework. Any attempt to assert how a linguistic framework or how some assertion within
a linguistic framework relates to the thing in itself must also be asserted within a linguistic
framework ad infinitum.
To conclude, all naturalized metaphysics is impossible until or unless Carnap’s challenge is
refuted.
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